

STUBLEY PHOTO LIBRARY
1000 10th Ave. S.W.
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93940-5000

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/ AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.	
b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE			
PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If Applicable) 38	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School	
c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000		7b. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code) Monterey, CA 93943-5000	
a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If Applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
c. ADDRESS (city, state, and ZIP code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
1. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Detering Nuclear-Armed Third World Dictators: A Targeting Strategy for the Emerging Threat			
2. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) David J. Gellene			
3a. TYPE OF REPORT Master's Thesis	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (year, month, day) June 1992	15. PAGE COUNT 148
6. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
7. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The continuing efforts of several developing nations to acquire nuclear weapons indicates that the United States may be required to implement a deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World. Therefore, U.S. decision-makers must re-evaluate the conceptual foundations of American deterrence policy. This research suggests a solution to the problem of deterring nuclear-capable Third World nations from using nuclear weapons against the United States, its allies and friends. The new deterrence policy is based on the theory of omnibalancing which predicts that the Third World dictators are strongly influenced by perceived internal threats to their regime. Successful deterrence, therefore, is dependent on holding at risk the mechanisms used by Third World authoritarian regimes to maintain internal control. Although developing a nuclear deterrence policy against Third World dictators is critical to the security of the United States, there has been a hesitancy for Western analysts to consider the problem of Third World nuclear deterrence because they either perceive that these regimes are irrational and therefore non-deterrable or they believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal in itself will provide deterrence. This analysis addresses the flaws of these perceptions and offers an analytical basis for new U.S. strategic thinking about deterrence and the Third World. A deterrence policy based on omnibalancing can be a viable means of preventing Third World nuclear use against the United States and its interests.			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL James J. Wirtz		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (408) 646-3483	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL Code NS Wz

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**Deterring Nuclear-Armed Third World Dictators:
A Targeting Strategy for the Emerging Threat**

by

David J. Gellene

Lieutenant, United States Navy

B.S. United States Naval Academy, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS**

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1992

ABSTRACT

The continuing efforts of several developing nations to acquire nuclear weapons indicates that the United States may be required to implement a deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World. Therefore, U. S. decision-makers must re-evaluate the conceptual foundations of American deterrence policy. This research suggests a solution to the problem of deterring nuclear-capable Third World nations from using nuclear weapons against the United States, its allies and friends. The new deterrence policy is based on the theory of omnibalancing which predicts that the Third World dictators are strongly influenced by perceived internal threats to their regime. Successful deterrence, therefore, is dependent on holding at risk the mechanisms used by Third World authoritarian regimes to maintain internal control. Although developing a nuclear deterrence policy against Third World dictators is critical to the security of the United States, there has been a hesitancy for Western analysts to consider the problem of Third World nuclear deterrence because they either perceive that these regimes are irrational and therefore non-deterrable or they believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal in itself will provide deterrence. This analysis addresses the flaws of these perceptions and offers an analytical basis for new U.S. strategic thinking about deterrence and the Third World. A deterrence policy based on omnibalancing can be a viable means of preventing Third World nuclear use against the United States and its interests.

10013
G259575
C.1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With the end of the Cold War and the potential for reduced tension between the United States and the former Soviet Union, there is little likelihood of nuclear warfare between the superpowers. The recent war in the Middle East and the current focus on the security threat of nuclear proliferation, however, has introduced a requirement for a different emphasis in nuclear deterrence. This analysis is a first step in the development of a deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World armed with nuclear weapons.

A review of the concept of deterrence, reveals that the coercive strategies applicable to deterring Third World nuclear use are those of denial and punishment. A denial strategy is defensive in nature. The United States needs technological solutions to the defensive problem, such as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes in the case of ballistic missile delivery systems, in combination with conventional preemptive attacks against Third World nuclear capabilities. The coercive strategy of punishment must threaten the value system of the targeted regime. The development of this punishment threat is the focus of this study.

It is assumed that the decision-making of the authoritarian leaders is influenced by the factors described in Steven David's theory of omnibalancing. Specifically, these regimes perceive that their base of power is vulnerable to internal security threats. A deterrence policy based on a punishment strategy must take advantage of this perception by targeting the mechanisms on which the regime relies for internal control. Two methods of internal control are significant: suppression and economic distribution.

The most common means of suppressing internal opposition is the use of elite security forces. Since they are included in the regime's core following, their loyalty can be assumed to be high. The regime leadership depends on these forces not only to counter domestic

civilian unrest but also to suppress any potential rebellion in the general military forces. Targeting the control mechanism of suppression translates into threatening to destroy the elite forces and the command and control network connecting these forces to the regime's leadership.

Economic distribution as a control mechanism refers to the use of monetary rewards to ensure loyalty with the implied threat of interruption of financial benefits for disloyal behavior. This method of control obviously requires a constant flow of wealth to the regime for subsequent payments. For the majority of Third World nations, this source of revenue is derived from few, if not just one, export product. Targeting the means of economic distribution translates into attacks on the source, storage or transportation facilities related to exports.

If implemented, a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing shares similarities with the arguments stated by advocates of the Carter administration's justification for the nuclear targeting shift codified by Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59). Therefore, the criticisms of PD-59 serve as an applicable test of the viability of omnibalancing for deterrence.

An analysis of the requirements for PD-59 revealed a critical intelligence failure in the U.S. capability for locating counter-control targets. While recent examples of U.S. interventions in the Third World demonstrated similar shortcomings, the characteristics inherent in Third World nations indicate that associated intelligence failures are more dependent upon a lack of committed resources rather than on the nature of the problem. Third World borders are readily penetrated by technical or human intelligence assets. Additionally, the control structure in Third World dictatorships is indicative of an authoritarian regime but not a totalitarian system based on the Soviet model and can therefore be more readily isolated and identified than could the control mechanisms of the former Soviet Union. The targeting strategy of PD-59 was also criticized for its questionable

assumption that once the internal control mechanisms were destroyed, the population would rise up to overthrow the Soviet regime. This criticism may have validity regarding the Third World. Analyses of American attacks on Libya and Iraq demonstrate the difficulty in predicting Third World domestic responses to military strikes against the regime. As a threat, however, deterrence addresses the perceptions of the regime leadership rather than the desires of the population. In this regard, there is substantial evidence that Third World leaders behave and make decisions in accordance with the theory of omnibalancing. Therefore, for the maintenance of deterrence, threatening the possibility for revolt becomes more significant than the potential for actual rebellion.

Finally, critics of PD-59 argue that the targeting requirements were beyond the actual U.S. military capability to implement. Additionally, a lack of defense against a Soviet counter-strike in a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction made deterrence incredible. Third World regimes do not possess a secure second-strike capability against the United States. The relatively small size of Third World nations, the concentration of control mechanisms of suppression and economic distribution in a handful of cities, and vulnerable nuclear delivery systems result in a targeting strategy that is well within present U.S. capabilities.

By implementing a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing, the United States would threaten the overthrow of the aggressor regime through the destruction of the mechanisms of internal control. There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the development of a deterrence policy based on this concept: (1) wars waged by the United States against Third World nuclear powers should be restricted to limited objectives; (2) the distinction between declaratory policy and employment policy will likely be significant if deterrence fails; and (3) the Third World perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons can lead to a situation of mutual deterrence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. DEFINING THE THIRD WORLD	1
B. THE NEED FOR NEW THINKING ABOUT DETERRENCE	4
1. The Emerging Threat	4
2. Western Perceptions of Regime Behavior	6
C. A DETERRENCE POLICY FOR THE THIRD WORLD	9
D. ORGANIZATION	11
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRING THIRD WORLD DICTATORS	12
A. TYPES OF DETERRENCE	15
B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE	16
1. Threat Credibility	17
2. Signalling the Threat	22
3. Aggressor's Cost Benefit Analysis	31
4. Rationality	33
C. COERCIVE STRATEGIES FOR DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE	37
1. Retaliation	37
2. Denial	38
3. Punishment	39
D. LESSONS OF MAD	40
E. COERCIVE STRATEGY FOR THE THIRD WORLD	44
III. OMNIBALANCING AND THIRD WORLD DETERRENCE	47
A. INTERNAL THREATS AND OMNIBALANCING	47
1. Externalization of Internal Threats and Scapegoat Wars	52

B. MECHANISMS OF INTERNAL CONTROL	60
1. Clientelism and Regime Legitimacy	60
2. Internal Control Through Suppression	63
3. Internal Control Through Economic Distribution	65
C. TARGETING INTERNAL CONTROL	68
1. Targeting Suppression	68
2. Targeting Economic Distribution	69
D. CONCLUSION	75
IV. COMPARISON OF OMNIBALANCING TO PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59	77
A. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59	77
1. Historical Setting	77
2. Targeting Shift	79
3. The Utility of Ethnic Targeting	81
B. THE CRITICISMS OF PD-59 AND THIRD WORLD DETERRENCE	84
1. Shortcomings of Intelligence	84
2. The Effects of Counter-Control Targeting	88
3. The Response of the Soviet Population	92
4. Lack of American Capability	101
C. CONCLUSION	104
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	107
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	107
B. CONCLUSIONS	110
1. Limited Objectives of War	110
2. Declaratory vs. Employment Policy	111
3. Mutual Deterrence	112
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY	114

1. The Utility of U.S. Nuclear Weapons	115
2. The Applicability of Omnibalancing to Third Party Deterrence	117
WORKS CITED	120
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	133

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last four decades, American nuclear deterrence policy has been focused on the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China. While the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons remains small, the continuing efforts of several developing nations to acquire nuclear capabilities indicate that the United States may be required to implement a deterrence policy aimed at Third World regimes. Therefore, U.S. decision-makers must re-evaluate the conceptual foundations of American deterrence policy. This research suggests a solution to the problem of deterring nuclear-capable Third World nations from using nuclear weapons against the United States, its allies and friends.

A. DEFINING THE THIRD WORLD

To appreciate the nature of the threat these nations pose, it is first necessary to define what is meant by the term "Third World nuclear regime." The label "Third World" may be a misnomer considering the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the "Second World."¹ The Third World states included in the membership of the United Nations refer to themselves as the Group of 77.² Recent literature, however, still refers to the developing nations as the Third

¹ Kurt C. Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss argue that with the collapse of Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe, nations are more accurately described as being members of either the oil-rich and industrialized "north" or the poor and developing "south." Kurt C. Campbell and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Third World in the Wake of Eastern Europe," The Washington Quarterly 14 (Spring 1991): 98.

² Paul Lewis, "Disaster Aid Plan Upsets Third World," New York Times, 13 November 1991, A4. The term "Group of 77" was first coined in the early 1970's and the number no longer describes its membership which currently exceeds 100.

World.³ For the purposes of this discussion, the term "Third World" will be used. While this analysis examines the general behavior of Third World leaders, the focus will be on authoritarian regimes. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg define an authoritarian regime as "an arbitrary and usually a personal government that uses law and the coercive instruments of the state to expedite its own purposes of monopolizing power and denies the political rights and opportunities of all other groups to compete for that power."⁴ In this analysis, the label "authoritarian regime," as defined by Jackson and Rosberg, will be used synonymously with the term "dictatorship."

To determine a pattern of behavior in the Third World, common characteristics must be found to exist among these nations. One such trait is a former colonial background. It is true that exceptions to this criteria exist and that a colonial past is not the only recognized indicator of Third World status. If that were the case, the United States would also be included in this category. A common colonial experience, however, suggests a shared political background in Third World authoritarian governments.⁵

Former colonial status is the basis for one characteristic that helps explain the decision-making of Third World dictators: the arbitrariness of national borders. In the majority of cases, Third World borders were established by the colonizing powers without due regard for indigenous cultures or ethnic groups. Mohammed Ayoob states that "[d]efined...primarily by boundaries drawn by the colonial powers...[Third World nations] have not yet developed

³ For a historical review of the origins of the term "Third World," see Leslie Wolf-Phillips, "Why 'Third World'?: Origin Definition and Usage," Third World Quarterly 9 (October 1987): 1311 - 1327.

⁴ Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 23.

⁵ Caroline Thomas lists an ex-colonial status as the primary criteria of Third World nations. She also includes, however, a degree of social deprivation and a technological dependence on the industrialized world as additional criteria. Caroline Thomas, In Search of Security, The Third World in International Relations (Boulder: Lynne Runner Publishers, 1987), 2 - 3.

the capacity to ensure the habitual identification of their populations with their respective states...."⁶ In fact, some ethnic populations were divided by the imposition of borders. One example of this situation is the Kurdish people of the Middle East who occupy adjacent territories of Iraq, Iran and Turkey.

The artificiality of these Third World borders results in a narrow support base for the authoritarian regime. Various subnational groups with differing cultures and social structures often live within national borders.⁷ A domestic political consensus, therefore, rarely exists, which weakens attempts to form a "national consensus."⁸ This low level of domestic support results in the nation's leadership representing the desires of a selected few, if not only one, of many subnational groups. The ruling regime competes with other social and political bodies for control of power. Domestic stability is dependent on the success of either the development of political compromise between groups or the regime's use of coercion to suppress opposition.

Arbitrary borders and a restricted support base result in weak legitimacy of the Third World authoritarian leadership.⁹ Without the sanction of popular support, a regime ruling a nation that is not politically or ethnically homogeneous will be perceived as illegitimate by the majority of the domestic society. This does not imply that internal opposition is united. Each group, not represented by the ruling party, will support its own leaders and political goals.

⁶ Mohammed Ayoob, "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?," International Affairs 60 (Winter 1983-1984): 45.

⁷ Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43 (January 1991): 239.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., 240.

What emerges from these characteristics is a model of authoritarian Third World regimes. It is a model of a dictatorship, backed by a minority group, which lacks credibility and support of the majority of the heterogeneous population. Because of this, the regime is in a constant struggle to maintain domestic stability. While this model may apply to a large number of nations, the set of authoritarian states can be reduced further by considering those regimes with a potential nuclear capability, such as Iran, Iraq or Libya. It is this group of Third World powers that is the focus of this research.

B. THE NEED FOR NEW THINKING ABOUT DETERRENCE

There are two reasons why developing a nuclear deterrence policy against Third World dictators is critical to the security of the United States. First, the number of potential Third World regimes with a capability to produce nuclear weapons is growing. Second, there has been a hesitancy for Western analysts to consider the problem of Third World nuclear deterrence because they either perceive that these regimes are irrational and therefore non-deterrable or they believe that the U.S. nuclear arsenal in itself will provide deterrence. Both of these issues will be briefly addressed.

1. The Emerging Threat

Presently, only the United States, Great Britain, France, the Commonwealth of Independent States and China are declared nuclear powers.¹⁰ There is a general consensus among analysts, however, that Israel has probably between 50-100 nuclear weapons and South Africa and India have the capability for weapons production.¹¹ In February 1992, an official from the Pakistani Foreign Ministry admitted that his country also had acquired the

¹⁰ Leonard S. Spector with Jacqueline R. Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 5.

¹¹ Ibid. India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 and Spector speculates that South Africa may have conducted a nuclear test detonation in 1979 with Israeli assistance.

capability to produce an atomic bomb.¹² That same month, Robert M. Gates, the Director of Central Intelligence, testified before Congress that North Korea may be only a few months away from possessing nuclear weapons.¹³ Iran, Iraq and Libya also have been acknowledged by analysts to be actively pursuing a nuclear capability.¹⁴ Since the end of the Gulf War, U.N. inspection teams have uncovered evidence suggesting that Iraq was closer to possessing a nuclear device than Western intelligence sources had previously thought. In March 1992, there was concern in the Bush administration that Iran may have gained access to former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons that had been stored in Kazakhstan.¹⁵

Of all these examples, Iran, Iraq and Libya are perhaps the most worrisome for U.S. military planners because, in the last decade, all three have been involved in hostilities with the United States. In fact, a recent study by the Center for Naval Analyses, generated scenarios recognize these three nations as potential opponents in a future nuclear conflict with the United States.¹⁶ Iraq and Libya also match the model describing authoritarian Third World regimes. Therefore, due to the recognized nuclear potential of these countries and,

¹² Paul Lewis, "Pakistan Tells of Its A-Bomb Capacity," New York Times, 8 February 1992, I5.

¹³ Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Chief Doubts North Korean Vow on Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 26 February 1992, A1 and A6. It should be noted that the State Department disputed Gates's testimony and argued that North Korea would require at least two years before obtaining a nuclear capability. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Agencies Split Over North Korea," New York Times, 10 March 1992, A1 and A8.

¹⁴ Spector with Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990, 143.

¹⁵ Philip J. Hilts, "Tally of Ex-Soviets' A-Arms Stirs Worry," New York Times, 16 March 1992, A3.

¹⁶ Other scenarios with potential American involvement are conflicts between Pakistan and India and between South Korea and North Korea. Jerome H. Kahan, Hedging Against the Unthinkable: U.S. Military Responses to Third World Nuclear Crisis, Professional Paper 484 (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1990), 39 - 47.

in the case of Iraq and Libya, the nature of their governments, this discussion will also emphasize these nations.¹⁷

2. Western Perceptions of Regime Behavior

There are two conflicting arguments concerning the receptiveness of authoritarian Third World leaders to nuclear deterrent threats. The first proposes that the regime leadership is incapable of rational decision-making. The second argument is that the existence of a stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons will deter potential proliferators regardless of the leadership type. Yet, proponents of these arguments fail to justify their positions with analytical evidence.

In the late 1970's, advocates of the "irrational regime" argument proposed that nations newly acquiring nuclear capabilities did not have the benefit of the deterrence experience of the United States and Soviet Union; the emerging nuclear powers were immature in regards to nuclear deterrence issues and thus unpredictable and irresponsible in their decision-making.¹⁸ Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, echoes this sentiment in his 1992 Report to Congress.¹⁹ The implication of this view was that nuclear weapons in the hands of these regimes would increase the likelihood for nuclear war. Yair Evron argues this point concerning the Middle East:

[T]he level of rationality of some of the leaders in the Arab world and the highly irresponsible behavior of some of the other leaders...suggest that

¹⁷ One obvious omission in this list of potential Third World nuclear adversaries of the United States is North Korea. While it is recognized that a nuclear-armed North Korea must be accounted for in any U.S. deterrence policy, the totalitarian government and homogeneous population of this state precludes the application of a deterrence policy aimed at Third World authoritarian regimes. For further discussion on the nature of the North Korean regime see John Curtis Perry, "Dateline North Korea: A Communist Holdout," Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990): 172 - 191.

¹⁸ Onkar Marwah, "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy," International Security 2 (Fall 1977): 114.

¹⁹ Secretary Cheney described nations such as Iraq as "hostile and irresponsible." Department of Defense, Report of The Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress February 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), 7.

nuclear weapons in the Middle East...might in fact lead to the first full-scale nuclear war....²⁰

Evron's view implies that the irresponsibility of Middle East leaders may lead to inadvertent nuclear escalation.

Prior to the Gulf War, a slightly different argument was proposed. Advocates of initiating conflict against President Saddam Hussein of Iraq justified their position by emphasizing the despicable nature of the Iraqi leader. Once Hussein acquired nuclear weapons, he would not be deterred from their use because he was "not constrained by conscience"²¹ or by neither "international law, nor traditional norms of international behavior...."²² Dr. William R. Graham stated in Congressional testimony: "[Saddam Hussein] has demonstrated his disregard for...standards of civilized behavior...."²³ The implication of these views is that Hussein is non-deterrable.

Contrasting these assessments of Third World leadership behavior is an argument that these regimes, armed with nuclear weapons, will behave no differently than would be expected of the superpowers. Kenneth N. Waltz proposes that the mere possession of nuclear weapons leads to rationality in decision-making:

[Many] analysts emphasize the importance of *who* the new nuclear states will be and dwell on the question of whether their rulers will be 'rational'...Nuclear peace depends not on rulers and those around them

²⁰ Yair Evron, "Nuclear Weapons for Israel?," Commentary 61 (February 1976): 6.

²¹ Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 4-6, 12-14, 17, 19-20 December 1990, 49.

²² Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 11, 13 September, 27-30 November, 3 December 1990, 537.

²³ Ibid.

being rational but on their aversion to running catastrophic risks.¹⁴

This statement implies that the American nuclear deterrence policy designed for the Soviets may apply to other nations as well. Waltz states:

[New] nuclear states will confront the possibilities and feel the constraints that present nuclear states have experienced...Nations that have nuclear weapons have strong incentives to use them responsibly...Because they do, the measured spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than feared.¹⁵

Therefore, the emergence of new nuclear-armed nations, according to Waltz, is not cause for re-examining U.S. deterrence policy.

Waltz's conclusion that nuclear proliferation is potentially beneficial has been supported empirically by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker.¹⁶ While they do not advocate widespread proliferation, they conclude that a situation in which adversaries are both armed with nuclear weapons can theoretically increase the prospects for peace.¹⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to President Carter, argues along these lines in regards to a future nuclear-armed Iraq. "Israel already has nuclear weapons and can thus deter Iraq, while the United States has certainly both the power to deter or to destroy Iraq. Deterrence has worked in the past"¹⁸ The implication of Brzezinski's claims is not intuitively accurate. The nuclear deterrence policy aimed at the former Soviet Union was based on more than just the existence of American nuclear weapons. It was

¹⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better, Adelphi Paper No. 171 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981), 21. Emphasis in original.

¹⁵ Ibid., 30.

¹⁶ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (June 1982): 283 - 306.

¹⁷ Ibid., 306.

¹⁸ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, Part I, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 4-5 December 1990, 171.

focused on threatening the Soviet's values. For example, the 1983 Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces defines deterrence of the Soviet Union in the following way:

Deterrence is not an abstract notion amenable to simple quantification. Still less is it a mirror image of what would deter ourselves. Deterrence is the set of beliefs in the minds of the Soviet leaders, given their own values and attitudes, about our capabilities and our will. It requires us to determine, as best we can, what would deter them from considering aggression, even in a crisis – not to determine what would deter us.¹⁹

This definition of deterrence conflicts with both Waltz's and Brzezinski's assessments in that it calls for tailoring a deterrence strategy to the perceptions and values of the regime being deterred. It would be expected that the value system of a Third World dictatorship differs from that influencing the behavior of decision-makers in the United States or the former Soviet Union.

C. A DETERRENCE POLICY FOR THE THIRD WORLD

Given the threat of nuclear proliferation, this analysis addresses the development of a nuclear deterrence policy directed at Third World dictatorships. It rejects both the arguments that these regimes are non-deterrable and that the mere existence of an American nuclear arsenal will satisfy future deterrence requirements. A deterrence policy for emerging Third World nuclear powers must threaten what these regimes value. This translates into holding at risk the mechanisms these regimes use to maintain internal control.

In order to determine the value system of Third World authoritarian regimes, it is necessary to understand what influences their behavior. One theory that attempts to provide this understanding is termed "omnibalancing." It describes Third World decision-making as a balance between internal and external threats to regime security. It is Third World dictators' preoccupation with internal threats that provides the United States with the targets

¹⁹ Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, By Brent Scowcroft, Chairman (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), 3.

to hold at risk in a situation of deterrence. For successful deterrence, the Third World authoritarian regime must perceive a credible threat to the mechanisms it uses to maintain internal control.

This suggested deterrence policy implies that if the United States becomes involved in a military conflict with these authoritarian states, it will be restricted to waging a limited war. This is because the deterrent threat must raise the perceived costs of using nuclear weapons higher than any potential benefits in the mind of the Third World leadership. By threatening internal control mechanisms, the cost of using nuclear weapons would be the overthrow of the regime. Therefore, in order to preserve the credibility of this threat, the United States would need to restrict its attacks so the resulting destruction is proportionate with limited objectives. Unrestricted warfare on the part of the United States, would leave no available targets that could be perceived by the Third World dictator as threatened in the event of Third World nuclear use.

There are significant limitations to basing a deterrence policy on the theory of omnibalancing. One limitation is that the theory may not have universal applicability throughout the set of authoritarian nuclear regimes in the Third World. These nations have important differences along economic, political, cultural and ethnic lines. It is not intuitively obvious that one theory could accurately encompass these differences.

Another potential limitation concerns the communication of the deterrent threat. There are significant cultural and social differences between these Third World nations and the United States. It will be a greater challenge to ensure accurate threat signalling than it was in regards to the former Soviet Union. Over the last four decades, American and Soviet leaders reached considerable understanding of the other's behavior.¹⁰

¹⁰ Stephen Van Evera proposes that the bipolar Cold War relationship between the United States and Soviet Union made it easier to "establish 'rules of the game' and agreed spheres of influence." Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War," International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 34.

D. ORGANIZATION

The remainder of this analysis will describe and justify the policy for deterring Third World nuclear regimes that has been outlined in the preceding discussion. The next chapter discusses the concept of deterrence and how it is applied to prevent the use of nuclear weapons. The requirements of effective deterrence will be introduced with an emphasis on how they can be satisfied in reference to Third World dictatorships. Then, based on the U.S. experience of the Cold War, the coercive strategies available to the United States will be enumerated.

The third chapter introduces the concept of omnibalancing and the potential for using it to determine the value priorities of Third World authoritarian regimes. After identifying the means by which these regimes maintain their internal security, a targeting strategy will be proposed for implementation of a nuclear deterrence policy.

In the fourth chapter, a comparison is drawn between a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing and the nuclear targeting doctrine of Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59). It is argued that the perception of Soviet values that formed the basis of PD-59 is similar to the Third World value system described by omnibalancing. A review of the criticisms of PD-59, therefore, serves as an applicable test of the viability of omnibalancing for deterrence in the Third World.

The final chapter reviews the findings of the thesis and presents three significant conclusions. These are: (1) wars waged by the United States against the Third World nuclear powers should be restricted to limited objectives; (2) the distinction between declaratory policy and employment policy will likely be significant if deterrence fails; and (3) the Third World perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons can lead to a situation of mutual deterrence. The chapter concludes with recommendations for further study in the area of nuclear deterrence against Third World dictators.

II. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRING THIRD WORLD DICTATORS

A variety of scholars have assigned different interpretations to the term deterrence.¹ Simply put, as Patrick M. Morgan states, deterrence is "the use of threats of harm to prevent someone from doing something you do not want him to do."² Morgan's definition is general enough to include threats to prevent an adversary from taking undesired political, economic or military action. The focus of deterrent threats in this discussion, however, is the prevention of the use of nuclear weapons by Third World regimes.³ Therefore, the object of deterrence is limited to persuading an aggressor, through the use of threats, that the cost of using nuclear assets is higher than any potential benefits gained by their use.⁴

Since the object of deterrence is to prevent aggression, the defending nation initiating a deterrent threat places the decision for action on the aggressor.⁵ The defender is

¹ Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (London: Sage Publications, 1977), 17 - 24.

² Ibid., 17.

³ The emphasis of deterrence on a potential military attack (i.e. use of nuclear weapons) is in keeping with the assumptions of contemporary deterrence theory. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 78.

⁴ Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 15. Huth defined the deterrent threat as one of retaliation. It will be argued that the term "retaliation" has special meaning and, in fact, is more appropriately used in reference to compellent threats.

⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 71.

interested in maintaining a status quo and threatens reaction to the aggressor's challenge to the situation. A deterrent policy can therefore be described as defensive.⁶

A significantly different concept is that of compellence. In a compellent situation, the defender's objective is to coerce the aggressor into taking a desired action.⁷ A policy of compellence requires a defender to initiate action to force a change of the status quo. Therefore, compellence can be regarded as offensive.⁸ Some analysts postulate that situations of compellence more often lead to armed conflict than deterrence situations.⁹ One reason given for this phenomenon is that compellent threats are issued under conditions of high expectations of war whereas deterrent threats are made in an opposite atmosphere.¹⁰

Besides the difference of which side initiates action, deterrence and compellence can also be contrasted in terms of timing of the defender's threats. Deterrent threats, since they enforce a status quo, can remain in use indefinitely. The timing of carrying out compellent threats, in contrast, can be critical. Once an aggressor has taken an action undesired by the defender there is a definite period of time in which compellent threats will succeed. Thomas Schelling states, "Too little time [after the aggressive action], and compliance becomes impossible; too much time, and compliance becomes unnecessary."¹¹ Finally, deterrence and compellence differ in the point of the confrontation when success can be measured. Since deterrence is preventative, deterrence policy focuses on the initial phase of the conflict.

⁶ Ibid., 78. As Schelling argues, to think of deterrence as defensive does not imply that deterrence is synonymous with defense or a defensive military strategy.

⁷ Ibid., 70 - 71.

⁸ Ibid., 78.

⁹ Walter J. Peterson, "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom," International Studies Quarterly 30 (September 1986): 279 - 282.

¹⁰ Ibid., 286.

¹¹ Schelling, 72.

Compellence requires the aggressor to reverse actions already taken. Therefore, the success of compellence is realized in the final stage of the conflict, after the aggressor has fully complied with the defender's demands.¹²

Even with these apparent differences, the concepts of deterrence and compellence may be confused. The recent Gulf War and the events leading to its initiation provide an excellent example. Representative Les Aspin (D-WI), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, argues that the Gulf War provided insightful lessons concerning deterrence of Third World authoritarian regimes:

Saddam Hussein was *non-deterrable*...The buildup of American Forces in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield would have convinced any Soviet leader that the Americans were serious and it was time to back off. However, the overwhelming threat of force did not *compel* Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait...¹³

By citing the buildup of allied forces, Aspin is certainly evaluating a failure of coalition compellence policy. He wrongly concludes that compellence failure demonstrates Hussein was non-deterrable. Aspin fails to recognize that the deterrent value of Operation Desert Shield was the threat against an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.¹⁴ While Iraqi forces did not enter Saudi Arabia before commencement of combat, it is difficult to ascertain whether this was the result of successful deterrence.¹⁵

¹² Ibid., 75.

¹³ Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990's: Defining a New Basis for U. S. Military Forces," Speech before the Atlantic Council of the United States, 6 January 1992, 8, emphasis added.

¹⁴ President George Bush justified the initial deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia stating, "I took this action to assist the Saudi Arabian Government in the defense of its homeland...U.S. forces will work together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia and to deter further Iraqi aggression." "Excerpts From Bush's Statement on U.S. Defense of Saudis," New York Times, 9 August 1990, A15.

¹⁵ Richard K. Herrmann proposes that Hussein may never have intended to invade Saudi territory. Richard K. Herrmann, "The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking U. S. Political Strategy after the Gulf War," International Security 16 (Fall 1991): 52.

A. TYPES OF DETERRENCE

The definition of deterrence can be refined further by considering the immediacy of the threat of aggression. Immediate deterrence refers to coercive threats against an aggressor expected to be preparing an imminent attack.¹⁶ It is a crisis situation that makes immediate deterrence necessary and, therefore, the time for the defender's policy formulation is critically compressed.¹⁷

General deterrence is the term describing a relatively longer-term policy aimed at a historical adversary when the threat of immediate aggression is low.¹⁸ An example of U.S. general deterrence policy is the decades of NATO deterrence against the now defunct Warsaw Treaty Organization. Since general deterrence implies a long-standing relationship between adversaries, there is an opportunity for the defender to develop economic and political deterrence policies rather than relying on the threatened use of military force.¹⁹

Deterrence can be further broken down in terms of the relationship between the defender and the object of the aggressor's attack. A policy deterring an attack upon the defender's own territory is termed central deterrence. An attempt to prevent an aggressor from attacking an ally of the defender is called extended deterrence.²⁰ In deterrence literature, central and extended deterrence have been referred to as Type I and Type II

¹⁶ A useful example for a failure of immediate deterrence can be found in the Gulf War experience. Prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the United States attempted to send a deterrence signal to Hussein through diplomacy and publicized military exercises with Gulf allies. Ibid., 51 - 52.

¹⁷ Morgan, 28.

¹⁸ Ibid., 29. Morgan argued that immediate deterrence situations are infrequent but illogically serve as the basis for much of contemporary deterrence theory.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Huth, 16.

deterrence respectively.¹¹ Both central and extended deterrence can be either immediate or general. Finally, deterrence can be described in terms of the point in a crisis at which it is applied. A deterrence policy aimed at preventing an attack can be referred to as pre-war deterrence. If, however, the deterrent threat is meant to prevent escalation of conflict once it has begun, the policy is described as intra-war deterrence.¹²

B. REQUIREMENTS FOR DETERRENCE

Nearly forty years ago, William W. Kaufmann described the requirements for successful deterrence:

To achieve [deterrence] it becomes necessary to communicate in some way to a prospective antagonist what is likely to happen to him should he create the contingency in question. The expectation is that, confronted with this prospect, he will be deterred from moving in directions that are regarded as inimical, at least so long as other less intolerable alternatives are open to him.¹³

Kaufmann's argument can be refined to the following list of requirements for deterrence:

(1) the defender's threat is credible; (2) the defender's threat is communicated effectively to the aggressor; (3) the aggressor recognizes the costs of attack are higher than any potential benefits; and (4) the defender and aggressor are rational.¹⁴ Described in this manner, the requirements imply that a successful deterrence policy is dependent on the

¹¹ Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 126. Kahn also referred to a Type III deterrence, a threat of graduated response to a limited attack.

¹² Kahn, 175. For discussions of the implications of intra-war deterrence in a nuclear conflict, see Stephen J. Cimbala and Joseph D. Douglass, ed., Ending a Nuclear War (London: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishing Inc., 1988).

¹³ William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William W. Kaufmann, ed., Military Policy and National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 17.

¹⁴ Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), 40 - 41. George and Smoke list three requirements that concern the formulation and issuance of the defender's threat. Rationality and the aggressor's cost/benefit analysis are described as an assumption and a condition respectively rather than as requirements for deterrence. George and Smoke 64, 73, 522 - 530.

perceptions and decisions of both the aggressor and defender. Therefore, it is improbable that threats can be formulated in general terms and utilized in a variety of conflict situations. An understanding of the requirements for deterrence will assist in the development of the specific threats necessary to prevent Third World nuclear use.

1. Threat Credibility

The credibility of a defender's threat depends upon a dynamic process influenced by the decision-making and perceptions of both the aggressor and defender. For purposes of discussion, threat credibility can be divided into either elements dependent on the aggressor or those dependent on the defender. The defender's contribution can be further broken down into structural and behavioral influences.²⁵ Structural effects include the military balance and the defender's value system. Behavioral influence refers to the defender's reputation.

The aggressor can affect the credibility of a defender's threat by its decision on which military strategy to initiate. The options available can be defined as: (1) quick decisive; (2) test of capabilities; (3) coercive diplomacy; and (4) attrition.²⁶ A quick decisive strategy entails the use of sufficient force to occupy disputed territory or destroy a specified amount of the opponents military capability.²⁷ A test of capabilities has two facets. The first is a limited probing strategy by which an aggressor incurs minor military action to test the

²⁵ Huth, 34.

²⁶ Alexander L. George, "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, ed., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971), 16 - 21.

²⁷ Defined in this way, a quick decisive strategy includes George's meaning as well as George and Smoke's description of the fait accompli deterrence failure and Huth's descriptions of the limited arms and rapid offensive attack strategies. George and Smoke, 536 and Huth, 35 - 36. John J. Mearsheimer refers to the quick decisive strategy as the blitzkrieg strategy. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 29 - 30.

defender's commitment.¹⁸ The second facet is that of circumventing the defender's deterrent capabilities by exploiting perceived vulnerabilities in the defender's commitments.¹⁹ Coercive diplomacy describes a strategy which incrementally escalates a military conflict forcing the defender to establish repeatedly its commitment against continued aggression.²⁰ Finally, Alexander George defines an attrition strategy as "prolonged warfare under a set of conditions or limitations on military operations that give neither side a clear advantage."²¹

The different attack strategies available to the aggressor demonstrate that a defender's threat must be appropriate to the type of attack for the threat to be credible.²² The defender must tailor the threatened response to the aggressor's attack strategy. This is not meant to imply that the defender must respond to every possible aggressive action.²³ It does follow, however, that a single deterrent threat will not be successful over the spectrum of attack strategies.

The attack strategy represents the aggressor's influence on the credibility of deterrent threats. The defender affects credibility through structural and behavioral means.

¹⁸ George and Smoke, 540 - 543.

¹⁹ Ibid., 545. George and Smoke offer the examples of the Berlin crises of 1958 and 1961. The aggressor (the Soviet Union) recognized the defender's (the United States) commitment to resisting a direct attack on West Berlin but attempted to work around that by implementing a less threatening blockade.

²⁰ George, 18 - 19.

²¹ Ibid., 19. Mearsheimer proposes the objective of the attrition strategy is to wear down the opponent's defenses until resistance becomes impossible. Mearsheimer, 29.

²² This was the basis of one of the criticisms of the Eisenhower administration's doctrine of massive retaliation which threatened nuclear attack in response to any form of Communist (i.e. Soviet) aggression. See Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), 5 - 10.

²³ The defender's decision of whether or not to respond is influenced by the concept of reputation which will be discussed.

Structurally, credibility depends on the military balance and the relative value to the defender of the object of threatened attack.¹⁴

The military balance aspect of structural credibility is relatively obvious. The deterrent threat is incredible if the defender does not have the military forces necessary to resist an attack. While the defender's required military capability may appear obvious, this will not always be the case. In fact, the requirements for adequate defense may be significantly less than what would be assumed necessary based on the aggressor's military capabilities.

An example is the U.S. effort to defend against a Soviet invasion of Iran in the early 1980's. Alarmed by the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter used his 1980 State of the Union Address as a vehicle to issue a deterrent threat against further Soviet encroachment in the Middle East. "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America. And such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."¹⁵ This threat, later referred to as the Carter Doctrine, led to the development of the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), an intraservice U.S. military command designed for quick response to Iran in time of crisis.¹⁶ One criticism of the RDF concept was that it was numerically inadequate to oppose the Soviet military potential in the region. The RDF of approximately four divisions would potentially face twenty-four Soviet divisions.¹⁷ Based on a Department of Defense estimate, in the first thirty days of conflict,

¹⁴ Huth, 34.

¹⁵ "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress," New York Times, 24 January 1980, A12.

¹⁶ Joshua M. Epstein, "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent," International Security 6 (Fall 1981): 126 - 127.

¹⁷ Ibid., 127.

U.S. troops would be outnumbered five to one.¹⁸ The implications of these statistics is that the military imbalance made Carter's threatened response incredible. Joshua M. Epstein, however, argues that the regional military balance was not a critical determinant of the deterrent potential of the RDF. In a detailed military analysis of the Soviet invasion scenario, Epstein concludes that the geography of the invasion route and the consequent limitations on Soviet attack options resulted in the likelihood that a properly trained and deployed RDF, though numerically inferior, could have effectively opposed a Soviet invasion.¹⁹ Perhaps even more significant to this discussion, Epstein argues that Soviet planners were aware of this situation as well.⁴⁰

The defender's value assessment is the most ambiguous of the structural elements. The defender must perceive that the object being threatened by the aggressor is of high enough interest to warrant an attempt at deterrence. Some empirical analyses of deterrence cases have postulated that economic, political, or military interdependence between the threatened state and defender leads to a credible deterrent situation.⁴¹ It is also possible, however, for a defender to commit resources for deterrence when there is no measurable interest at risk.⁴²

¹⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force," International Security 5 (Spring 1981): 59.

¹⁹ Epstein, 126 - 158.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 147.

⁴¹ Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 - 1980," World Politics 36 (July 1984): 514 - 520. For a critical assessment of this work, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable," World Politics 43 (April 1990): 336 - 369.

⁴² Robert Jervis argues this point concerning the United States interest in curbing nuclear proliferation. He cites a potential nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. American intervention would be "less for narrow concerns about U. S. security than for the desire to spare other countries the horrors of nuclear war." Robert Jervis, "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?," International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92): 67.

Regardless of what is considered an interest to the defender, it is clear the perception of this value assessment on both sides is critical to threat credibility. A deterrence situation thus becomes a question of an imbalance of interests.⁴¹ Robert Jervis argues, "[T]he higher the value a state places on prevailing on an issue, the higher the risks it will be willing to run to do so. Thus the side that has more of a stake in an issue can make more credible threats to stand firm."⁴² When the interests of both sides are asymmetrical in favor of the defender, a deterrent threat is credible.⁴³

The behavioral aspect of threat credibility refers to the reputation of the defender in past crises.⁴⁴ Some states may have acquired the reputation of being more resolute or more reckless than others.⁴⁵ A deterrent threat, therefore, may be inherently credible based solely on who is making it. Additionally, a defender may feel pressured to make deterrence policy decisions in order to preserve or initiate a reputation of resolve.⁴⁶

While reputation may influence credibility, there are analytical obstacles to a defender relying on reputation to enhance deterrence. The most basic of these is the fact

⁴¹ Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 30.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Huth also included the adoption of diplomatic strategies and movement of military forces by the defender as behavioral elements. While these actions may add to threat credibility, a discussion of them will be deferred to that dealing with communicating a deterrent threat. Huth, 34.

⁴⁵ Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," International Security 7 (Winter 1982/83): 9.

⁴⁶ Barry Nalebuff used the example of President John F. Kennedy's statement regarding the 1961 Berlin crisis to make this point. "If we do not meet our commitments to Berlin, where will we later stand? If we are not true to our word there, all that we have achieved in collective security, which relies on these words, will mean nothing." Barry Nalebuff, "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World," World Politics 43 (April 1991): 315.

that reputation is only significant in the perception of the aggressor.⁴⁹ It matters little in how the defender perceives its own reputation because the aggressor may have a different historical perspective. Another problem with the concept of reputation is to whom the reputation becomes attached.⁵⁰ It may become difficult for a democracy to maintain a reputation through succeeding administrations when they represent different political parties. It may also be difficult for an authoritarian Third World regime to expect to retain its reputation after a dictator dies. The fundamental problem with reputation is that it has many sources including individual, regime, national and government. It is unlikely that both the defender and aggressor will recognize it in the same manner.

2. Signalling the Threat

Once a defender formulates a deterrence policy, and determines a credible threat, both the threat and conditions for its implementation must be communicated to the aggressor. As with perceptions of threat credibility, signalling a deterrent threat must be evaluated from the aspects of both the defender and the aggressor. The signal must be clearly sent through declarations or actions and must be unambiguously received.⁵¹

In order to send a coherent signal, the defender must first recognize who on the opponent's side needs to receive the message.⁵² This will determine the most effective signalling method to be used.⁵³ Once the target of the signal is identified, the defender must

⁴⁹ Ibid., 316.

⁵⁰ Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception," 9.

⁵¹ George and Smoke, 60.

⁵² Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964 - 1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 13.

⁵³ If the aggressor regime is centrally controlled, the leadership may be the best target for a deterrent signal. In cases of decentralized control, particularly in a crisis, it may be critical that the aggressor's military leaders receive the signal.

decide which of the aggressor's attack options is being opposed.⁵⁴ Finally, the method of transmitting the signal must be chosen.

There are two methods of signalling a deterrent threat available to the defender: Verbal declarations or military actions.⁵⁵ Declaratory signalling refers to statements of government officials or military officers which are intended to be received by the aggressor regime. Action signalling is primarily concerned with the use of military force. Two methods of action signalling are possible: changing the disposition of armed forces; and providing military assistance.⁵⁶ The disposition of armed forces can be reduced into movement, activity or readiness.⁵⁷ Minor changes in the disposition of forces can enforce a general deterrence policy. Significant changes, however, appear to be more applicable in immediate deterrence situations. Schelling argues that, "It is in the wars that we have come to call 'limited wars' that the bargaining [through military action] appears most vividly and is conducted most consciously."⁵⁸ Therefore, the actual use of military firepower is especially applicable in cases of intra-war deterrence and compellence.

There are two types of problems that arise regarding signalling deterrent threats. These are technical and perceptual and can be applied to declaratory or action signalling.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ George and Smoke, 561.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 561 - 565.

⁵⁶ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978) 7 - 12. See also Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 20 - 26.

⁵⁷ Blechman and Kaplan included the following in military activity: "[T]he use of firepower; the establishment or disestablishment of a permanent or temporary presence abroad; a blockade; an interposition; and exercise or demonstration; the escort or transport of another actor's armed forces or material; a visit by a military unit to a foreign location; an evacuation; the operation or reconnaissance patrol, or surveillance units in a non-exercise context; or a change in readiness status." Ibid., 12 - 13.

⁵⁸ Schelling, 142.

⁵⁹ Thies, 406.

Technical problems originate with the defender and refer to difficulties in articulating the desired threat.⁶⁰ Declarations may lack the specificity required to enable the aggressor to recognize the threat. Similar to the problems of threat credibility, non-specificity results from communicating a general threat to cover a variety of attack options.⁶¹ Additionally, in bureaucratic western administrations such as that in the United States, it is not always possible to identify which spokesman represents the official government position. The declaratory policy becomes confused as many voices attempt to interpret and articulate it.⁶² Technical problems associated with action signalling are the same difficulties inherent whenever military force is employed. Unforeseen variables such as weather, equipment malfunction or personnel error impede the successful application of armed force.⁶³

Similar to technical problems, perceptual impediments to signalling result in a failure of the aggressor to receive the deterrent threat. The difference, however, is that unlike the technical side, perceptual problems are not due to the failure of the defender to transmit a coherent signal. Rather, they are due to the aggressor not interpreting the signal as desired by the defender.⁶⁴ This is particularly applicable to situations when military action is used to communicate the threat. In that case, there are two types of perceptual problems.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 346.

⁶¹ William W. Kaufmann addresses this point in his criticism of the 1954 speech of John Foster Dulles which outlined the Eisenhower administration's policy of "massive retaliation." Kaufmann, 12 – 38.

⁶² Thies, 13.

⁶³ Ibid., 406.

⁶⁴ Thies proposes that it is the misperceptions of both sides that leads to this type of signaling failure. Ibid. See also Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).

The first type is the aggressor simply receiving the wrong message from the action taken.⁶⁵ One example of this is the use of the movement of naval forces to signal commitment and deterrence.⁶⁶ It has been argued that navies are particularly suited for signalling threats because of their inherent flexibility of movement.⁶⁷ Naval forces can be easily deployed to a crisis region or withdrawn to avoid unnecessary escalation.⁶⁸ In contrast to this view, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan argue:

[F]orces actually emplaced on foreign soil were more frequently associated with positive [political] outcomes than were naval forces, which can be withdrawn almost as easily as they can be moved toward the disturbed area. The movement of land based forces...involves real economic costs and a certain psychological commitment that are difficult to reverse...⁶⁹

Therefore, the flexibility inherent in naval forces may actually send a signal of non-commitment to potential aggressors.

The second type of perceptual problem for threat signalling occurs during situations of intra-war deterrence. The aggressor may have difficulty distinguishing the signal from other ongoing military action.⁷⁰ In this situation, it is not a question of the aggressor perceiving the wrong signal, it is a case of the aggressor perceiving no signal at all.

The recent Gulf War provides an applicable example of the difficulties in signaling a deterrent threat, particularly to a Third World authoritarian regime. One goal of coalition

⁶⁵ Thies, 296 - 298.

⁶⁶ Charles D. Allen, The Uses of Navies in Peacetime (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980), 15 - 29.

⁶⁷ H. Laurence Garrett III, ADM Frank B. Kelso II, USN and GEN A.M. Gray, USMC, "The Way Ahead," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 117 (April 1991): 38.

⁶⁸ Isaac C. Kidd, "For the Alliance, Seapower is an Anchor of Stability in an Unstable World," Seapower (January 1992): 36. See also Joseph F. Bouchard, Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), ix - 56.

⁶⁹ Blechman and Kaplan, 529.

⁷⁰ Thies uses the example of American escalatory bombing campaigns against North Vietnam to demonstrate this point. Thies, 297 - 298.

deterrence both before and during the conflict was to prevent Iraqi forces under Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons against coalition troops. Whether the threats were effective may never be known. But more importantly for this discussion, is how successful the coalition led by President George Bush was in communicating their intentions.

It is clear that the Bush administration consistently warned Saddam Hussein of some form of retaliation if Iraq attacked coalition forces with chemical weapons.⁷¹ In an 31 August 1990 interview, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of coalition forces in Southwest Asia, warned that if Iraq used chemical weapons, "They will pay for it big time."⁷² James Baker, U.S. Secretary of State, echoed Schwarzkopf's sentiment on 29 October 1990. "[Saddam Hussein] must also realize that should he use chemical or biological weapons, there will be the most severe consequences."⁷³ In a letter to Hussein, which was subsequently released to the press on 12 January 1990, Bush stated, "[T]he United States will not tolerate the use of chemical or biological weapons....You and your country will pay a terrible price if you order unconscionable actions of this sort."⁷⁴ Finally in a 5 February 1991, press conference, President Bush was asked if the U.S. might retaliate in kind to a chemical attack. He answered:

Well, I think it's better to never say what option you may be considering or may or may not do...[Saddam Hussein] ought to think very carefully about [using chemical weapons]...And I will leave that up to a very fuzzy interpretation because I would like to have every possible chance that he

⁷¹ It should be noted that the following analysis is based exclusively on the public statements of coalition officials. There is a possibility that private communications were also issued. The effect of this means of declaratory signalling is obviously unknown.

⁷² Michael R. Gordon, "No War Unless Iraq Strikes, U. S. Gulf Commander Says," New York Times, 1 September 1990, I6.

⁷³ Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush and Baker Explicit in Threat to Use Force," New York Times, 30 October 1990, A12.

⁷⁴ "Text of Letter From Bush to Hussein," New York Times, 13 January 1990, I9.

decides not to do this.⁷⁵

This "fuzzy interpretation" may have led Schwarzkopf and others to later speculate about a deterrent threat of nuclear retaliation.⁷⁶ By leaving the specific means of retaliation ambiguous, Bush was providing uncertain variables for Hussein's calculus of war. Clearly, if Hussein had been sure of the coalition response, he could accurately assess the risks of using chemical weapons.

The means of U.S. retaliation, however, may not have been as ambiguous as Bush implied. Some post-war analysts argued that the tremendous conventional superiority enjoyed by the coalition forces precluded any need or desire from considering chemical or nuclear weapons in answer to a chemical attack.⁷⁷ While this argument may have been valid after observing the results of the initial air campaign, it was not as readily apparent before the war began. The balance of forces between the coalition and Iraq was certainly different in August 1990, when Schwarzkopf declared his threat, than in February 1991, when Bush held his press conference.

There is evidence, however, indicating that President Bush may have been politically restrained from considering a chemical or nuclear response. This restraint grew out of a fear of the potential international reaction to the use, even in retaliation, of weapons of mass destruction. At a time when the Bush administration was trying to define a "new world order," it would have been counterproductive to be forced to justify chemical or

⁷⁵ "Excerpts from Talk by Bush on Gulf War," New York Times, 6 February 1991, A10.

⁷⁶ On February 27, 1991, Schwarzkopf proposed, "There's [sic] other people who are speculating that the reason [the Iraqi forces] didn't use chemical weapons is because they're afraid that if they use their chemical weapons there would be nuclear retaliation." "Excerpts from Schwarzkopf News Conference on Gulf War," New York Times, 28 February 1991, A8. McGeorge Bundy interpreted the cited 12 January 1990 letter as a "veiled but powerful warning" of nuclear retaliation for Iraqi chemical use. McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf," Foreign Affairs 70 (Fall 1991): 84 - 85.

⁷⁷ Neil C. Livingstone, "Iraq's Intentional Omission," Seapower (June 1991): 30.

nuclear use. On 8 August 1990, President Bush was questioned at a news conference regarding potential Iraqi chemical attack. He stated, "I would think that [Hussein would] know that, given the way the world views the use of chemical weapons, that it would be intolerable and that it would be dealt with very, very severely."⁷⁸ There is an implication in that statement, that world opinion may not have tolerated any use of chemicals, even in retaliation. At the time of this news conference, many military analysts believed that the risk of losing international support for the coalition was high enough to preclude U.S. chemical or nuclear use.⁷⁹

Two months later, Bush supplied further evidence that he was not considering chemical or nuclear retaliation. The arena for his remarks was the United Nations General Assembly.

As a world community, we must act, not only to deter the use of inhumane weapons like mustard and nerve gas, but to eliminate the weapons entirely...We must also redouble our efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons, biological weapons and the ballistic missiles that can reign destruction upon distant peoples. The United Nations can help bring about a new day - a day when these terrible weapons and the terrible despots who would use them, or both, were a thing of the past.⁸⁰

The United States use of chemical or nuclear weapons would have jeopardized the possibility of achieving Bush's aims. Therefore, it appears that Bush never seriously considered chemical or nuclear retaliation. In support of this proposition, John Sununu, then White House Chief of Staff, was reported as stating in January 1991, that if Iraq attacked with chemical weapons, the U.S. would not respond in kind.⁸¹

⁷⁸ "Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," New York Times, 9 August 1990, A15.

⁷⁹ Malcolm W. Browne, "As U. S. Force Builds, a Military Stalemate Shapes Up," New York Times, 10 August 1990, A11.

⁸⁰ "Transcript of President's Address to U. N. General Assembly," New York Times, 2 October 1990, A12.

⁸¹ Leslie H. Gelb, "Gas, Germs and Nukes," New York Times, 30 January 1991, A23.

Statements from the Department of Defense appeared also to lend credence to the theory that chemical or nuclear response was not considered. At a Pentagon briefing in January 1991, Major General Martin L. Brandtner stated, "To this point in time, we do not intend to use chemical weapons."¹¹ This echoed the opinion of a U.S. military officer interviewed a month earlier: "If Saddam [Hussein] is smart, he won't go chemical or biological, because we'll give it back to him in spades with our conventional weaponry."¹²

If the assumption, that President Bush did not intend to retaliate for a chemical attack with weapons of mass destruction, is correct, the logical alternative would be the use of conventional munitions. If a conventional response was planned, it would be essential to both select an appropriate target set and communicate the deterrent threat to the adversary.

In regards to Iraq, potential targets could be characterized into categories of population or military forces. The former refers to cities, transportation networks and other areas where the purpose of an attack would be to kill civilians or lower the standard of living of the population. The latter refers to the military and infrastructure targets, such as electrical power plants or bridges, whose destruction would degrade military performance.¹³

From the outset of the Gulf crisis, President Bush indicated that the population of Iraq would not be targeted. In September 1990, before a joint session of Congress, Bush stated: "[T]he United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator, and with his aggression."¹⁴ A few days later, Bush reiterated this sentiment in an

¹¹ Patrick E. Tyler, "Pentagon Said to Authorize U. S. Use of Nonlethal Gas," New York Times, 26 January 1991, I7.

¹² Philip Shenon, "Troops Who'll Counter Gas Attack: Ready or Not?" New York Times, 13 December 1990, A20.

¹³ This distinction between target categories is not meant to imply that destroying military forces does not result in civilian casualties. Targeting a nation's infrastructure would produce collateral damage to the population.

¹⁴ "Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress," New York Times, 12 September 1990, A20.

address to the people of Iraq: "We have no quarrel with the people of Iraq...our only object is to oppose the invasion ordered by Saddam Hussein...I do not want to add to the suffering of the people of Iraq."⁶⁶ In December 1990, Bush again made the point clear adding, "We've only friendship for the people [in Iraq]."⁶⁷ These statements are evidence that President Bush was not threatening Saddam Hussein with conventional, retaliatory attacks on the Iraqi population. In fact, the emphasis on not targeting the Iraqi population forced the Pentagon to justify attacks that resulted in reported civilian casualties.⁶⁸ Therefore the only retaliatory option remaining would have been conventional attacks on Iraqi military targets.

Before the commencement of the coalition air war against Iraqi forces, it was possible to speculate on possible military target sets that the coalition would strike in retaliation for Iraqi chemical attacks. Once the actual fighting began, however, it became clear that the coalition was already striking the majority of potential military targets.⁶⁹ Given this situation, it would not have been credible to threaten conventional retaliation for Iraqi chemical attacks. The threat would not have made the situation any worse for the Iraqi military.

The arguments presented thus far, cast doubt on the speculation that the retaliation referred to by President Bush and others, would have involved nuclear or chemical

⁶⁶ "Text of Bush's Television Message to Iraqi People," New York Times, 17 September 1990, A10.

⁶⁷ "Excerpts from President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf," New York Times, 1 December 1990, I6.

⁶⁸ One example of this was the result of a 13 February 1991 U.S. strike on a bunker in Baghdad. Coalition intelligence had determined that the bunker was being used as a command and control facility. It was later discovered that the bunker had been sheltering as many as 400 Iraqi civilians. Military briefers, after the incident, were forced to defend the strike by providing evidence indicating the military significance of the bunker. Strategic Survey 1990 - 1991 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), 69.

⁶⁹ For a review of the military targets attacked during the air war, see *Ibid.*, 68 - 71.

munitions. Additionally, a U.S. threat of a conventional response would not have been credible once the air war began. Yet, declaratory statements from Bush administration officials indicated that a deterrent threat was being signalled to Saddam Hussein. It is certainly not obvious that the Iraqi officials could have interpreted this threat from the administration declarations previously cited.⁹⁰

3. Aggressor's Cost Benefit Analysis

The development of a deterrence policy requires that an assumption be made about how an aggressor measures the costs and benefits of conflict. The object of deterrence is to persuade the aggressor that, accounting for the threatened response of the defender, the costs of an attack will be larger than any expected benefits. Bueno de Mesquita defines the summation of costs and benefits as the "expected utility."⁹¹ The defender's goal is to convince the aggressor that the expected utility is negative or that the attack will result in a net cost.

In order to achieve this goal, the defender estimates how the aggressor calculates expected utility. A simplistic view would argue that the costs are measured as the direct results of battle. If this argument were valid, successful deterrence would merely require the defender to convince the aggressor that it will lose militarily. John J. Mearsheimer argues that "war is most likely to start when the potential attacker envisions a quick victory. When the conflict promises to be more prolonged...deterrence is...likely to [be successful]..."⁹² The implication of Mearsheimer's proposition is that the aggressor makes his decisions as an opportunist, willing to attack if the military odds are in his favor.

⁹⁰ An assumption of this argument which requires emphasis is that Hussein was able to receive all of the Bush administration's declaratory signals cited. It may never be possible to know what the Iraqi regime was "hearing" during the crisis.

⁹¹ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 34.

⁹² Mearsheimer, 24.

An evaluation of deterrence situations has indicated that this argument does not always apply. Richard Ned Lebow examined thirteen international crises that he described as cases of "brinkmanship."⁹⁴ Lebow theorizes that rationality would dictate that an aggressor back down if a defender articulated a credible threat that was recognized to raise excessively the costs of the attack.⁹⁵ In eight of the cases, Lebow presents historical evidence indicating that the defender did provide a credible commitment but deterrence failed anyway.⁹⁶ Lebow proposes that there was more than opportunity that influenced the aggressor's behavior: "We discovered a good opportunity for aggression (i.e., a vulnerable commitment) in only about one-third of our cases but found strong needs to pursue an aggressive foreign policy in every instance."⁹⁷ The needs Lebow refers to may force the aggressor to take great risks to challenge the status quo, even against a stronger and more capable defender.⁹⁷ In assessing the potential costs, the aggressor must compare them to the cost of doing nothing at all.⁹⁸ Philip E. Tetlock proposes, "[Advocates of deterrence] can argue that, dismal though the prospects for successful aggression were, those prospects were still brighter than the prospects for a perpetuation of the status quo."⁹⁹ Included in

⁹⁴ Lebow defined brinkmanship as the situation "when a state knowingly challenges an important commitment of another state in the hope of compelling its adversary to back away from his commitment." Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 57. Notwithstanding the confusing reference to compellence in his definition, Lebow is describing an immediate deterrence situation in which the challenger is an aggressor threatening an attack.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 83.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 93 - 97.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 276.

⁹⁸ Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 33 - 34.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Philip E. Tetlock, "Testing Deterrence Theory: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues," Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4 1987): 87.

the costs of the status quo are domestic instability and the political vulnerability of the aggressor leadership.¹⁰⁰

For successful deterrence, therefore, the defender must search beyond a military assessment to appreciate the cost analysis of the aggressor. By recognizing what pressures, both internal and external, are influencing the aggressor's decision-making, the defender will be able to develop an effective threat.

4. Rationality

Underlying the assumption that the aggressor can be convinced that the costs of an attack are too high is the premise that expected utility is determined in a rational manner. The defender, in fact, is relying on an assumption of aggressor rationality while developing a deterrence policy. Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Brody propose that:

[I]t is important to be able to deal with potentially irrational actions by other governments, even suicidally irrational ones...Suicidal opponents cannot be deterred from attacking the United States by threats to destroy them if they do. Nor can the United States in any way prevent them from moving to higher levels of nuclear violence.¹⁰¹

Therefore, the alternative of irrationality would imply the aggressor is non-deterrable. Rationality, as referred to in deterrence literature, describes the process of decision-making rather than the decisions themselves or consequences of implementing them.¹⁰² Rational actors will make decisions which, in their perception will maximize their expected utility.¹⁰³

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 34; and Lebow, Between Peace and War, 70 - 72.

¹⁰¹ Albert Wohlstetter and Richard Brody, "Continuing Control as a Requirement for Detering," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zracket, ed., Managing Nuclear Options (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 144 - 145.

¹⁰² Edward Rhodes, Power and MADness (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 47.

¹⁰³ Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," World Politics (January 1989): 208.

Two types of rationality are often described in literature: perfect and objective.¹⁰⁴ Perfect rationality defines a process in which all necessary information and intelligence are available and the decision-makers on both sides can unambiguously determine the costs and benefits of any action.¹⁰⁵ While it does not assume that the defender and aggressor share the same value system concerning their individual cost/benefit analysis, perfect rationality does imply that each side recognizes and understands the other side's value priorities. Obviously, there are impediments to the realization of perfect rationality in the actual decision-making process. Foremost among these is the assumption that all sufficient information is available to both sides.¹⁰⁶ Neither the defender nor the aggressor may know, with any assurance, what the consequence of a decision will be. Similarly, the adversary's value system may not be known and any actions taken, which are based on threatening the other's values, may be ineffective. Another problem is that an actor's value system is not always internally consistent. Therefore, it is difficult to translate values into courses of action.¹⁰⁷

The critique of perfect rationality leads to the concept of objective rationality. Fundamentally, objective rationality describes a process which recognizes all of the problems and obstacles inherent in real-world decision-making and selects an action that will result in the best possible outcome.¹⁰⁸ The decision-maker may not have complete information but will make the best choice based on what is known. Objective rationality does not imply that decision-makers must avoid risks. On the contrary, if the potential benefits of succeeding

¹⁰⁴ Rhodes, 52 - 54, and Morgan, 78 - 79. Morgan adds a third concept of rationality which he places between perfect and objective and which he simply terms rationality.

¹⁰⁵ Rhodes, 52.

¹⁰⁶ George and Smoke, 75.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 74 - 75.

¹⁰⁸ Rhodes, 53.

with a risky action outweigh its perceived costs, then risk-taking would be a logical option.¹⁰⁹ It is this concept of risk which drove Richard Ned Lebow's analysis of cases of brinkmanship. Lebow implies that aggressors driven by influences other than the military balance and initiating attacks against the odds were irrational.¹¹⁰ To a rational aggressor, the costs should have been high enough to deter attack.¹¹¹

Aggressors may perceive that the resolution of internal pressures requires an attack against a stronger and more capable defender.¹¹² This should not be considered irrational behavior but must be accounted for when developing a deterrence strategy.¹¹³ For the purposes of this discussion, rationality is assumed to allow aggressors to evaluate their costs by comparing internal and external pressures.

This concept of rationality has significant implications for deterrence policies against authoritarian Third World regimes. Often the leaders of these regimes are termed fanatical or mad.¹¹⁴ As one example, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq has even been

¹⁰⁹ Lebow and Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter," 208 - 209. Lebow and Stein differentiate between risk-prone and risk-adverse behavior but argue that both can be described as rational. The difference is whether one attempts to maximize gain or minimize loss.

¹¹⁰ Richard Ned Lebow, "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?," in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, ed., Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 182 - 184.

¹¹¹ For an argument defending this logic, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence," Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4 1987): 6 - 7.

¹¹² Lebow recognizes these internal threats but proposes that their influence on an aggressor's decision-making is an indication of irrationality. Lebow, Between Peace and War, 70 - 72.

¹¹³ Lebow and Stein dismiss the possibility of basing deterrence on more than the aggressor's external pressures. They argue that it is too difficult to identify the relevant internal political and domestic variables that influence the aggressor's decision-making. Robert Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Beyond Deterrence: Building Better Theory," Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4, 1987): 164.

¹¹⁴ Les Aspin, A New Kind of Threat: Nuclear Weapons in an Uncertain Soviet Union, 12 September 1991, 1.

described as a sociopath with no conscience.¹¹⁵ The implication of these labels is that these dictators do not adhere to accepted principles of international behavior and therefore, are very difficult to deter.¹¹⁶

There exists a paradox when considering rationality as it concerns nuclear deterrence policy. Due to the destructiveness inherent in the weapons and the consequences of a nuclear counterattack, it would seem to be an act of irrationality to consider their use.¹¹⁷ In fact it may be beneficial for a regime possessing nuclear weapons to appear irrational to lend credibility to the threat of nuclear use.¹¹⁸ Therefore, what has been described as an underlying requirement for deterrence may not only be invalid but may also be counterproductive to a deterrence policy.

A distinction must be made, however, between the rationality associated with a regime's cost/benefit analysis and that associated with the decision-making process. In order to credibly threaten an aggressor, a defender must recognize what the aggressor values. It must be assumed that these values are arrived at in a rational manner. The resulting policy of deterrence, however, should also account for the possibility that it will fail due to an aggressor's irrational decision-making.

¹¹⁵ Adam Garfinkle, "Will Saddam Get the Bomb," National Review (13 May 1991): 37.

¹¹⁶ Steve Fetter, "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?" International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 28.

¹¹⁷ Jervis argues that many American nuclear strategists were flawed in their thinking of nuclear weapons because they failed to recognize their unusability. He referred to this as "conventionalization." Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 52.

¹¹⁸ Rhodes, 45.

C. COERCIVE STRATEGIES FOR DETERRENCE AND COMPELLENCE

While the objectives and implementation of deterrence and compellence differ, both policies can focus on the threatened use of military force to coerce an aggressor. Three coercive strategies are available to a defender. The first of these, the strategy of retaliation, is applicable to both deterrence and compellence situations.¹¹⁹ The other two strategies, denial and punishment, apply only to deterrence.¹²⁰

1. Retaliation

The term retaliation is often equated to any use of military force in reaction to an aggressive action. In that sense, retaliation merely describes the process of implementing a threatened coercive strategy. The threat of retaliation, however, is a unique strategy onto itself and it fundamentally differs from the strategies of denial and punishment.

As it relates to compellence, a threat of retaliation involves the use of military force to change the status quo. The threatened response is initiated and applied until the aggressor complies with the defender's demands. Retaliation can, however, also be utilized as a strategy of deterrence. Edward Rhodes argues that a threat of retaliation can have deterrent value if made to prevent an aggressor's action. In other words, a defender may threaten that should an attack take place, a retaliatory response will be maintained until the aggressor disengages from the attack. Rhodes proposes, "[i]n deterrence by

¹¹⁹ Rhodes refers to retaliation as a deterrence strategy. His description of retaliation, however, also applies to situations of compellence. "The threat of retaliation is the threat systematically to inflict an unrelated pain until the opponent ceases his noncompliance." Rhodes, 94.

¹²⁰ Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment Research Monograph No. 1 (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1958), 3 - 7.

retaliation...there is a blurring of the distinction between deterrence and compellence."¹²¹
The situation would become one of compellence, if the deterrent threat failed and the aggressor attacked.

2. Denial

A strategy of denial may be based on one of two policies: defense or removal. Each has significantly different approaches regarding implementation. Both policies share the same objective which is to deter by threatening the denial of an aggressor's goals for an attack.

Much of the literature discussing deterrence by denial emphasizes the defense aspect. One argument states that a defender can deter aggression by providing for a defense that would thwart any attempted attack. A simple manifestation of this would be a defense aimed at repelling any forced territorial accession by an attacker.¹²² In this sense, denial is equated with defense, however, the similarity between these terms is misleading.

The objective of defense is to prevent harm from attack while the goal of a denial strategy is to prevent an attacker from gaining benefits from an attack.¹²³ The two objectives only become synonymous if the goal of the attacker is harming the defender. This has not always been the case. Even though the defensive capabilities of a defender may be

¹²¹ Rhodes, 95. It is not intuitive how a compellence strategy of retaliation could succeed if the threat of the same retaliation failed to deter an aggressor. Rhodes offers three possible reasons: (1) the aggressor may act irrationally either before or after retaliation; (2) the aggressor may not have had accurate information on the damage the retaliation would cause; and (3) the benefits for taking the aggressive act may decline with time.

¹²² Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, 1.

¹²³ Rhodes, 92.

unambiguous, there is historical precedent for an aggressor conducting an attack knowing there stood a slim chance of military victory.¹²⁴

A practical problem with a deterrence policy of denial by defense is the lack of appropriate defenses. In the past, the lack of a strategic missile defense has prevented adoption of a defensive denial strategy against the Soviet Union.¹²⁵ Additionally, even if the defenses exist, they may not be completely effective. Defensive capabilities are therefore only one aspect of this type of denial strategy. The other aspect is preemption. Preemption requires the defender to destroy the aggressor's military capability before the aggressor attacks. The aggressor is thus prevented from attacking and denied the potential benefits resulting from an attack.¹²⁶

The second policy applicable to a denial strategy is removal. This policy entails destroying or removing the object of the aggressor's attack. An application of removal would be a "scorched earth" policy. As the defender retreats from the territory desired by the aggressor, the territory is destroyed to deny the aggressor any potential value from the attack. As with a policy of defense, removal would only deter if it matched the objectives of the aggressor.

3. Punishment

The final coercive strategy is that of punishment which does not account for the aggressor's objectives like denial or attempt to force compliance like retaliation. As Robert Jervis states, "Deterrence by punishment means convincing an adversary that is not sensible

¹²⁴ Rhodes recounts the Egyptian decision to attack a superior Israeli army in 1973. According to Rhodes, the Egyptian goal of the attack was not to defeat Israel, therefore an Israeli strategy of defensive denial would not have been appropriate. Ibid., 92 - 93.

¹²⁵ Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 10.

¹²⁶ Ibid. Jervis discussed preemption in terms of a U. S. strategic deterrence strategy aimed at the former Soviet Union. The concepts of his argument are also valid for a general discussion of deterrence.

to attack because doing so will lead to unacceptable costs."¹²⁷ Unlike the other coercive strategies, punishment does not involve an interactive process between defender and aggressor.¹²⁸ If deterrence fails, the aggressor's attack elicits a response and then deterrence must be reestablished. This is in sharp contrast to retaliation which reverts to a compellence situation of coercive bargaining if deterrence fails.¹²⁹ Even a strategy of denial involves a degree of interactive competition between forces attempting to seize or defend objectives.

Other differences between the coercive strategies can be noted. A strategy of retaliation relies on a threat based on the ability to compel a reversal of aggressive action and therefore is a more challenging strategy than the others.¹³⁰ Deterrence based on a strategy of denial may be the most recognizable to an aggressor but is relatively more expensive to maintain than strategies of retaliation or punishment.¹³¹

D. LESSONS OF MAD

The American experience at deterring the use of nuclear weapons has been shaped by the Cold War conflict with the former Soviet Union. In 1964, Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, introduced the term "assured destruction" to describe the capability required for nuclear deterrence.¹³² The essence of assured destruction was that successful

¹²⁷ Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 75.

¹²⁸ Rhodes, 97.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Schelling, 100. For an opposing view, see Peterson, 286 - 287.

¹³¹ Snyder argues that the elements of a punishment strategy may be required to ensure security regardless of what strategy is implemented. Therefore providing for an adequate denial capability would incur added costs to the defender. Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, 7.

¹³² Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 246.

deterrence against a Soviet nuclear attack was achieved by the American capability to absorb a nuclear first-strike and still maintain sufficient retaliatory forces to inflict unacceptable punishment on the Soviet Union.¹⁴¹ By the late 1960's, it became evident to the U.S. defense establishment that the Soviets also had acquired a second-strike capability. In his 1968 statement before Congress, McNamara stated:

The Soviets have, in fact, acquired a large force of ICBM's [Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles] installed in hardened underground silos. To put it bluntly, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can attack the other, even by complete surprise, without suffering massive damage in retaliation. This is so because each side has achieved, and will most likely maintain over the foreseeable future, an actual and credible second strike capability against the other.¹⁴⁴

The situation described by McNamara has been termed mutual assured destruction (MAD).¹⁴⁵ It is not the goal of this discussion to debate the logic or criticisms of nuclear strategies based on MAD. Rather it is helpful to demonstrate how the strategies for deterrence are applied to the situation of MAD in U.S. policy.¹⁴⁶

Of the coercive strategies available to the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, it can be argued that all three, punishment, retaliation, and denial have been applied. The strategy of punishment was first articulated in 1954 by John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State

¹⁴¹ Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961 - 1969 (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), 174.

¹⁴⁴ Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969-73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968): 174.

¹⁴⁵ It may be more descriptive to use the term mutual assured vulnerability. See Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), 271 - 276.

¹⁴⁶ MAD is sometimes referred to as an American strategy or doctrine. It is neither. MAD describes the perceived situation based merely on the capability of the opposing nuclear arsenals and the rejection of defenses that would affect vulnerability to attack. One significant criticism of MAD is that the Soviets never accepted this American perception.

in the Eisenhower administration.¹³⁷ It became known as the doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" although it described a simple punitive, rather than retaliatory strategy. It did not seek to either deny the Soviets their war objectives or to threaten the application of compellent force as would respective strategies of denial and retaliation.¹³⁸

Edward Rhodes proposes that, in the 1960's U.S. strategy accommodated "the new reality of mutual societal vulnerability...by attempting to abandon nuclear punishment not in favor of nuclear denial but in favor of nuclear retaliation."¹³⁹ Rhodes argues that the Kennedy administration's strategy of "Flexible Response" was a threat to escalate gradually the use of nuclear weapons to increase the overall costs to the Soviets in order to enforce compliance for conflict termination.¹⁴⁰ Others refer to a U.S. deterrent policy after the recognition of MAD as denial.¹⁴¹ Jervis proposes that the policy actually relied on the notion of punishment. "[T]he mutual vulnerability created by nuclear weapons has brought about a revolution in statecraft. The superpowers can no longer deter by denial. Instead they must deter by punishment."¹⁴² The confusion over which strategy was applied rests in the failure for a single coercive strategy to address all of the attack options that were available to the Soviet Union.

¹³⁷ Earlier, during the Truman administration, American policy towards the use of atomic weapons was unclear, although the military did plan for their availability to use in a war against the Soviet Union. See David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945 - 1960," International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 12 - 14.

¹³⁸ Rhodes, 99.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Snyder, Deterrence by Denial and Punishment, 5. Denial is appropriate if it succeeds in thwarting the Soviets from achieving their goals by threatening destruction of their economic, military, and political power after an attack.

¹⁴² Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 114.

A nuclear strategy of punishment appears credible as a threat to deter a nuclear attack on the United States.¹⁴⁴ It loses credibility, however, when applied to a case of extended deterrence. To threaten punishment to prevent nuclear attack on a third party in a situation of MAD, a defender must accept destruction of its own country.¹⁴⁴ Punishment appears even less logical as a threatened strategy when used to deter a conventional attack on a third party.

Focusing on deterring the Soviet use of nuclear weapons, a strategy of punishment is credible in situations of central deterrence and the strategies of denial and retaliation are credible in cases of extended deterrence. Of the latter two, denial appears to have been a more logical choice if the deterrent goal is the prevention of nuclear use. This is because retaliation becomes a compellent threat once deterrence fails and attempts to prevent nuclear escalation rather than initial use of nuclear weapons.

The lessons of MAD and the American experience are only useful in this discussion as they relate to a potential deterrence situation in the Third World. It is therefore important to recognize the differences between a deterrence policy once aimed at the Soviet Union and one aimed at a nation in the developing world.

The most obvious difference is that the situation of MAD does not exist. Estimates of the potential size of Third World nuclear arsenals, indicate that in the foreseeable future, they will neither be large enough nor have the capabilities to maintain a survivable second-

¹⁴⁴ Paul Nitze argues that punishment is not an adequate central deterrence threat. He proposes a scenario of a Soviet first-strike against U.S. nuclear forces in which an American President would feel restrained from retaliating by the knowledge that Soviets would respond by an attack on U. S. cities. Paul Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Policy 25(Winter 1976 - 77): 195 - 210.

¹⁴⁴ Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 10 -11.

strike capability.¹⁴⁵ The credibility problems associated with extended deterrence under MAD, therefore, disappear. The absence of a second-strike capability does not imply that central deterrence is not an issue for the United States vis-a vis the Third World. The proliferation of missile and other delivery system technology indicates a future potential capability for Third World attacks on the United States.¹⁴⁶

If the need for central deterrence against Third World nuclear powers appears remote, the need for a U.S. extended deterrence policy is imminent. Even the crudest of nuclear delivery systems can threaten U.S. allies or forces abroad. Therefore, it is critical that the United States address the extended deterrence problem with an appropriate coercive strategy.

E. COERCIVE STRATEGY FOR THE THIRD WORLD

In order to decide which coercive strategy is appropriate for the Third World, it is important to focus again on the desired goal of deterrence. This discussion is centered on the need to develop a deterrence policy to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by Third World authoritarian regimes. It is not a prescription for threatening a response against any attack option available to a potential Third World dictator. Therefore, the deterrence policy developed should be applicable in either pre-war or intra-war situations.

Since the goal is preventing nuclear use, a strategy of retaliation is rejected. It would not be productive to threaten that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, the United States will respond until the aggressor ceases the use of nuclear weapons. Again, the size of the

¹⁴⁵ Spector and Smith propose that of all the potential Third World nuclear powers, Israel's arsenal is the largest at an estimate of between 50 and 200 devices. Spector with Smith, Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990, 159. This number is 10 times smaller than the most conservative proposal for U.S. warhead reductions. Andrew Rosenthal, "Bush and Yeltsin Propose Deep Cuts in Atomic Weapons," New York Times, 30 January 1992, A1 and A6.

¹⁴⁶ Fetter, 6. For an analysis of the potential of Third World ballistic missile capabilities, see Janne E. Nolan, Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991), especially Chapter Three.

Third World arsenals will restrict the number of nuclear attacks made by the aggressor. This could result in retaliation succeeding only after a significant portion of the aggressor's nuclear inventory is depleted.

Since it is difficult to ascertain whether the authoritarian Third World regimes in question can be relied upon to behave rationally, a strategy of denial must be developed in the event deterrence fails. Specifically, a defensive denial strategy is needed. The capability for intercepting and destroying nuclear delivery systems will effectively deny the aggressive regime any benefit for their use. Even if technical solutions are found for the defense challenge, however, it is improbable that such answers will guarantee complete effectiveness.¹⁴⁷ Therefore, the limitations of defense capabilities necessitate the integration of the preemptive aspects of a denial strategy. This would alleviate the burden on defenses to satisfy the requirements of a denial strategy.¹⁴⁸ The targeting goals of the denial strategy are easily recognizable. Preemption will require the United States to target and destroy the nuclear delivery systems before the potential aggressor has the opportunity to employ them.

While a strategy of denial addresses deterrence failure, a punishment strategy would be an appropriate basis for a deterrence policy. Third World nuclear powers must be threatened with attacks that will excessively raise the costs of nuclear use. The absence of a situation of MAD allows this strategy to be credible. This threat, however must also be perceived as credible both before a crisis and as an intra-war deterrence policy. One of the critical lessons of the Gulf War is that once the coalition air attacks began, the Bush

¹⁴⁷ An extensive discussion of American defensive capabilities will be presented in chapter IV.

¹⁴⁸ Interestingly, The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization argues that ballistic missile defenses eliminate the need for preemption "Defenses also reduce the incentives for anticipatory or preemptive attacks by allied, coalition, or other national forces against those countries threatening attack with ballistic missiles." Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1991 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, May 1991, 1-6.

administration was severely limited to the types of targets that either could be credibly threatened or that would be recognized by the Iraqi regime as significantly different.

The targeting requirements of the punishment strategy, therefore, are not readily apparent. To fulfill the requirements of deterrence, the threat must target the value system of the aggressor and be within U.S. capabilities. Additionally, because of the potential need to implement this type of deterrence during an on-going conflict, the threat must be effectively signalled so that it is recognized by the aggressor as significantly more devastating than the scope of the present fighting. It is the criteria for the development of this deterrent threat that forms the basis of the next chapter.

III. OMNIBALANCING AND THIRD WORLD DETERRENCE

The discussion of nuclear deterrence emphasized three coercive strategies available to the United States: retaliation, denial and punishment. Of these, denial and punishment were evaluated as applicable to a Third World nuclear deterrence policy. The focus of this chapter is the development of a punishment strategy aimed at Third World authoritarian regimes. This discussion identifies a common value system among Third World dictators and translates this into a target set that could be threatened, in a crisis, for successful deterrence. It will be argued that the theory of omnibalancing predicts that authoritarian regimes are influenced by perceived threats to their internal security. An analysis of how these regimes maintain their base of power will be offered. Finally, a general target set will be developed based on holding at risk the mechanisms Third World dictatorships utilize to maintain internal control.

A. INTERNAL THREATS AND OMNIBALANCING

Third World authoritarian regimes are characterized by a heterogeneous population, narrow support base and domestic challenges to regime legitimacy. These features influence the threat assessment calculations of Third World dictators. In many cases, the lack of consensus in domestic support results in the internal dimension of security becoming the most significant to the regime in power.¹ According to Mark Gasiorowski, "In much of the Third World today, domestic political instability poses a much greater threat to vital national

¹ Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States (Dover, MA: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1987), 5.

values than threats originating abroad.”² The effect of this perception of internal threats on decision-making of Third World authoritarian regimes has been discussed in literature with respect to alliance formation. Steven R. David introduces the term, “omni-balancing” to describe the behavior of Third World leaders.³ The term omnibalancing implies that a compromise is sought between addressing external and internal threats. David does not argue that Third World leaders will only react to internal threats to their regimes. He does propose, however, that threat prioritization will be dependent on “the drive of Third World leaders to ensure their political and physical survival.”⁴

The consideration of internal threats distinguishes the theory of omnibalancing from previous theories explaining Third World alignment decisions. Stephen M. Walt proposes that when faced with an external threat, Third World leaders respond in one of two ways.⁵ The first is termed “balancing” and describes the formation of an alliance in order to check a potential adversary and prevent it from becoming a dominant power in the region.⁶ The second response is “bandwagoning” which refers to the act of allying with a stronger power when it threatens the security of the Third World regime.⁷ In discussing both balancing

² Mark J. Gasiorowski, “Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi Iran,” in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon ed., National Security in the Third World (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988), 228.

³ Steven R. David, Choosing Sides (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 7.

⁴ David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” 236.

⁵ Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 28 – 29.

⁶ Ibid., 18.

⁷ Ibid., 19.

and bandwagoning, Walt focuses on the external aspects of regime security.⁸ David does not entirely dismiss Walt's theories of alignment behavior but believes their omission of the internal dimension of security renders them inadequate.⁹

The prioritization between internal and external threats may result in behavior that may not appear to be in the national interest of the Third World state. The theory of omnibalancing, however, allows even for the case of a Third World dictator who acts to protect his regime at the expense of the population. David proposes, "[W]hen confronted with a decision between aligning so as to benefit the state but endangering their hold on power and aligning in such a way that would harm the state but would preserve their power, the [Third World] leadership will choose the latter."¹⁰ This behavior is understandable since the authoritarian leadership neither recognizes its country as a "nation," nor is driven by national aspirations.

The preoccupation with internal threats characterized by omnibalancing is historically justifiable. Between 1945 - 1985, there have been 183 successful coups d'état and 174 unsuccessful coup attempts in the Third World.¹¹ Between 1958 and 1981, there were 41 successful coups in 22 countries of Black Africa alone.¹² In Latin America, every nation

⁸ Walt's discussion of "balancing" and "bandwagoning" draws upon arguments from Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979). For a critical analysis of Waltz's theories, see Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization 44 (Spring 1990): 137 - 168.

⁹ David, Choosing Sides, 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.

¹¹ Steven R. David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 1.

¹² Jackson and Rosberg, 8.

except Mexico has experienced at least one coup since World War II.¹¹ In fact, according to David, the coups d'état is the "most common form of coercive regime change"¹⁴ in the Third World.

While the internal security perceptions of Third World leaders may not have received adequate attention in literature, it is not a new phenomenon.¹⁵ In the early 1960's, for example, the military assistance from the United States to Latin America was primarily concerned with the military aspects of counter-insurgency.¹⁶ In sub-Saharan Africa, ten nations have suffered severe domestic disorder or civil war from the mid-1950's to the early 1980's.¹⁷

Adding to the significance of internal security for Third World authoritarian regimes is the rarity of the loss of sovereignty to external forces. Even considering the recent attempt by Iraq to annex Kuwait, the weakest of the Third World nations have managed to maintain their legal status of nationhood.¹⁸ National survival, therefore, is rarely threatened

¹¹ John Samuel Fitch, The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 3.

¹⁴ David, Choosing Sides, 12.

¹⁵ For a review of the literature emphasis on external threats to the Third World and the recent shift in focus, see Mohammed Ayoob, "The Security Problematic of the Third World," World Politics 43 (January 1991): 257 - 283.

¹⁶ Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins Policies and Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 50.

¹⁷ The nations are: Sudan (1956 - 1972); Rwanda (1959 - 1964); Zaire (1960 - 1965; 1977 - 1978); Ethiopia (1962 - 1982); Zanzibar (1964); Burundi (1966 - 1972); Chad (1966 - 1982); Uganda (1966; 1978 - 1982); Nigeria (1967 - 1970); and Angola (1975 - 1982). Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," 5.

¹⁸ Jackson and Rosberg define the legal criteria for nationhood as the possession of defined territory and the international recognition of independence. *Ibid*, 13.

but the stability of the regime in power is frequently at risk.¹⁹ The stability of Third World sovereignty is attributed to the influence and support of the international community as represented by organizations like the United Nations.²⁰ This international support lends legitimacy, not to the regime, but to the territorial integrity of the state.²¹

The argument that external threats are less frequent than internal threats to regime security does not imply that international conflict does not occur in the Third World. A review of the outbreak of wars in the Third World since 1945 clearly demonstrates the prevalency of conflict due to external forces.²² Omnibalancing theory does predict, however, that faced with both internal and external threats, Third World leaders will act to protect their regime.

For this discussion, omnibalancing behavior is assumed to be the significant influence on Third World decision-making. A logical extension of this explanation of how authoritarian regimes align themselves in the face of threats is a formula for successfully threatening Third World states. Omnibalancing may be the key in determining how to deter Third World authoritarian regimes.

Deterrence in the Third World will require threatening the regime's base of power. Specifically, the deterring power must hold at risk the mechanisms Third World dictators utilize to maintain internal control. The question that requires answering is whether or not

¹⁹ Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962 - 73," International Organizations 45 (Summer 1991): 373.

²⁰ Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," 16 - 21.

²¹ Ibid., 20.

²² Azar and Moon report that between 1945 and 1988, 90% of all conflict and international violence and 119 out of 120 recorded wars have taken place in the Third World. Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, "Rethinking Third World National Security," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon ed., National Security in the Third World (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988), 3.

it is possible to influence favorably the decision-making of the regime leadership, by threatening the internal stability of a Third World state.

1. Externalization of Internal Threats and Scapegoat Wars

Before discussing the mechanisms Third World authoritarian leaders use for internal control, two behavioral obstacles to successful deterrence need to be discussed. They are the externalization of internal threats and the tendency toward "scapegoat wars." These obstacles are similar in that they describe methods by which Third World authoritarian regimes use foreign policy to strengthen their domestic position.²¹ Both represent responses to threats to the internal security of the regime. While there is historical precedence for these responses in the face of actual external enemies, it has also been possible for the regime to conjure up threats for use in dissipating internal opposition.²⁴ Understanding the way Third World dictators respond to perceived internal threats is thus critical to the development of a nuclear deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.

The authoritarian leadership, in an attempt to thwart internal opposition, may focus the blame for the state's domestic ills on a recognizable external foe. For the purposes of this discussion, this is referred to as externalizing the internal threat. The generational memory of the former colonial populace is especially susceptible to a dictator's accusations against former imperial powers. The regime leadership can also achieve its aims by focusing blame on a regional rival, particularly if there is a history of conflict between the regime and the rival state.

The Ba'athist regime in Iraq is one example of the latter case. Specifically, the decision of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade Iran in September 1980 suggests that Hussein was concerned about the internal opposition to his regime. While the Shah of Iran

²¹ W. Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 228 - 236.

²⁴ Ibid., 230.

held power he did not directly threaten the stability of the Ba'athist regime.²⁵ With the fall of the Shah in June 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini became a significant threat. The Ayatollah was committed to having the Iraqi Ba'ath Party overthrown and replaced with a Shi'ite Islamic government of the same ideology as himself.²⁶ While initially the Shi'ite population in Iraq was unresponsive to Khomeini's call for rebellion, the Ba'ath regime quickly took action to strengthen its control including ordering purges of Shi'ite fundamentalists.²⁷

On July 17, 1979, Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq and Chairman of the Ba'ath Party.²⁸ He expanded the purges to include the Ba'ath membership and within one month, over 100 arrests were made.²⁹ According to Ralph King, it was the externalization of Hussein's perception of the internal threat that led him to the decision of war with Iran. "The Iraqi argument for war might have been put this way: If no positive step were taken soon to meet the political challenge head on, the Ba'ath authority - and by extension, the state - might collapse."³⁰ Reacting to the external threat of Khomeini, Hussein quickly acted to consolidate his internal power base.

²⁵ Mohammed Ayoob, "Perspectives from the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security," in Donald Hugh McMillen, ed., Asian Perspectives on International Security, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 102. In fact, Ayoob proposed that the Shah actually increased Ba'athist consolidation of power by "playing the role of credible whipping boy" on which the domestic ills of Iraq could be blamed.

²⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War Volume II: The Iran - Iraq War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 22.

²⁷ This was not a new tactic. In 1978, Iraq had launched a crackdown among Kurds and Iraqi Communists, resulting in executions in May 1978. *Ibid.*, 25.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 27.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

³⁰ Ralph King, The Iran - Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper No. 219 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1987), 10.

The Iraqi case indicates potential limitations of using the theory of omnibalancing for a deterrence policy. Hussein's response indicates that Khomeini was threatening the Ba'ath regime's internal control. The result was an escalation of conflict rather than any type of deterrence.¹¹

There are some unique circumstances however, that certainly influenced Hussein's decision.¹² At the very least, Hussein calculated that he could defeat Iran and the threat Khomeini posed. An obvious lesson is that threatening internal control may not deter if Third World elites believe it can be circumvented.¹³

Another example of externalizing an internal threat is Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's decision to invade Israel in October 1973. The influence of the internal threat to Sadat's regime can be traced back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. As a result of that war, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula and faced Egypt across the Suez Canal.¹⁴

Sadat had been named Vice-President under Gamal Abdel Nasser in December 1969. When Nasser died in September 1970, Sadat ascended to the Presidency.¹⁵ When Sadat took office, it appeared that the external threat of Israel was the most significant

¹¹ Hussein's behavior does not conflict with omnibalancing. According to David's logic, Hussein perceived Khomeini as the greatest threat to his internal control and acted accordingly.

¹² The timing of the Iraqi invasion was critical. Post-revolutionary Iran was perceived to be weak. The Iranian military had been purged of their leadership and had lost Western military assistance. Also, the perceived defection of Egypt from the Arab camp with the signing of the peace treaty with Israel created a leadership vacuum which Hussein was eager to fill. Ayooob, "Perspectives From the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security," 104.

¹³ This point regarding deterrence failure serves as a critique of conventional deterrence literature. Mearsheimer proposes that conventional deterrence is not a function of either the balance of forces or the available weapons. Rather, it is a function of the military strategy utilized by both sides. In the Iraqi case, Hussein perceived that his strategy would overcome the internal threat posed by Khomeini and thus was not deterred. Mearsheimer, 28.

¹⁴ David, Choosing Sides, 58.

¹⁵ Ibid.

source for instability in his regime. Walt argues that Sadat was primarily reacting to this external threat when he made the decision for war.³⁶

David, however, counters Walt's argument. He describes Sadat's initial threat concern as predominantly internal to the regime. According to David's proposition, Sadat realized that "his tenure in office depended on the support of the military."³⁷ As long as Israeli forces occupied the Sinai, the Egyptian military would grow increasingly frustrated and resentful of the Egyptian regime in power. No goal was more portentous to the Egyptian military leadership than regaining their honor by ousting Israeli forces from their lost territory.³⁸ In fact, as David recounts, the threat of an Israeli attack on Egypt became remote by 1970.³⁹ By that time, only the Egyptian military had the power to remove Sadat's regime from power. Placating the military, therefore, was Sadat's most important priority.⁴⁰ As David proposes, by 1973 Sadat had exhausted diplomatic and political solutions to remove the Israelis from the Sinai:

The Egyptian military had become dangerously restive after years of inactively and humiliation on the banks of the Suez Canal. The Egyptian people too had run out of patience with the continuing stalemate. Stopgap measures and excuses could no longer justify the failure to take action against the Israelis.⁴¹

³⁶ Walt traced the 1973 war to three developments: "(1) The failure to reach a political solution to the Arab-Israeli Dispute, (2) The ability of key Middle East states...to obtain increased military support from their superpower patrons, and (3) The formation of the first effective anti-Israeli alliance by the Arab states." Walt, 114.

³⁷ David, Choosing Sides, 59.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid., 68. David argues that omnibalancing not only explains Sadat's decision for war, but also makes Egypt's alignment decisions with the Soviet Union understandable.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 69.

⁴¹ Ibid., 84.

As with the Iraqi example, omnibalancing explains why Sadat externalized the internal threat to his regime.

The externalization of internal threats does not always result in military hostilities. For example, during over two decades of rule, President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria has deflected internal opposition to his regime by passing blame for Syria's domestic troubles onto such external powers as Israel, Iraq and the United States.⁴² Interestingly, this same technique for diffusing internal opposition has also been attributed to the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan, in his famous "X" article, argues that, starting in the 1920's, "all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power."⁴³

The second obstacle to utilizing omnibalancing to formulate deterrence strategy is the notion of the "scapegoat" or diversionary war. According to the concept of diversionary war, a regime facing internal instability may choose to initiate external conflict to unite domestic consensus against a common foe.⁴⁴ A scapegoat war can be utilized by the regime to justify reductions of local autonomy and political freedom.⁴⁵ It can also assist in both preventing internal fragmentation and countering domestic insurrection.⁴⁶ As in the case of a regime externalizing its internal threat, a regime prone to scapegoat wars might respond

⁴² Margaret G. Hermann, "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," in Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin ed., Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988), 76.

⁴³ X [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 570.

⁴⁴ For a concise review of the theoretical arguments concerning the validity of scapegoat wars, see Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman Inc., 1989), 259 - 288.

⁴⁵ Wiggins, 230.

⁴⁶ Arno J. Mayer, "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870 - 1956: A Research Assignment," World Politics 41 (September 1969): 295.

to a deterrent threat on its mechanisms of control by attacking the deterring power. The argument supporting scapegoat wars would predict that deterrence based on omnibalancing may have difficulty succeeding.

One case that is often explained in terms of the notion of a scapegoat war is the 1982 Falkland Islands War between Great Britain and Argentina. The debate over ownership of the Falkland Islands has a interminable history. The impetus for Argentine occupation of the islands in April 1982, however, was more than the insistence of legal entitlements.⁴⁷

In March 1976, control of the Argentine government had been taken over, in a bloodless coup, by a military Junta.⁴⁸ The Junta had promised an end to inflation, an increase to productivity and wages, and the elimination of leftist terrorist groups.⁴⁹ By 1982, it had become clear that the Junta was failing to keep these promises. Economically, attempts in the late 1970's to restructure the production base and enter the world market resulted in nearly bankrupting entire industrial sectors.⁵⁰ By 1981, economic growth was below 1.0 percent and twenty-eight major banks had collapsed. Inflation was 149 percent and real wages had declined by 18 percent. Out of a population of twenty-eight million,

⁴⁷ Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule (London: Verso Editions, 1984), 63.

⁴⁸ Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculations in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," The Journal of Strategic Studies 6 (March 1983): 11.

⁴⁹ Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 144.

⁵⁰ Dabat and Lorenzano, 64. The hardest hit were the textile industries, agricultural consumer-goods, branches of the metal industry and regional employers of labor such as vineyards and fruit farms.

there may have been as many as two million unemployed.⁵¹ Additionally, the Junta had increased Argentina's foreign debt faster than had any previous regime.⁵²

In addition to the economic turmoil, the Argentine people had suffered from indiscriminate attacks on Leftist groups and their alleged sympathizers. Some estimates report as many as 20,000 people were killed.⁵³ In 1981, the influential Catholic Church began to publicly protest the excesses of the government. Strikes were being threatened by the major unions and mass protest movements began to be organized.⁵⁴ The Argentine press began to criticize openly the Junta's economic performance and failure for settling the Falkland dispute.⁵⁵

It was in this context that the Junta of General Leopoldo Galtieri considered military action in the Falklands. He sought to unite the principal opposition groups by selling the Falklands campaign as a patriotic defense against imperialist England.⁵⁶ He also sought to transform the image of the military and their role in Argentina's government. According to Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano:

From being the army of the 'dirty war,' [the Argentine military] would turn into patriots bent on recovering for the nation a portion of territory under imperial occupation. And having risked their lives in defence (sic) of the nation, they would become the dispensers of reward and punishment. All dissent would constitute an outrage against the architects and guarantors of national integrity....No one would feel able to...question the course [the junta] charted in the economy, policy and society.⁵⁷

⁵¹ Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," 12.

⁵² Gustafson, 145.

⁵³ Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," 11.

⁵⁴ Dabat and Lorenzano, 72 - 75.

⁵⁵ Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War," 12.

⁵⁶ Dabat and Lorenzano, 76.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

In this view, a victory in the Falklands would have vindicated the military government in the eyes of the Argentine people.

The Falkland War example aside, there is some doubt that the scapegoat war phenomenon is valid.⁵⁸ Geoffrey Blainey analyzed warfare between 1815 and 1939. He concludes that the historical record does not support the notion of scapegoat wars.⁵⁹ Blainey argues that nations suffering from severe internal unrest tended to avoid wars because of the lack of domestic support for providing the resources required to fight.⁶⁰ The ability of a regime to extract the required war resources from its society is dependent on the strength of domestic opposition to the regime and on the internal perception of the external threat.⁶¹ According to Blainey's argument, a deterrent threat based on omnibalancing would not lead to a scapegoat war if the regime perceived its internal control at risk.⁶² Notwithstanding Blainey's findings, some analysts still consider the scapegoat war a real phenomenon.⁶³

The cases of externalizing an internal threat and the scapegoat war both indicate potential limitations of using omnibalancing to formulate a Third World nuclear deterrence policy. Both cases describe regimes who reacted to the internal threats to their security by

⁵⁸ For a contrasting view of the Junta's reasons for invading the Falklands see Gustafson, 146 - 152; and Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1984), 261 - 272.

⁵⁹ Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (New York: The Free Press, 1973), 72 - 86.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 86.

⁶¹ Alan C. Lamborn, "Power and the Politics of Extraction," International Studies Quarterly 27 (June 1983): 130.

⁶² Mayer, studying European warfare from 1870 - 1956, comes to a similar conclusion. "[G]overnments that face acute internal turmoil or conflict are inclined to avoid a test of arms in which the risks of defeat, and hence of fatal inner convulsions, seem prohibitively high." Mayer, 295.

⁶³ Levy, 259 - 288.

striking external powers. While this result is opposite of the one desired in a deterrence situation, it does not invalidate a strategy based on omnibalancing. According to omnibalancing, a Third World regime will react to what it perceives as the greatest threat to its power. In the cases of Iraq, Egypt, and Argentina, the regimes perceived that the potential external conflict was less threatening than the potential of a coup. In order to deter these regimes, the external power must pose a credible and overwhelming threat to mechanisms of internal control and convince the regime that if deterrence fails, the regime will be overthrown.

B. MECHANISMS OF INTERNAL CONTROL

To implement a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing, the internal control mechanisms of a Third World authoritarian regime must be threatened. Two sources of literature can explain how these regimes maintain their stability. The first is the literature which analyzes the likelihood and results of coups d'etat. The second is the literature dedicated to the study of Third World economic development. Using this evidence, it is possible to formulate a list of general types of targets to hold at risk for deterrence. Before developing these theoretical target sets, it is first important to distinguish between the core following and the periphery following of a regime.

1. Clientelism and Regime Legitimacy

Many authoritarian regimes are "personal" governments that are dependent on the support of the state elites.⁶⁴ One mechanism by which these regimes maintain stability is termed clientelism. Jackson and Rosberg define clientelism as "a system of patron-client ties that bind leaders and followers in relationships not only of mutual assistance and

⁶⁴ Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa, 23.

support, but also of recognized and accepted inequality between big men and lesser men."⁶⁵ The leadership of the regime, in the role of patron, elicits support and allegiance from the military, the regime membership and other sources of power in the state. These ties of loyalty can be broken down into two different levels: affective and instrumental.⁶⁶

Affective ties are based on more than professional or economic relationships. They develop from personal links between the patron and clients.⁶⁷ The ruler may have come from the same town or village as the clients or have been a classmate of the clients in school. The relationships that form affective ties range from that based on the ruler and regime elite being family members to that resulting from shared ideological convictions.

For this analysis, it is not necessarily important to distinguish the source of the affective ties. It is more important to note that these ties represent the core following of the regime leadership.⁶⁸ The size of this core is an indication of the stability of the regime because it contains the "virtually irreducible"⁶⁹ base of support. The loyalty of the core following is strong enough to make it impervious to external threats to the regime.

Instrumental ties are based on the perceived supply of benefits that clients receive from the dictator. These ties form between the authoritarian leadership and the periphery following and are dependent on the resource base of the regime.⁷⁰ Since the instrumental ties are based on material reward, they are subject to the fluctuations of the regime's

⁶⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁶⁶ James C. Scott, "Patron - Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972): 99.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

economic growth. The periphery following could turn against the dictatorship, if it perceived a declining resource base.⁷¹

The size of the periphery following is an indication of the perceived legitimacy of the regime.⁷² As Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat states, "[T]he degree of satisfaction of [societal] wants and needs determines...aggressive drives in the society...."⁷³ To say that a particular regime ignores the domestic needs of its society (and therefore has a low periphery following), however, is not to say the regime is unstable. According to Al-Mashat, "The generalized loyalty of a wider public to a personal ruler is probably less important than the more immediate and direct loyalty of lieutenants and [core] clients."⁷⁴ Nevertheless, it is the mechanisms the authoritarian regime uses to control the periphery following that are the focus of this section.

There is abundant literature on the causes of coups d'état in the Third World. There are disagreements, however, on the motivating influences that spark a coup d'état.⁷⁵ For this discussion, the conditions that lead to successful coups are more significant than the motivations that lead to coup attempts. Two causal themes that reoccur in the coup literature are the dissatisfaction of the general military forces and the deterioration of the national economy. The general military forces may become dissatisfied with their lack of military autonomy under the often oppressive control of elite security forces. The economy

⁷¹ The term "resources" in this discussion does not only refer to financial or investment wealth. Status is also a resource dependent on the regime leadership and can affect the perceptions of the regime's military or security forces.

⁷² Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, National Security in the Third World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), 43 - 44.

⁷³ Ibid., 44.

⁷⁴ Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa, 41.

⁷⁵ For an excellent empirical analysis of common theories of the causes of coups, see William R. Thompson, "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup," Comparative Politics 7 (July 1975): 459 - 487.

of the authoritarian state determines the strength of the instrumental ties between the periphery following and the dictator.

The periphery following represents the challenge to the Third World dictator in maintaining internal control. An organized dissatisfaction of the periphery could result in a coup d'etat. Third World regimes have two instruments to control the periphery following, suppression and distribution of resources.

2. Internal Control Through Suppression

Suppression refers to the utilization of force to ensure that the potential opposition is unable to threaten the regime. The most common means of suppression are internal security forces. In many regimes, these forces are made up of an elite military membership separate from the general purpose forces. The regime leadership depends on these forces as part of the core following.

In Libya, the revolutionary guards play this role for Khadaffi's regime. The majority of them have been recruited from Khadaffi's own tribe to ensure their loyalty. They have been placed in positions of control and authority throughout the Libyan military forces and, though relatively small in numbers, are lavishly provided with combat equipment and other rewards.⁷⁶

In Hussein's Iraq, the Republican Guard is the elite military force. Originally, the Guard was organized as a security force rather than as a combat formation.⁷⁷ In contrast to Libyan elite forces, the Guard do not hold positions of authority within the regular military. From the late 1970's, according to Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, the Republican Guard has been "recruited...and charged with a specific mission to protect the

⁷⁶ An example of the control the revolutionary guards hold over the Libyan military are the reports of guard members holding the keys to ammunition stockpiles at the major military bases and thus controlling weapon distribution. Helen Chapin Metz, ed., Libya: A Country Study, (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 257.

⁷⁷ Cordesman and Wagner, 61.

core of the regime. In the process of fitting them for this task, it was noticeable that they were being trained and armed not to deal with civil disturbance but with military revolt."⁷⁸ Hussein's perception of internal threats, therefore, is focused on the regular military forces.

Both the Libyan and Iraqi regimes tightly control the recruitment of elites, especially in the case of internal security forces. Mohammed Ayoob defines the recruitment system as "'closed' since one has to belong to the right parentage or town/area to obtain membership."⁷⁹ Recruitment can make the regime vulnerable to a threat that targets the elite military forces. The general purposes forces do not share the elite's support of the regime and the regime leadership may feel anxious about the prospect of the military becoming unshackled from elite control.

By contrast to Iraq and Libya, the Iranian recruitment system is very open. As Ayoob states, the only restrictions for acceptance to the Iranian elite system are "ideological commitment and shared political values."⁸⁰ In 1984, one Iranian revolutionary leader described the composition of the elite Iranian revolutionary guards as, "10 percent city thugs, 60 percent poor youths who needed a job, and 30 percent ideologically dedicated youth."⁸¹ This open recruitment system provides the regime an ability to survive political or military disruption, making the targeting of elite forces difficult.

⁷⁸ Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq at War (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 19.

⁷⁹ Ayoob, "Perspectives From the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security," 108.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Richard W. Cottam, Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 192.

3. Internal Control Through Economic Distribution

The second form of internal control, that Third World regimes share is the ability to regulate the distribution of economic resources. David proposes that the "power of the Third World state...derives from the ability to distribute goods."⁸² For many Third World regimes, economic control is easier to maintain than suppression. For example, according to Christopher Clapham, "When the piped water supply or the tarmac road went to the ruling party's constituency, and stopped sharply at the boundary with the opposition one, it did not take the people across that boundary long to perceive the virtues of loyalty."⁸³ Controlling resources is equivalent in these regimes to maintaining internal stability.⁸⁴ The behavior associated with this control has been termed the "politics of accommodation."⁸⁵ The regime leadership rewards the loyalty of the most powerful elite groups. Those in the periphery following that have no power or represent potential opposition are suppressed through a withholding of economic support. This behavior has been recognized as a significant obstacle to economic development in the Third World.⁸⁶

Barry Ames addresses the politics of accommodation in an analysis of Latin American regime behavior. He concludes that Latin American regimes focused on a combination of five budgeting strategies of control.⁸⁷ The basis for the categorization of these strategies was the portion of the periphery following they were designed to

⁸² David, Choosing Sides, 13.

⁸³ Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 66.

⁸⁴ Robert L. Rothstein, The Weak in the World of the Strong, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 182.

⁸⁵ Ibid. Rothstein credits R. Crawford Pratt with coining this phrase.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 183.

⁸⁷ Barry Ames, Political Survival (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 212.

accommodate. The first budgeting strategy involved increasing the military budget to hedge against military opposition.⁸⁸ The second strategy focused on paying for the loyalty of civil government officials. The third attacked potential regional opposition by buying security through funding of desired local needs.⁸⁹ Transfer payments, such as social security, were the basis of the fourth strategy, which targeted an unorganized, potentially hostile population. The last strategy was aimed at a particular societal class and provided funding based on the target's desires.⁹⁰

Each of these strategies requires a continuous flow of economic resources to the regime leadership. For the purpose of formulating deterrence policies, it is not important to recognize which budgeting strategy is being followed. What is important, however, is determining the source of the economic benefits. If the source can be threatened, it is conceivable that the authoritarian regime would perceive its internal control to be threatened as well.

The economies of most Third World nations are dependent on few, and in many cases, a single export. As a result, many regimes become extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity prices and, if the export is agricultural, to weather conditions.⁹¹ This vulnerability directly influences the frequency of coups d'état in the Third World. Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, for example, examined 52 Third World countries that

⁸⁸ Ibid., 213. In regimes such as Khadaffi's Libya or Hussein's Iraq, it might only be necessary to placate the elite security forces who could be used to crush any military opposition to the regime.

⁸⁹ Ibid. An example of this would be the funding of a hospital or school in a particular region. Ames recognizes that the political capital of this strategy could only be collected after the project was completed. Thus, this is a strategy of last resort.

⁹⁰ Ibid. Ames provides the example of a regime funding education at the expense of the military to placate the working middle class.

⁹¹ Jackson and Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa, 27.

depended on a single export for 50% or more of their export receipts.⁹² Of that 52, only 14 had not experienced a coup.⁹³ Inclusion of those nations which have a single export dependency of 40% or more was also revealing. Twelve out of a possible 15 nations experienced coups.⁹⁴

While O'Kane's analysis may appear convincing, the empirical relationship between single export dependence and the vulnerability of Third World authoritarian regimes is not clear cut.⁹⁵ The economic vulnerability of Third World regimes is more complex than the argument focusing on single exports. For many regimes, the combination of a dependence on critical imports, such as oil, with potential shortfalls of basic necessities, such as food crops, results in the vulnerable situation O'Kane describes.⁹⁶ A lack of industry and manufacturing capabilities is another characteristic that leads to regime susceptibility to coups.⁹⁷

Whatever the influence of single export dependence on regime vulnerability, it can be concluded that interruptions in the ability to export that commodity will have an adverse affect on the economy of that nation. If the regime does depend on a budgeting strategy to maintain control, threatening its ability to continue exporting could potentially be perceived as threats to regime security.

⁹² Rosemary H. T. O'Kane, The Likelihood of Coups (Aldershot, England: Avebury, 1987), 48.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Thompson empirically tested the hypothesis that "systems experiencing economic deterioration tend to be more prone to military coups." While he did not specifically define economic deterioration in terms of export dependence, he was able to prove that the evidence is only partially consistent with the hypothesis. Thompson, 472 - 475.

⁹⁶ Jackson and Rosberg, "Why Africa's Weak States Persist," 11.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

C. TARGETING INTERNAL CONTROL

The discussion of the internal control mechanisms of suppression and economic distribution provides potential categories of targets to threaten to deter Third World authoritarian regimes. The purpose of this section is to identify these targets in general terms. It is recognized that a specific targeting strategy must be tailored to individual situations.

1. Targeting Suppression

Targeting the mechanisms of suppression focuses primarily on the elite security forces. Threatening the neutralization of these forces, for example in Khadaffi's dictatorship, would remove the internal restraint on the military forces which present the greatest threat to the regime. In Hussein's regime, targeting the elite forces threatens the elimination of the loyal core following which serves as the direct defense of the government against a potentially hostile regular military force.

In addition to targeting the forces themselves, the command and control of those forces must also be threatened. The regime must perceive that if deterrence fails, it will quickly become isolated. It must be made evident to the dictatorship that the external deterrent threat represents a genuine risk of being overthrown.

In the recent Gulf War, declaratory statements by President George Bush clearly indicated that the overthrow of the Ba'ath regime was not a war objective.¹¹ Hussein did appear, however, to be concerned with the security of his regime. In fact, while analysts are

¹¹ When asked if overthrowing Hussein was being considered a U.S. objective, Bush answered, "Well it wouldn't disappoint me if the Iraqis got up and said ['] Look this man is our problem...['] but I've spelled out our objectives here, and I...stopped short of adding to them..." The objectives to which Bush referred were listed in his opening statement: "The immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf, and the protection of American citizens." "Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf Crisis," New York Times, 31 August 1990, A11.

still trying to explain why chemical weapons were not used in the Gulf War,⁹⁹ statements by Hussein indicate that he may have been trying to use the threat of chemical use to deter attacks on his regime. In a 30 August 1990 interview, Hussein was asked if he might use chemical weapons to save Iraq. He replied, "I haven't said this. What I'm saying is that Iraq is an independent sovereign state, and whoever attacks Iraq to change the government or to destroy Iraq, then they should expect that Iraq is not going to be an easy bite to swallow."¹⁰⁰ Hussein repeated this warning, during the war, in an interview with Peter Arnett of the Cable News Network. In the interview, Hussein stated, "We have maintained our balance using only conventional weapons...We pray we shall not be forced into taking a forced measure...."¹⁰¹ Hussein asserted that his missiles could deliver chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads and that using such weapons may be necessary to preserve Iraq.¹⁰²

The aforementioned evidence does support omnibalancing as a description of Third World behavior and highlights the potential of omnibalancing for deterrence. There is no clear evidence, however, that if the leaders of the United States and Iraq were consciously pursuing deterrence policies, the targeted nation received and understood the threat.

2. Targeting Economic Distribution

In order to predict the effect of targeting the means of Third World economic distribution, it is useful to review the body of literature on economic sanctions. Sanctions

⁹⁹ John Tagliabue, "Iraqi Weapons had Chemical Warheads," New York Times, 12 November 1991, A3.

¹⁰⁰ "Excerpts From Interview with Hussein on Crisis in Gulf," New York Times, 31 August 1990, A10.

¹⁰¹ Robert D. McFadden, "Hussein Hints Use of All His Weapons," New York Times, 29 January 1991, A12. According to Arnett, the interview was initiated by Hussein who surprised the interviewer by having him brought to the bungalow where the interview took place. One possible explanation of this is that Hussein may have felt it necessary to reissue his warning due to the impending ground war.

¹⁰² Ibid.

are similar to the results of a counter-economic strike in that they both aim to disrupt the regime's source of revenue. According to Robert E. Looney and Craig Knouse, economic sanctions are "coercive measures directed toward political objectives."¹⁶³ The goal of the sanctions is to weaken the target nation's economy so that the regime leadership will alter its behavior.¹⁶⁴ There is little consensus on the question of whether economic sanctions are successful in influencing the targeted decision-makers. Arguments about the efficiency of sanctions surfaced in the early stages of the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf. Advocates of the use of military force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait argued that there is little historical evidence that the economic sanctions would work.¹⁶⁵

Three causes can explain the historical failure of sanctions. According to Looney and Knouse, "It is...unrealistic to expect all countries to cooperate fully in imposing a total embargo against a target state. The lack of universality of application has indeed been a major cause of the failure of sanctions..."¹⁶⁶ Therefore, the inadequacy of enforcement at the international level is the first cause of sanction failure.

The second reason why economic sanctions can fail is the inability of the imposing nations to predict the response of the target state.¹⁶⁷ Presently, the United Nations is maintaining sanctions on Iraq to ensure compliance with the terms of the Gulf War ceasefire. While there is clear evidence that the sanctions are crippling the Iraqi economy,

¹⁶³ Robert E. Looney and Craig Knouse, "Predicting the Success of Economic Sanctions," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13 (No. 2 1991): 40.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Interestingly, the Central Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.), argued in favor of sanctions. The C.I.A.'s argument was based on the assertion that Iraq would be forced to deplete its foreign reserves and would in a matter of months, be unable to maintain basic services. Ibid, 42.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., 50.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

it is not apparent that the Ba'ath party is in danger of being overthrown.¹⁰⁸ In fact, the Ba'ath regime is using the external threat of sanctions in an attempt to unify its periphery following.¹⁰⁹ In the case of Libya, the United Nations Security Council threatened economic sanctions in March 1992, as punishment for a failure to cooperate in an international investigation of alleged Libyan terrorists.¹¹⁰ Describing the effect the sanctions would have on Khadafi's peripheral following, Mansour Kikhia, an opposition leader stated, "We worry about sanctions or military actions that can only hurt the Libyan people. The issue in Libya is that people in this case think the West is out to get Libya, not Muammar Qaddafi (sic) and his clique."¹¹¹ In both Iraq and Libya, therefore, sanctions tend to strengthen the loyalty of the periphery rather than incite rebellion.

The third cause of the failure of sanctions is the ability of target nations to implement plans to alleviate their impact.¹¹² Again, the current Iraqi case is a good example. Economic sanctions are not leakproof and the longer a regime can survive, the more difficult it becomes for the sanctions to make a difference.

Even in cases that analysts argue are sanction success stories, sanctions alone rarely result in the overthrow of a regime. One such case is Idi Amin in Uganda. Less than six

¹⁰⁸ To placate the Iraqi periphery following, Hussein is "printing money, raising salaries of key military and government personnel and lowering gasoline prices." Patrick E. Tyler, "Who's Talking Tough? Why Saddam Hussein," New York Times, 24 October 1991, A4.

¹⁰⁹ Iraqi Oil Minister, Osama A. R. al-Hiti, rejected an United Nations proposal that allowed Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil to finance the purchase of food and medicine stating, "They are trying to change our Government, and it's not going to happen." Patrick E. Tyler, "Iraqi Oil Minister Rejects U.N. Plan," New York Times, 25 October 1991, A4.

¹¹⁰ The sanctions included a ban on flights to or from Libya, a ban on arms and aircraft sales, and a reduction in the number of Libyan diplomats in U.N. member nations. Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Sanctions on Libya Likely To Fuel Qaddafi's Chaos," New York Times, 1 April 1992, A6.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Looney and Knouse, 50.

months after the United States established a total trade ban with Uganda in October 1978, Idi Amin's regime was overthrown. The most significant impetus for the coup, however, was the indirect effect the U.S. trade boycott had on international investment in Uganda. Western corporations closed their Ugandan offices and oil companies became unwilling to provide credit to Amin. Without oil or foreign capital, Amin could not transport Ugandan coffee for export and therefore lost his primary source of income.¹¹³ Thus, although the U.S. trade ban did not directly threaten Amin's internal control, the sanctions were successful because of their effect on Uganda's base of economic support.

If the goal of economic sanctions is similar to that of a counter-control strike against mechanisms of economic distribution, there are also significant differences. One such difference is the means of attaining the goal. Sanctions prevent a regime from exporting its dominant product. In contrast, counter-control targeting threatens the destruction of the capabilities dictators need for export extraction. Presumably, in the latter case, the economic destruction would be rapid and the targeted regime would have a more difficult time preparing strategies to soften the blow.¹¹⁴ Failures of sanctions due to enforcement difficulties would not be applicable to a military strike that could destroy the physical means a regime uses to extract, transport or refine its primary export.

In O'Kane's analysis of the 67 nations which depend on a single export for 40% or more of their export earnings, the following categories of exports are represented: (1) petroleum or petroleum products; (2) minerals/metals; (3) food products; and (4) non-food

¹¹³ Judith Miller, "When Sanctions Worked," Foreign Policy No. 39 (Summer 1980): 122 - 123.

¹¹⁴ An illustrative case is the situation in Zaire in late 1991. Violence and destruction significantly disrupted copper and cobalt mining and led to rapid disintegration of the economy. See Jane Perez, "Violence Kills Dozens in Zaire Mining Town," New York Times, 28 October 1991, A6; and Kenneth B. Novle, "In Zaire, Fear and Despair Grow as Economy Slides into Chaos," New York Times, 4 November 1991, A4.

agriculture.¹¹⁵ The targeting of these exports might focus on the source, storage or transportation facilities.

Targeting the source, such as the oil fields for petroleum products, would be the most efficient means of destroying the regime's ability to export its dominant product. The economic destruction, however, would not easily be reversed. If it was successful in overthrowing the regime, the new leadership would face formidable economic dilemmas. Also, especially when petroleum is involved, allied and domestic support for such targeting would be unlikely. The target selection of the 1986 U.S. raid on Libya demonstrates this point.

Prior to the 1986 conflict, the Reagan administration had been conducting a campaign, launched in 1981, to promote the overthrow of Libyan leader Muammar Khadaffi.¹¹⁶ There were several reasons for this American initiative but perhaps the most important was Khadaffi's sponsorship of international terrorism against the West.¹¹⁷

In 1986, Khadaffi's regime appeared vulnerable to a coup. The falling price of oil had seriously disrupted the Libyan economy.¹¹⁸ Khadaffi's consolidation of power and adventurous foreign policy at the expense of internal development had angered religious leaders and technocrats. More significantly, the regular military forces were resentful of their lack of autonomy at the hands of the elite revolutionary guard.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁵ O'Kane, 45 - 49.

¹¹⁶ Claudia Wright, "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?," International Affairs 58 (Winter 1981/1982): 13.

¹¹⁷ David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security, 57.

¹¹⁸ Libya is dependent on oil exports for the majority of their export earnings. Prior to the 1969 coup that brought Khadaffi to power, petroleum accounted for 99 percent of Libyan export earnings and 95 percent of Libyan gross national product. O'Kane, 71.

¹¹⁹ David, Third World Coup d'Etat and International Security, 58.

In April 1986, following the terrorist bombing of a nightclub in Berlin in which one American soldier had been killed, U.S. naval and air force aircraft bombed targets in Libya.¹²⁰ While Khadaffi's regime was economically dependent on its oil exports, the facilities associated with the Libyan oil industry were not targeted.¹²¹ One explanation of this omission is that the destruction of economic targets could not be credibly linked to the anti-terrorist signal the Reagan administration was attempting to send.¹²²

Another planning consideration might have been a concern about the effect of counter-economic strikes on U.S. allies. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, of Great Britain, allowed U.S. aircraft based in England to take part in the raid as long as the strike entailed only "action directed against specific Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of terrorist activities...."¹²³ These same aircraft were denied overflight rights by the governments of France and Spain.¹²⁴ Although many factors influenced the French and Spanish decisions, Frederick Zilian Jr. argues that one factor was the economic relationship these countries shared with Libya.¹²⁵ The Libyan case highlights the difficulty in targeting the source of the exports that are vital to nations allied with the United States.

Targeting storage facilities is less likely to agitate allied consumers, although the proximity of storage to the source may be such as to make the discriminate destruction of

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ W. Hays Parks, "Crossing the Line," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (November 1986): 47.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Joseph Lelyveld, "Intense Talks Led to Thatcher Ruling," New York Times, 16 April 1986, A14.

¹²⁴ Frederick Zilian, Jr., "The U.S. Raid on Libya - and NATO," Orbis 30 (Fall 1986): 514 - 517.

¹²⁵ Ibid. In 1984, Spain was the third largest trading partner with Libya and France was the fourth. Additionally, Libya provided 80% of Spain's natural gas and 5% of France's oil imports.

storage impossible. The transportation facilities may be the least objectionable from the standpoint of the new regime that comes to power, but it may also be the most complex for targeting due to the number of ways the export could be moved. Targeting storage or transportation facilities, while politically more viable than destroying the source, would result also in a longer time needed for the strategy to have an impact.

In summary, targeting the mechanisms of internal control involves targeting means of suppression and economic distribution. The former involves targeting the elite security forces and command and control nodes. The latter includes primarily the source, storage facilities or means of transportation of the Third World dictatorship's dominant export.

D. CONCLUSION

The preceding analysis was based on one significant assumption which bears repeating. This was the acceptance of the logic behind the theory of omnibalancing. It seems unlikely that a single theory can predict behavior of Third World dictators considering their diverse backgrounds. Third World nations differ in their economies, politics, culture, and history. Additionally, they differ in the amount of time they have been sovereign and thus the amount of experience they have in self-government. More importantly perhaps, for this discussion, they differ in military capabilities and security requirements.

There is, however, a large aggregate of literature that indicates there is a preoccupation among Third World authoritarian regimes with potential internal threats to their power. Omnibalancing does appear to be a logical extension of this concept. Also, the literature on coups d'etat and budgeting strategies does support omnibalancing behavior.

Omnibalancing does provide a useful point of departure for considering nuclear deterrence policies for the Third World authoritarian regimes. Threatening the internal mechanisms of suppression and economic distribution should at least, influence the decision-making process of Third World dictators. Unfortunately, the only true measure of

deterrence is if it fails and conflict ensues. Obviously, if the goal of deterrence is to prevent nuclear use by Third World powers, the United States cannot afford this conclusive test. A less expensive means of testing the viability of a Third World deterrence policy based on omnibalancing is to compare it to previous policies and their associated targeting strategies. This comparison is the focus of the next chapter.

IV. COMPARISON OF OMNIBALANCING TO PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59

A. PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 59

The theory of omnibalancing and the implications for Third World nuclear deterrence have been presented. It might seem that omnibalancing presents a new challenge in terms of developing a deterrent targeting strategy. The assumption that Third World dictators are influenced by perceived internal threats to their regime, however, was made by the Carter administration regarding Soviet decision-making. This analysis of Soviet behavior contributed to a re-evaluation of U.S. strategic targeting in the late 1970's. The result was codified as Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59) and signed by President Jimmy Carter on 25 July 1980.¹ The similarity between PD-59's description of Soviet perceptions and the theory of omnibalancing provides an excellent opportunity for testing the viability of a nuclear deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian Third World regimes. Criticisms of PD-59 can be applied to omnibalancing to evaluate its utility as the basis for deterrence. The comparison of PD-59 to omnibalancing is the purpose of this chapter.

1. Historical Setting

During the 1976 Presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Carter doubted that the Nixon/Ford administration's deterrence strategy of limited nuclear warfare and selected nuclear options was possible or necessary.² President Richard M. Nixon had signed

¹ Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program," Journal of Strategic Studies, 6 (June 1983): 125.

² Desmond J. Ball, Developments in U. S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Administration Working Paper No. 17 (Canberra: The Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1979), 4.

National Security Decision Memorandum 242 (NSDM-242) on 17 January 1974.³ One unique aspect of NSDM-242 was its emphasis on counter-recovery targets. The objective of this targeting was to destroy the assets needed for the Soviet Union to recover as a world power after a nuclear exchange.⁴ This destruction was specified at 70% of the Soviet economic base.⁵

After his inauguration, President Carter commissioned a series of studies evaluating the American strategic posture and exploring different approaches to nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. One such study, the National Targeting Policy Review, was assigned to Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, in the summer of 1977.⁶ Brown reported the results in 1978. The principles of this study were then integrated into the planning requirements of U.S. nuclear strategy.⁷

A detailed account of a shift in nuclear targeting philosophy was provided in the January 1980 Report of the Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown summarized the philosophy, stating:

Articulation of the principles of our [targeting policy] focuses us on an obvious but too often ignored point: to deter effectively we must affect the perceptions of Soviet leaders whose values, objectives, and incentives differ sharply from our own...[There is] every reason to believe that the Soviet leadership has in fact been deterred and can continue to be, not by theory, but recognition of the certain costs of aggression to things

³ Desmond Ball, Targeting for Strategic Deterrence Adelphi Paper No. 185 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983), 18.

⁴ Ibid., 19.

⁵ Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Department of Defense, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978 Part 2, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 212.

⁶ See Thomas Powers, "Choosing a Strategy for World War III," Atlantic Monthly 250 (November 1982): 91; and Walter Slocombe, "The Countervailing Strategy," International Security 5 (Spring 1981): 20 - 21.

⁷ Slocombe, 21.

most valued by that leadership.⁸

PD-59 was the directive implementing this shift in targeting emphasis outlined in Brown's 1980 report.

2. Targeting Shift

The Carter administration's National Targeting Policy Review concluded that successful deterrence was dependent on holding at risk what the Soviet leadership valued the most. This conclusion is also the premise behind deterrence based on onmibalancing. In order to evaluate the selection of Third World targets to hold at risk, it is useful to review how PD-59 translated the perception of Soviet values into a potential target set.

In a speech at the Naval War College in August 1980, Secretary Brown publicly revealed, in general terms, the Soviet targets to be threatened for deterrence. "It is our policy...to ensure that the Soviet leadership knows that...we could...exact an unacceptably high price in the things the Soviet leaders appear to value most - political and military control, military force both nuclear and conventional, and the industrial capability to sustain a war."⁹ The Soviet leadership would thus be threatened with attacks on the mechanisms that were being used to maintain its power base. PD-59 articulated a targeting emphasis on Soviet political and military leadership, strategic military targets, and other military targets.¹⁰ The resulting target set increased the National Strategic Target List from 25,000 to 40,000 targets.¹¹

⁸ Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981 - 1985 Defense Programs (January 29, 1980) (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1980): 82 - 83.

⁹ Harold Brown, "The Flexibility of Our Plans," Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 October 1980, 743.

¹⁰ Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program," 129.

¹¹ Ibid.

The leadership target category can be separated into three sets: the leadership itself, the lines of communication between the leadership and the organizations of control, and these organizations themselves.¹² The term "other military targets" refers to targets other than the Soviet strategic nuclear systems and the military and political leadership, and includes conventional military forces and their bases, chemical and biological weapons capabilities, and space facilities.¹³ By targeting "other military targets" the United States hoped to obtain three objectives. The first was to prevent the Soviets from establishing control over areas not already under their power. In the event the Soviets did gain command of these areas, the second objective was to ensure they could not maintain it. The third objective was to inflict costly destruction on Soviet military forces.¹⁴

The target set envisioned in PD-59 would not only threaten to destroy the hardened shelters that housed the central government's party officials, but also the hundreds of Communist Party cadre leaders at all levels throughout the country.¹⁵ Organizations, such as the KGB and economic planning councils, which assisted in maintaining control of the Soviet communist regime, also were targeted.¹⁶ Additionally, the target set included troops on the Soviet-Chinese border and Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe.¹⁷ According to Jeffrey Richelson, the objective of such targeting was to destroy the internal mechanisms of Soviet political control "either by killing the leadership itself, making it

¹² Jeffrey T. Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," Comparative Strategy 2 (No.3 1980): 226.

¹³ Desmond Ball, "Toward a Critique of Strategic Nuclear Targeting," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, ed., Strategic Nuclear Targeting, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 23.

¹⁴ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 229.

¹⁵ Powers, 109.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 226.

impossible for the leadership to communicate with its subordinates, or destroying the means (people and facilities) by which the leadership's orders are carried out."¹⁸

3. The Utility of Ethnic Targeting

An extreme variant of threatening the source of Soviet internal control is the exploitation of the ethnic heterogeneity within the Soviet Union. The Soviet population represented 100 distinct nationalities residing in fifteen republics.¹⁹ The largest republic, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, itself was a conglomeration of sixteen sub-republics, five regions and ten national areas.²⁰ Ethnic Russians, although by population a minority, dominated the positions of political and military leadership.²¹ Therefore, it could be argued that the deliberate targeting of ethnic Russians would result in the destruction of Soviet control of the various non-Russian nationalities. The hope behind such an ethnic targeting plan would be that the other nationalities, once "liberated" of Russian domination, would resist Soviet war objectives and, in effect, shut down the operation of the Soviet government.²² Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, indicated an acceptance of the logic of ethnic targeting by interrupting a nuclear war plan brief to ask how many ethnic Russians were being targeted.²³

¹⁸ Ibid., 227.

¹⁹ Steve F. Kime, "How the Soviet Union is Ruled," Air Force Magazine 63 (March 1980): 54 - 55.

²⁰ Ibid., 55.

²¹ Ibid., 57.

²² Bernard S. Albert, "Constructive Counterpower," Orbis 20 (Summer 1976): 362.

²³ Powers, 86.

There is no evidence that PD-59 targeted ethnic population groups.¹⁴ The concept of ethnic targeting is significant, however, because it is an extension of the counter-control argument referred to in PD-59. An argument in favor of ethnic targeting could also be supported by the theory of omnibalancing. The ethnic makeup of authoritarian Third World states closely resembles that of the former Soviet Union in that both are heterogeneous and controlled by ethnic minorities. Because of its potential applicability to Third World nuclear deterrence, a further discussion of the utility of ethnic targeting is warranted.

While the logic of ethnic targeting appears to be complementary to deterrence based on omnibalancing, there are reasons to doubt its utility for enhancing the deterrent threats discussed in the last chapter. There are two objections to implementing a Third World ethnic targeting strategy: (1) the moral revulsion to a deliberate form of genocide; and (2) the improbability of ethnic targeting as effective deterrence.

Targeting ethnic groups is actually a plan for threatening genocide. As such, it would be morally unacceptable for Americans to support.¹⁵ Even as a response to a Third World nuclear attack, the United States would enjoy little international acceptance of deliberate ethnic destruction. George Quester argues, "Even if [ethnic targeting] were indeed to produce fewer fatalities than old-fashioned massive retaliation, its sheer cold-blooded deliberation is likely to offend the moral sensitivities of much of the world, of our allies as well as of the neutrals."¹⁶ The second objection to ethnic targeting in the Third World is the probability that it would not enhance deterrence. Omnibalancing predicts that authoritarian regimes will be influenced by threats to their base of power. This is not

¹⁴ George H. Quester, "Ethnic Targeting: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 5 (June 1982): 230.

¹⁵ Quester, 232.

¹⁶ Ibid.

necessarily synonymous, however, with threats to their ethnic heritage or ancestral tribe. In fact, the ethnic group represented by the regime leadership is not safe from persecution by the regime to ensure internal security. Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime in Iraq demonstrates this point. Hussein represents a minority population who are of Arab descent and Sunni Islamic faith.¹⁷ Yet upon becoming President in 1979, Hussein did not hesitate in purging his own Ba'ath party and arresting over 100 potential oppositionists.¹⁸ It is unlikely that threatening the indiscriminate annihilation of Sunni Arabs would enhance a nuclear deterrence policy against Saddam Hussein. Therefore, for the reasons of moral objection and questionable utility, ethnic targeting is rejected as a component of Third World nuclear deterrence.¹⁹

The message broadcast to the Soviet Union by Secretary Brown's declarations was that if deterrence failed, the American response would not necessarily be one of massive retaliation. Rather, the Soviet regime risked the destruction of its internal base of power and control. Thus, the targets selected in PD-59 appear to be precisely what would threaten a Third World dictator who behaves in accordance with the predictions offered by the omnibalancing theory. Brown, in fact, described Soviet behavior in a manner that is very similar to omnibalancing:

[In] a time of great crisis what [the Soviets] most need to be deterred by is the thought that their power structure will not survive. That is even more important to them than their personal survival or survival of 10, 20,

¹⁷ The Iraqi population is composed of 75% Arabs and 20% Kurds. The remaining population is of a Turkish or Assyrian lineage. In terms of religious demographics, Iraq is approximately 95% Islamic, of which 55% is Shi'ite and 40% Sunni. The remaining 5% is chiefly of the Christian faith. Since the majority of Iraqis of the Sunni faith are Kurdish, the regime leadership represents only 20% of the population. See Michael G. Cooper, "The Iran-Iraq War and Lessons for the Future," (Naval War College, 1989), 10; and King, 8 - 9.

¹⁸ Cordesman and Wagner, 28.

¹⁹ Quester proposes an additional objection with respect to the Soviet Union. He argues that the Soviets could retaliate with their own form of ethnic targeting along racial lines. As was discussed in Chapter I, the lack of a second-strike capability in the Third World precludes the applicability of this criticism to omnibalancing. Quester, 232.

or 30 million, or even 50 million of their fellow countrymen.¹⁰

For successful deterrence, it was necessary that the Soviets perceived the targeting focus of PD-59 as a credible threat to their internal security. Whether this was achieved and the applicability of PD-59 to the Third World is the focus of the following sections.

B. THE CRITICISMS OF PD-59 AND THIRD WORLD DETERRENCE

The targeting philosophy of PD-59 did not enjoy universal acceptance among strategic analysts. Because of the similarity between the assumptions of Soviet behavior contained in PD-59 and the assumptions of Third World behavior predicted by omnibalancing, a critique of PD-59 can be utilized in evaluating the viability of omnibalancing as the basis for a Third World nuclear deterrence policy. The purpose of this section is not to evaluate the validity of the criticisms of PD-59. Rather, this section will determine whether the opposing arguments to PD-59 apply to a targeting strategy based on omnibalancing. The critique of PD-59 focuses on five problems: (1) the shortcomings of intelligence; (2) the effects of counter-control targeting; (3) the response of the Soviet population; and (4) the lack of American capabilities. This section will explore each area reviewing the basis of each argument and evaluating the applicability for deterring Third World dictators.

1. Shortcomings of Intelligence

A basic intelligence problem regarding the counter-control targeting of PD-59 is identifying the locations of all the shelters that would house the regime leadership during a crisis. Secretary Brown conceded this point in his 1980 Defense Report. He stated, "Hardened command posts have been constructed near Moscow and other cities. For the some 100,000 people we define as the Soviet leadership, there are hardened underground shelters...The *relatively few leadership shelters we have identified* would be vulnerable to

¹⁰ Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nuclear War Strategy, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 16 September 1980, 27.

direct attack."⁴¹ But even the knowledge of all shelter location would not help in identifying which shelters housed the key individuals.⁴² Additionally, critics argue that attacking such things as the KGB headquarters would be of limited utility because the essential people would not be there in times of crisis, especially since the U.S. declaratory policy has identified them as targets.⁴³ Soviet military forces would also prove difficult to target because of their mobility. Also, the sensor systems used to track the movement of such forces were probably high on the Soviet list of targets to be attacked upon initiation of hostilities.⁴⁴

The intelligence problems associated with implementing the PD-59 targeting strategy would also impede targeting of Third World regime control assets. For example, when General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked at a press conference, during the Gulf War, why coalition forces were not targeting Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, he replied, "We were not [targeting Hussein] because frankly I have learned from previous experience how difficult it can be to track a head of state in whom you might be interested. And I think we spent a good part of the morning of the 20th of December 1989 in this room discussing that subject."⁴⁵ General Powell was referring to the difficulty U.S. forces had in locating Panamanian dictator, General Manuel Noriega, during Operation Just Cause in December 1989. The declaratory U.S. policy in the Gulf War

⁴¹ Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY1981 Budget, 78, emphasis added.

⁴² Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 99.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 233.

⁴⁵ "Excerpts From Remarks by Cheney and Powell on War Effort," New York Times, 18 January 1991, A9.

emphasized that Hussein was not a target.⁴⁶ In contrast, during Operation Just Cause, the location and capture of Noriega was announced as an objective of the U.S. invasion.⁴⁷ Therefore, the Panamanian conflict serves as an effective example of the limitations of U.S. intelligence capabilities in the Third World.

In the initial phase of Operation Just Cause, U.S. special forces unsuccessfully struck seven locations where intelligence sources estimated Noriega to be.⁴⁸ In fact, the planning for the Panama operation was allegedly predicated by a lack of confidence in intelligence being accurate.⁴⁹ The Bush administration resorted to offering a \$1 million bounty for information leading to Noriega's capture.⁴⁰ In the end, Noriega was located only after he entered the Vatican embassy seeking asylum, four days after the U.S. invasion.⁴¹

The implication of the U.S. experience in Panama and the Persian Gulf is that if a counter-control targeting strategy was implemented against a Third World regime,

⁴⁶ Since the end of the Gulf War, it has been speculated that Hussein had indeed been targeted. The staff of U. S. News and World Report records that on 27 February 1991, the United States attempted to destroy an Iraqi command bunker where Hussein was believed to be. With the use of a specially designed, concrete-penetrating bomb, the bunker was allegedly destroyed, killing several high-level Iraqi military commanders. Hussein was obviously not among them. U. S. News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War (New York: Times Books, 1992), 391.

⁴⁷ The objectives of Operation Just Cause were: to assist the legitimately elected Panamanian government; protect American lives and treaty rights to the Panama Canal; and seize and extradite Noriega to the United States for prosecution on drug trafficking. "Excerpts From Statement By Baker on U.S. Policy," New York Times, 21 December 1989, A19.

⁴⁸ Bernard E. Trainor, "Hundreds of Tips but Still No Noriega," New York Times, 23 December 1989, I13.

⁴⁹ Bernard E. Trainor, "Gaps in Vital Intelligence Hampered U.S. Troops," New York Times, 21 December 1989, A21.

⁴⁰ Trainor, "Hundreds of Tips but Still No Noriega," I13.

⁴¹ Larry Rohter, "Noriega Eludes U. S.," New York Times, 25 December 1989, A1. It should be noted that although Noriega was not located for four days, during that time he was on the run and had been effectively removed from any control in Panama.

American planners would have a difficult time locating the regime leadership. Therefore, the critical appraisal of intelligence support for the PD-59 targeting strategy applies to the Third World as well. In fact, if it can be assumed that the majority of U.S. intelligence resources, analysts and training has been dedicated to the Soviet Union over the past four decades, the lack of experience and attention devoted to the Third World may exacerbate this problem. There are some characteristics of Third World authoritarian regimes, however, that assist in easier intelligence gathering than was possible against the Soviet Union.⁴² Unlike the Soviet leadership, Third World dictators do not enjoy the level of border security inherent in a true totalitarian state. Thus, compared to the Soviet Union, Third World states are easily penetrated by human or technical means of intelligence collection.⁴³ Additionally, Third World regimes are often dependent on Western technological assistance. In contrast to the Soviet state, this dependence allows greater access by foreigners and greater opportunity for obtaining adequate targeting intelligence.⁴⁴ Whether or not this opportunity will be exploited depends on the success of the U.S. intelligence agencies taking measures to focus more resources towards the Third World. Although some actions have been taken in this

⁴² For an analysis of the difficulties U.S. intelligence agencies had in collecting strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union, see John Prados, The Soviet Estimate (New York: The Dial Press, 1982)

⁴³ As an example, months after the end of the Gulf War, the Central Intelligence Agency reportedly deployed officers to Jordan, exploiting the open overland access into Iraq to gather intelligence about the stability of Hussein's regime. Patrick Tyler, "Hounding Hussein," New York Times, 20 March 1992, A6. For further discussion of the permeability of Third World states, see Andrew M. Scott, The Revolution in Statecraft (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982), especially Chapter VI.

⁴⁴ Andrew M. Scott, 12. For example, in Libya, thousands of foreign technicians, including Americans work in the Libyan oil industry. Paul Lewis, "Libyans Riot at Embassies; U.N. Protests," New York Times, 3 April 1992, A5.

direction, it is difficult to assess the future prospects of collecting the required targeting information.⁴⁵

2. The Effects of Counter-Control Targeting

While the preceding arguments questioned the capability to execute PD-59 targeting, many analysts also criticized two aspects of the premise behind the strategy. The first was the applicability of counter-control targeting to actual Soviet values. The second aspect addressed the desirability to target the Soviet command leadership. Both of these will be examined in this section.

Although it might not be a strategic revelation to assume that any regime would fear a loss of its control, the philosophy underlying the targeting doctrine of PD-59 rests on more than common sense. What made PD-59 attractive as a deterrence policy was the susceptibility of the Soviet political system to attacks on its control mechanisms. Advocates of PD-59 propose that the overcentralization of Soviet political and military authority would have left the Soviet regime extremely vulnerable to isolation from counter-control attacks. It is argued, for example, that the elimination of the KGB might have led to the inability of the Soviet Union to function effectively.⁴⁶ In this view, a counter-control strategy would pose a credible threat to the Soviet leadership. According to Colin Gray, the large scale counter-recovery strikes envisioned by the Nixon/Ford administrations would be incredible as threats because of the inevitable Soviet retaliation that would follow. However, "a war plan directed at the destruction of *Soviet* power would have inherent plausibility in Soviet

⁴⁵ In the 1992 Defense Authorization Act, Congress initiated a restructuring of the defense intelligence organization partly in response to the inability of U. S. assets to locate Hussein in the Gulf War. William Matthews, "Congress Gives DIA Day-to-Day Authority," Navy Times, 9 December 1991, 33. The Central Intelligence Agency has also been reorganized to shift its focus away from the former Soviet Union and towards acquiring the capabilities to satisfy regional intelligence requirements. Elaine Sciolino, "C.I.A. Casting About for New Missions," New York Times, 4 February 1992, A1 and A4.

⁴⁶ Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne, "Victory is Possible," Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 21.

estimation."⁴⁷ Gray refers to the structure of Soviet society to justify his claim. The very fact that the Soviet Union is organized as a totalitarian, militarized state is evidence that the leadership will consider threats to its internal control credible.⁴⁸ Such indirect evidence reveals a lack of analytical support behind the premise of PD-59. Successful deterrence depends on the aggressor perceiving that what is being threatened will lead to a net cost. Critics of PD-59 question whether Soviet behavior indicated a preoccupation with internal threats to control.⁴⁹

There is historical precedent for the contention that the Soviet leadership did not place a high value on the well-being of its citizenship.⁵⁰ History, therefore, reveals some circumstantial, but not convincing evidence that the Soviet regime was concerned more with the protection of its base of power than any domestic interests. Additionally, as Robert Jervis proposes, "[E]ven if it is Communist rule that Soviet leaders value...they could also believe that the party is supported by the population and would regenerate after a war...."⁵¹ Therefore, even if the assumption of PD-59 about Soviet behavior is valid, there is still the question of whether the target set articulated by Brown would have been perceived by the Soviets as threatening their internal control.

⁴⁷ Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory," International Security 4 (Summer 1979): 69, emphasis in original.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 68.

⁴⁹ See Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 105 - 106 and Keith B. Payne, "Does the United States Need a Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine and Strategy?," in Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, ed., Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980's (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), 172 - 173.

⁵⁰ Albert Wohlstetter cites the Soviet collectivization program of the 1920's which resulted in 12-15 million deaths and the 1933 increase of grain exports at a time when millions of Ukrainians were starving to death. Albert Wohlstetter, "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents," Commentary 75 (June 1983): 27.

⁵¹ Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 105 - 106.

The doubts raised about the validity of the assumptions of PD-59 can also be applied to omnibalancing and its predictions of the behavior of Third World authoritarian regimes. Third World nuclear deterrence is predicated on holding at risk the mechanisms these authoritarian regimes use to maintain internal control. Examples have been introduced that indicate these regimes do behave as predicted by omnibalancing, but like the criticisms of PD-59, it cannot be argued with assurance that targeting internal control will successfully deter nuclear use. Additionally, Third World dictators may believe that there is popular support for the "regeneration" of their regime after a counter-control strike. Therefore, any deterrence policy based on omnibalancing must also account for the possibility of deterrence failure.

The second criticism of the counter-control emphasis of PD-59 is the desirability of destroying the Soviet control structure. The focus of this critique is the situation of deterrence failure and what effect the employment of counter-control targeting would have on two areas: war termination and conflict escalation. The basis of objection in the discussion of these points is the perceived situation of MAD and the existence of a Soviet second-strike capability.

Michael Howard argues that if the top Soviet leadership were eliminated, there would exist no political entity with which to negotiate an end to the war. He believes it was unreasonable to expect that, after an initial nuclear exchange, "an alternative organized government would somehow emerge, capable, in spite of the destruction of all internal communications networks, of taking over the affairs of State."⁴¹ According to this argument, a counter-control strike would prevent the controlled termination of any Soviet military operations, presumably including nuclear strikes.

⁴¹ Michael E. Howard, "On Fighting a Nuclear War," International Security 5 (Spring 1981): 11. See also Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 119; and Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 230.

In addition to the problems associated with war termination, preventing the escalation of a conflict also would become difficult after a counter-control strike. If the attacks resulted in a disintegration of Soviet internal control, there would exist little incentive for the Soviet leadership to limit their retaliatory response.⁵¹ There would be little prospect, therefore, for intra-war deterrence. Gray proposes that, "[O]nce executed, a very large strike against the Soviet political and administrative leadership would mean that the United States had 'done its worst.' If the Soviet Government in the sense of [a National Command Authority], were still able to function, it is likely that it would judge that it had little if anything left to fear."⁵² The deterrent threat of a counter-control strike may have even provided the Soviet leadership with incentive to conduct a preemptive nuclear strike against the United States.⁵³

A Third World authoritarian regime may also recognize a counter-control strike as signaling an end to any possible restraint. Confronted with the loss of its internal control, the regime may see unrestricted retaliation as its only alternative. The Gulf War provides a relevant example. Statements made by Saddam Hussein during the conflict implied that he would have considered use of chemical weapons if the overthrow of his regime was imminent. With these statements, Hussein appeared to have recognized that it was necessary to reserve his most destructive weapons for intra-war deterrence.

If Hussein's behavior is indicative of Third World regimes, it bears similarities to what critics of PD-59 expected of the Soviet leadership. However, this is where the similarities end. What lends credibility to the argument against a counter-control targeting

⁵¹ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 232.

⁵² Colin S. Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War," Naval War College Review 35 (January - February 1980): 13.

⁵³ John D. Steinbruner, "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy 45 (Winter 1981-82): 19.

strategy directed at the Soviets was their nuclear second-strike capability. Striking what the Soviet regime valued most could have prompted them to unleash an unrestrained nuclear second-strike against U.S. targets, presumably cities. In the Third World, such capabilities do not exist. In fact, it is the United States which possesses an uncontested retaliatory capability. According to Eric H. Arnett, "a single [U.S. nuclear] land strike could entail the destruction of the single major city - the assured destruction of the [Third World] country's civilization - in some small countries."⁵⁶ It would be possible for the United States to eliminate the military capability of the Third World authoritarian regime. Therefore, there is little concern for the effects a counter-control strike has on war termination or conflict escalation in a Third World scenario. The inability of potential nuclear armed Third World regimes to survive a U.S. strike and to maintain the capability to retaliate precludes the validity of applying the decapitation criticism to a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.

3. The Response of the Soviet Population

Would the Soviet populace, freed from the shackles of central Communist rule, react as desired by the American strategists? The answer to this question must include a discussion of two arguments. The first concerns the amount of civilian casualties expected in a counter-control strike. The second argument is focused on the expected reaction of the population that survives the attack. Advocates of PD-59 argue that counter-control targeting is attractive from a moral perspective. As a declaratory policy, PD-59 emphasized that it was the Soviet regime that would be destroyed, not the Soviet population.⁵⁷ Thus the PD-59 targeting strategy distanced itself from previous ones which relied on the threat of

⁵⁶ Eric H. Arnett, Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation and the U. S. Navy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), 12. Arnett concedes that American decision-makers may be morally unable to target nuclear weapons at non-Soviet targets. This point is not subject to debate in this discussion which is merely an evaluation of the applicability of PD-59 to the Third World.

⁵⁷ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 227.

large scale killing of innocents. The implication of counter-control targeting is that it represents the means of reducing the death and destruction caused by a U.S. nuclear attack because it does not specifically target population centers. In 1979, the Office of Technology Assessment published estimates of the destruction anticipated in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.⁵⁸ The attack scenarios were based on the counter-recovery targeting strategy of NSDM-242. A specific case analyzed a retaliatory U.S. strike against Soviet military and economic targets. According to the analyses, this resulted in casualties of between 50 and 100 million lives or 20 to 40% of the Soviet population.⁵⁹ Accounting for effective Soviet evacuation procedures, these numbers were modified to 23 to 34 million.⁶⁰ Some advocates of the targeting strategy of PD-59 argue that these figures are unacceptable and that PD-59 represented a more humane alternative.⁶¹

Critics of PD-59 contest the conclusion that the counter-control targeting doctrine would spare massive civilian casualties. Striking the political and military leadership would certainly require a concentrated attack against Moscow.⁶² While other military targets may be separated from population centers, it would not be unreasonable to assume, armed with the knowledge of American strategy, that the Soviet leadership would have them moved into such areas in a crisis. Counter-control targeting would, in these circumstances, include a significant amount of counter-city strikes. It is difficult to perceive that the suffering

⁵⁸ Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, The Effects of Nuclear War (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1984), ix.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 100.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 227.

⁶² Ibid.

inflicted on the very people expected to revolt would not eliminate their potential for civil unrest.⁶¹

The Allied bombing campaigns of World War II provide analytical evidence to support this claim. On 3 November 1944, the American Secretary of War established the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) to evaluate the effects of the Allied bombing campaigns against Germany.⁶² Later, the USSBS was expanded to incorporate a study of the American bombing of Japan.⁶³ The portion of the USSBS that investigated the effects of bombing on morale are particularly significant to this discussion.

The USSBS investigators, in attempting to explain the effect the bombing had on civilian morale, proposed several enlightening conclusions. One of these, in the case of Germany, was that civilians that populated unbombed areas were still affected by the overall campaign:

It appears that the raids did not have to be directed against a particular area in order to affect adversely the morale of the population in that area. The news of the raids in other places was effective in depressing morale because it intensified both fears of losing the war and feelings of helplessness, and also created anxiety about future raids against the local area.⁶⁴

This conclusion conflicts with the notion that Soviet citizens would rebel after a U.S. attack.

⁶¹ Howard, 11. Barbara G. Levi, Frank N. Hippel and William H. Dougherty conclude that a U.S. nuclear attack on Soviet strategic nuclear facilities would promptly kill 12-27 million people and kill or injure 25-54 million people over a short term. Additionally, they estimate that a worse-case U.S. attack on Soviet urban areas would result in 45-77 million prompt deaths and 73-93 million people killed or injured soon after. Barbara G. Levi, Frank N. Hippel and William H. Dougherty, "Civilian Casualties from 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the Soviet Union," International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 169.

⁶² United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European War, Over-all Report (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), IX.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European War, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 43.

German authorities tracked the morale of their citizens throughout the war, and the USSBS relied on this record as one source for their own evaluation.⁶⁷ These German studies indicate that lowered morale was often offset by reports of German military victory enhanced by the use of propaganda. As the war progressed and there was less opportunity to report military victory, the German leadership stimulated the civilian morale with promises of retaliation and the reports of powerful secret weapons.⁶⁸

In Japan, authorities did not enjoy the same amount of success in compensating for the lower morale produced by the bombing. Propaganda was relatively effective in hiding the true outcome of the Pacific War only until the initiation of the systematic Allied bombing of the Japanese home islands. According to the USSBS, in contrast to Germany, the Japanese leadership found it necessary to resort to a "variety of repressive and directive controls over popular thought and feeling...."⁶⁹ The internal security forces were able to prevent insurrection due, in a large measure, to the nature of Japanese society. Pre-war Japan represented a homogeneous population. It was also highly militarized. After 1935, the education system was transformed into a program of nationalist indoctrination for Japanese youth. Even adherence to the national Shinto religion, with its tenets of Emperor-worship and blind obedience to the state, was mandatory for all citizens.⁷⁰ In this social setting, the USSBS reported that, "[the police force] operated in an aura of fear which was sufficiently awe-inspiring to cover up obvious inadequacies of operation."⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ibid., 42.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 43 - 44.

⁶⁹ United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific War, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947), 4.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid., 5.

Applying the results of the USSBS to the targeting strategy of PD-59 may be misleading. Both Germany and Japan represented homogeneous societies whose ruling regime enjoyed legitimacy and support from the majority of the population. The Soviet Union of the early 1980's did not share these traits and therefore may have been more susceptible to internal fragmentation after an attack. Also, the Allied bombing campaign was waged over months and years, whereas a nuclear strike would be conducted in terms of minutes and hours. This would negate any application of the USSBS findings of long-term morale problems to the PD-59 targeting strategy. Even accounting for these differences, however, the USSBS does provide some evidence that the unavoidable civilian casualties of a counter-control nuclear strike would preclude any large scale uprising.⁷²

A targeting strategy based on omnibalancing might also be criticized for the number of civilian casualties it would create. In contrast to implementing the PD-59 targeting, however, an attack of a Third World dictator's mechanisms of internal control would result in collateral damage of a much lower scale. This is because in a Third World authoritarian regime, the economic and political systems are highly concentrated and easier to disrupt than equivalent targets in the Soviet example. Since Third World dictators do not enjoy the totalitarian control of the Soviet Union, there is no Third World equivalent of the

⁷² In a contrasting view, John A. Lauder uses the conclusions of the USSBS to argue in favor of a counter-combatant targeting strategy which resembled the strategy of PD-59. Lauder proposes that, while the USSBS indicated the limitations to expecting an internal revolt after a nuclear attack, it also supported the "proposition that a nation's economic and military capability can be destroyed by measures short of the destruction of its cities." The means for successful implementation of the strategy is the selection of targets "of sufficient size and isolation to be destroyed by a small nuclear weapon with minimum residual damage to the civilian population." Unfortunately, Lauder does not specify how to meet this criteria. John A. Lauder, "Lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey for Contemporary Defense Policy," Orbis 18(Fall 1974): 777.

Communist Party which influenced all aspects of Soviet society.⁷³ A targeting strategy designed to destroy the Communist control may well have become a counter-cities doctrine. Selecting similar targets in Third World authoritarian states would result in a smaller and more discriminate set. Therefore, the scale of unnecessary civilian casualties in the Third World will be relatively much less than was argued in the criticism of PD-59.

The second argument of this section focuses on the reaction of the Soviet populace assuming limited civilian casualties. This is a topic that concerned American strategists since the late 1940's. At that time, some analysts believed an initial nuclear exchange would lead to domestic revolt in the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ In 1949, at the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense, an inter-service committee was formed to study this issue.⁷⁵ The committee's final report stated, "Among an indeterminate minority, atomic bombing [of the Soviet Union] might stimulate dissidence and the hope of relief from oppression. Unless and until vastly more favorable opportunities develop for them, the influence of these elements will not appreciably affect the Soviet war effort."⁷⁶ Though recognizing that a U.S. attack would seriously degrade the Soviet war-waging capability, the committee concluded that large scale domestic opposition to the Soviet regime could not be expected.

⁷³ Jeane Kirkpatrick proposes that the most significant difference between Third World authoritarian regimes and a totalitarian regime based on the Soviet model is the role of ideology. The Communist Party was able to maintain tight control over Soviet society through the manipulation of "national" ideology. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "U.S. Security and Latin America," Commentary 71 (January 1981): 33.

⁷⁴ Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 106.

⁷⁵ The committee is referred to as the Harmon Committee after its chairman, Air Force Lieutenant General H. R. Harmon. "Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive," in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945 - 1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 360.

⁷⁶ Etzold and Gaddis state that the Harmon Committee report was not well received because it conflicted with the then current Air Force justification for increases in budgets and numbers of aircraft. Etzold and Gaddis, 361.

Critics of PD-59 also stressed that conditions in the Soviet Union after a nuclear attack would not be conducive to a major domestic insurrection. The Soviet regime would have control of such domestic necessities as food and medical supplies, transportation to shelters and the shelters themselves.⁷⁷ Also, since it would be difficult for the population to recognize the discriminatory nature of the U.S. strikes, domestic priorities would be focused on survival rather than rebellion.⁷⁸

The assumption of PD-59 that the Soviet population would instigate a domestic revolt against the regime once the control mechanisms were attacked, is similar to the assumption of a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing. While there is some empirical evidence of Third World domestic response after the fall of a dictator, it does not accurately model the regime destruction envisioned in a nuclear deterrence policy. In addition, recent cases of military strikes against authoritarian regimes yield mixed results in regards to domestic response. Nevertheless, both the empirical analysis and the actual consequences of military action are useful to the understanding of the potential domestic response in the Third World to a counter-control strike.

Richard Betts and Samuel Huntington empirically analyzed authoritarian Third World regimes to determine whether the demise of the ruler in these nations would lead to political instability.⁷⁹ They conclude that three factors contributed to political instability after the death of the regime leader. These are: (1) a high level of pre-death instability; (2) duration in power of 20 or more years; and (3) a high level of autonomous social

⁷⁷ Richelson, "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting," 231.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Richard K. Betts and Samuel P. Huntington, "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs," International Security 10(Winter 1985/86): 112 - 143. The criteria for regime selection was authoritarian leaders in power for 10 or more years who died naturally or by accidental causes between World War II and 1984. Eighteen cases met this criteria.

organization.⁸⁰ Assuming this analysis is accurate, the factors influencing post-death political instability are beyond the influence of external powers.

There is a critical difference, however, between a peaceful death of a ruler and the destruction of a regime by external military power. Recent examples, while not providing adequate data for analysis, present contrasting conclusions. One example is the 1986 American raid on Libya. According to David, "Although the main goal of the strike was to deter further support of terrorism by Khadaffi, a clear secondary goal was to provoke a coup against the Libyan leader."⁸¹ George P. Shultz, Secretary of State during the Reagan administration, revealed three days after the raid that the targets selected were influenced by "a considerable dissidence in the armed forces in Libya with Qaddafi (sic) and what he's doing."⁸² When queried about the possibility of a post-attack coup, Shultz stated, "If a coup takes place, that's all to the good."⁸³ To spark a coup d'etat, the Americans struck some of the targets that represented Khadaffi's internal mechanisms of suppression. These included the elite guard forces, airfields, training camps, government buildings and Khadaffi's barracks headquarters.⁸⁴ At the same time, the Reagan administration attempted to incite a coup through declarations and propaganda.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Ibid., 118 - 121.

⁸¹ David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security, 58.

⁸² "Key Sections of Shultz Press Talk on Libya and Other Issues," New York Times, 18 April 1986, A 10.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Mary Jane Deeb, Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 171.

⁸⁵ Immediately after the raid, the Voice of America began broadcasting, in Arabic, calls for the Libyan people to overthrow Khadaffi. David, Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security, 58.

A coup, however, did not occur and Khadaffi remains in power. Immediately after the raid, some analysts saw the attack as increasing support for Khadaffi's regime because of involvement by American forces.⁸⁶ Another significant factor, explaining the lack of domestic uprising was the civilian casualties as a result of the attack.⁸⁷

By contrast, in Iraq, the end of the Gulf War in March 1991 was marked by a violent uprising which pitted several opposition groups against Hussein's Ba'ath Party.⁸⁸ Compared to the Libyan raid, estimates of Iraqi civilian casualties during the Gulf War range upwards to tens of thousands.⁸⁹ Aside from the loss of life, the degradation of domestic living conditions is many orders of magnitude higher than any damage caused by the attack on Libya.⁹⁰

Given the outcome of the Libyan and Iraqi cases, it is difficult to predict the domestic response of a counter-control strike against a Third World regime. It is safe to assume that many factors which may influence the outcome are beyond the control of the external power. The result, however, may not be critical. For successful deterrence, it is only important that the authoritarian leadership perceives that the targeting strategy poses

⁸⁶ An unnamed Libyan opponent of Khaddafi stated, "The opposition has been put into a corner by the American strikes. Any opposition member who is also a Libyan patriot cannot come out publicly against Colonel Qaddafi (sic) without being tainted as a tool of America." Elaine Sciolino, "Experts Assert Raid Will Stifle Libyan Opposition to Qaddafi," New York Times, 20 April 1986, 112.

⁸⁷ Deeb, 172.

⁸⁸ See Ahmad Chalabi, "Iraq: The Past as Prologue?," Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991): 20; and Strobe Talbot, "Post-Victory Blues," Foreign Affairs 71 (No. 1 1992): 62 - 63.

⁸⁹ A true estimate of Iraqi civilian casualties may never be known as it relies on Iraqi sources which may not be reliable or capable of making an assessment. Hisham H. Ahmed, "Iraq's Conduct of the Gulf Crisis," Arab Studies Quarterly 13(Winter/Spring 1991): 27 - 28.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 28 - 29.

a credible threat to its internal security. It is when deterrence fails that successful implementation is required.

4. Lack of American Capability

Analysts have criticized PD-59 for what they perceive as an optimistic assessment of the consequences of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. Michael Howard asks, "[W]hat would be going on here while the strategic strike forces of the United States were conducting their carefully calibrated and controlled nuclear war?"⁹¹ The targeting strategy of PD-59 was intended to provide flexibility to the National Command Authority by designing attack options other than a single massive nuclear strike. Yet, it can be argued that any strategy limiting nuclear strikes is neither credible nor desirable if the Soviets could retaliate massively.

Colin S. Gray states, "No matter how flexible U.S. strategic employment planning may be, if it is not matched by some very significant ability actually to defend North America, it would have to amount, in practice, to suicide on the installment plan."⁹² As with the arguments over expected Soviet domestic response, this criticism is based on the perceived situation of MAD and the Soviet second-strike capability. Flexibility in nuclear targeting, in itself, is not advantageous as long as the Soviets retain the ability to strike at the United States. Any targeting doctrine under these conditions, no matter how logically conceived, would have little strategic value. It would not be credible as a deterrent threat and could not be implemented if deterrence failed.⁹³

⁹¹ Howard, 12.

⁹² Gray, "Targeting Problems for Central War," 7.

⁹³ Jervis argues that American recognition that the Soviets could answer U. S. counter-control strikes with similar attacks would deter the U. S. from executing the targeting strategy of PD-59. Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 74.

In addition to the absence of an adequate defense system to counter Soviet nuclear retaliation, the United States would be unable to launch enough warheads to cover the entire PD-59 target base. The U.S. nuclear arsenal does not contain enough warheads accurate enough to strike all of the types of targets designated by PD-59.⁹⁴

The target set of a Third World authoritarian regime is considerably smaller than that of the Soviet Union. Therefore the criticism of PD-59 that the required target set is larger than can be accommodated by the number of U.S. warheads does not apply to the Third World.⁹⁵ Regarding effective U.S. defensive capability, the Bush administration's redefinition of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative into the Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) is intended to address this issue in reference to ballistic missiles.⁹⁶

A defensive capability represented by GPALS technology, however, cannot be considered adequate for three reasons: (1) the improbability of complete effectiveness; (2) the lagtime between the deployment of such a system and the realization of the ballistic missile threat; and (3) the potential for non-ballistic missile nuclear threats.

The Bush administration emphasizes the performance of the U.S. Army's Patriot air defense system in the Gulf War as evidence that technology is available for effective ballistic missile defenses.⁹⁷ The performance of the Patriot system, however, has been criticized since the end of the Gulf War. Estimates of Patriot effectiveness against Iraqi

⁹⁴ Ibid., 96 - 97.

⁹⁵ It is beyond the scope of this discussion to argue the costs and benefits of utilizing conventional versus unconventional weapons. The point emphasized here is that the U. S. arsenal is capable of striking all selected targets in a Third World country.

⁹⁶ Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1-1

⁹⁷ In his 1991 State of the Union message, Bush stated, "Now, with remarkable technological advances like the Patriot missile, we can defend against ballistic missile attacks aimed at innocent civilians." George Bush, "State of the Union 1991," Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 February 1991, 261.

SCUD ballistic missiles range from 96 percent to 20 percent.⁹⁸ If ballistic missiles are armed with nuclear warheads, any defensive system less than completely effective may not be adequate. As Steve Fetter argues, "Even a highly effective terminal defense is unlikely to destroy more than 90 percent of incoming warheads, but if only one nuclear...warhead penetrates the defenses of a city, thousands of people will die."⁹⁹ Additionally, the primitive nature of the Iraqi ballistic missiles precludes using the Gulf War experience as assurance that missile defenses are technologically possible in the near term.¹⁰⁰

The second reason why American defense capabilities are deficient is the time it will take to deploy a ballistic missile defense system. The Bush administration's goal is to deploy surface-based theater defenses by the mid-1990's.¹⁰¹ As with the performance of the Patriot, the projected progress of GPALS has come under severe criticism. Accusations of program mismanagement and improper testing practices imply that the deployment goal will not be realized.¹⁰² Regardless of when effective ballistic missile defenses are available, they do not affect the present threat. More than 20 nations have ballistic missile capabilities or

⁹⁸ The 96 percent estimate is from an initial post-war U.S. Army report. The 20 percent figure is attributed to a leaked assessment by the Israel Defense Force. Theodore A. Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience With Patriot," International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92): 134 - 135. It should be noted that the U. S. Army has revised its estimate during Congressional testimony in April 1992, an Army spokesman reported a Patriot success rate in Saudi Arabia and 40 percent in Israel. Eric Schmitt, "Patriots Downed Fewer Scuds, Army Admits," New York Times, 8 April 1992, A9.

⁹⁹ Fetter, 39.

¹⁰⁰ Postol, 171.

¹⁰¹ See Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, 1-9; and Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "New Army Ballistic Missile Buster To Be Ready for Action in 1996," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1992): 21 - 22.

¹⁰² See Aldric Saucier, "Lost in Space," New York Times, 9 March 1992, A15; and William J. Broad, "Pentagon Stance on Space Arms Is Faulted by Agency of Congress," New York Times, 11 March 1992, A12.

are trying to acquire them, including Iraq, Iran and Libya.¹⁰³ While current Third World capabilities are range-restricted to theater, rather than intercontinental, use this does not alleviate the threat to forward deployed U.S. military forces.¹⁰⁴

Finally and perhaps most importantly, the third reason why defenses are not adequate is that a system such as GPALS will not address the variety of nuclear delivery systems available to potential Third World aggressors. According to Fetter:

[Any] country sophisticated enough to develop ICBMs could certainly find other ways to deliver nuclear weapons if faced with an effective missile defense. Indeed, cruise missiles – about which SDI-type systems can do very little – may...prove to be far more effective delivery systems for emerging nuclear...arsenals than ballistic missiles.¹⁰⁵

Therefore, ballistic missile defenses will only solve part of the defensive problem.

The preceding discussion indicates that the lack of U.S. defenses is a valid criticism of any nuclear deterrence policy aimed at Third World dictators. Unlike the case of PD-59, however, the lack of a survivable Third World second-strike capability precludes the deficient American defenses from invalidating a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.

C. CONCLUSION

A deterrence strategy based on the theory of omnibalancing and Presidential Directive 59 are both predicated on the assumption that the targeted regimes place great value on the

¹⁰³ W. Seth Carus, Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response, The Washington Papers No. 146 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), 12.

¹⁰⁴ This range limitation is not insignificant especially as it effects two related issues not covered in this discussion: extended deterrence and coalition support. Steve Fetter argues that had Iraq developed the capability to launch ballistic missiles against Paris or London, France and Great Britain may not have supported the Gulf War effort. Fetter, 28.

¹⁰⁵ Fetter, 39. See also Kosta Tsipis, "Offshore Threat – Cruise Missiles," New York Times, 1 April 1992, A21. For an analysis of the effect of cruise missile proliferation on U.S. Navy operations, see Science Applications International Corporation for Defense Nuclear Agency, Missile Non-Proliferation: Implications for the United States Navy, 22 January 1990.

maintenance of their internal mechanisms of control. Targeting strategies derived from this assumption threaten the means by which these regimes, whether in the Third World or Soviet Union, secure their base of power. Criticisms of PD-59 are therefore relevant in evaluating the potential of omnibalancing to serve as the basis of a Third World deterrence strategy.

Much of the criticism of PD-59 was based on the existence of a Soviet nuclear second-strike capability. In the perceived situation of MAD, the undefendable vulnerability of American society to Soviet attack invalidated a U.S. counter-control targeting strategy. Not only would the elimination of Soviet internal control affect war termination and conflict de-escalation, the very fact that the Soviets had the ability to counter-attack made any U.S. targeting strategy inherently incredible. Authoritarian regimes in the Third World, however, do not possess an intercontinental nuclear second-strike capability. Therefore, the criticisms of PD-59 that questioned the desirability of a counter-control strategy, or that emphasized a lack of defenses are not applicable to a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing.

The implementation of PD-59 was also criticized because of a lack of required intelligence support for targeting. Recent Third World conflicts reveal a similar deficiency in intelligence. The nature of authoritarian regimes, however, indicates that American intelligence shortfalls are the result of a lack of dedicated resources, rather than the difficulty of collection. Therefore, while it is recognized as a valid criticism of a counter-control strategy against Third World authoritarian regimes, deficient targeting intelligence can be corrected. It does not invalidate the use of omnibalancing for deterrence.

The differences between Third World dictatorships and the Soviet Union also negate the criticisms of PD-59 regarding the unmanageable size of the target set and the expected amount of civilian casualties. A criticism that is applicable to a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing is the argument disputing the predicted reaction of the Soviet population. Recent U.S. military conflicts with Third World dictatorships indicate mixed responses from

the population. It should be re-emphasized that the domestic response is only critical if deterrence fails. It is only the perception of the authoritarian leadership that is significant for successful deterrence and there is evidence that this leadership is influenced by threats to its internal control. The case of deterrence failure will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

After comparing PD-59 with a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing, it is evident that the majority of the criticisms of PD-59 are not applicable to deterring Third World authoritarian states. Assuming that the theory of omnibalancing is an accurate description of Third World regime behavior, it appears logical that a targeting strategy similar to that of PD-59 could result in a viable deterrence policy.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

With the end of the Cold War and the potential for reduced tension between the United States and the former Soviet Union, there is little likelihood of nuclear warfare between the superpowers. The recent war in the Middle East and the current focus on the security threat of nuclear proliferation, however, has introduced a requirement for a different emphasis in nuclear deterrence. The preceding analysis is a first step in the development of a deterrence policy aimed at authoritarian regimes in the Third World armed with nuclear weapons.

A review of the concept of deterrence, reveals that the coercive strategies applicable to deterring Third World nuclear use are those of denial and punishment. A denial strategy is defensive in nature. The United States needs technological solutions to the defensive problem, such as GPALS in the case of ballistic missile delivery systems, in combination with conventional preemptive attacks against Third World nuclear capabilities. The coercive strategy of punishment must threaten the value system of the targeted regime. The development of this punishment threat has been the focus of this study.

It is assumed that the decision-making of the authoritarian leaders is influenced by the factors described in Steven David's theory of omnibalancing. Specifically, these regimes perceive that their base of power is vulnerable to internal security threats. A deterrence policy based on a punishment strategy must take advantage of this perception by targeting the mechanisms on which the regime relies for internal control. Two methods of internal control are significant: suppression and economic distribution.

The most common means of suppressing internal opposition is the use of elite security forces. Since they are included in the regime's core following, their loyalty can be assumed to be high. The regime leadership depends on these forces not only to counter domestic civilian unrest but also to suppress any potential rebellion in the general military forces. Targeting the control mechanism of suppression translates into threatening to destroy the elite forces and the command and control network connecting these forces to the regime's leadership.

Economic distribution as a control mechanism refers to the use of monetary rewards to ensure loyalty with the implied threat of interruption of financial benefits for disloyal behavior. This method of control obviously requires a constant flow of wealth to the regime for subsequent payments. For the majority of Third World nations, this source of revenue is derived from few, if not just one, export product. Targeting the means of economic distribution translates into attacks on the source, storage or transportation facilities related to exports. While threatened destruction of the source of a primary export may be the most efficient means of interrupting the dictatorship's income, it may not be politically feasible, especially if the export is a strategic resource for the United States or its allies. Petroleum products are one example of an export product that would probably not be targeted.

Two obstacles to threatening a regime's internal control mechanisms have been presented. The first is the inclination of Third World leaders to externalize a threat to their internal security. This may result in an escalation of conflict rather than a successful deterrence situation. The second obstacle is the phenomenon of the scapegoat war. The regime leadership can utilize the defender's deterrent threat to rally any internal opposition over to the dictator's side against a recognizable external foe. Both of these situations present difficulties in threatening internal control.

If implemented, a deterrence policy based on the theory of omnibalancing shares similarities with the arguments stated by advocates of the Carter administration's justification

for the nuclear targeting shift codified by PD-59. Therefore, the criticisms of PD-59 serve as an applicable test of the viability of omnibalancing for deterrence.

An analysis of the requirements for PD-59 revealed a critical intelligence failure in the U.S. capability for locating counter-control targets. While recent examples of U.S. interventions in the Third World demonstrated similar shortcomings, the characteristics inherent in Third World nations indicate that associated intelligence failures are more dependent upon a lack of committed resources rather than on the nature of the problem. Third World borders are readily penetrated by technical or human intelligence assets. Additionally, the control structure in Third World dictatorships is indicative of an authoritarian regime but not a totalitarian system based on the Soviet model. In other words, the internal control is not entrenched into every aspect of Third World society and can therefore be more readily isolated and identified than could the control mechanisms of the former Soviet Union. This fact also addresses the criticism of PD-59 that because of the number of Soviet targets identified, implementation would result in a counter-cities attack. In the case of a Third World regime, the size of a counter-control target set is relatively smaller and more discriminate. Therefore the scale of civilian casualties and collateral damage in the Third World will be less than was argued concerning PD-59.

The targeting strategy of PD-59 was also criticized for its questionable assumption that once the internal control mechanisms were destroyed, the population would rise up to overthrow the Soviet regime. This criticism may have validity regarding the Third World. Analyses of American attacks on Libya and Iraq demonstrate the difficulty in predicting Third World domestic responses to military strikes against the regime. As a threat, however, deterrence addresses the perceptions of the regime leadership rather than the desires of the population. In this regard, there is substantial evidence that Third World leaders behave and make decisions in accordance with the theory of omnibalancing. Therefore, for the

maintenance of deterrence, threatening the possibility for revolt becomes more significant than the potential for actual rebellion.

Finally, critics of PD-59 argue that the targeting requirements were beyond the actual U.S. military capability to implement. Additionally, a lack of defense against a Soviet counter-strike in a situation of MAD made deterrence incredible. Third World regimes do not possess a secure second-strike capability against the United States. The relatively small size of Third World nations, the concentration of control mechanisms of suppression and economic distribution in a handful of cities, and vulnerable nuclear delivery systems result in a targeting strategy that is well within present U.S. capabilities.

B. CONCLUSIONS

A deterrence policy based on omnibalancing targets what Third World regimes value the most: the mechanisms of internal control. By applying this strategy, the United States would threaten the overthrow of the aggressor regime through the destruction of these control mechanisms. There are three conclusions that can be drawn from the development of a deterrence policy based on this concept: (1) wars waged by the United States against Third World nuclear powers should be restricted to limited objectives; (2) the distinction between declaratory policy and employment policy will likely be significant if deterrence fails; and (3) the Third World perceptions of the utility of nuclear weapons can lead to a situation of mutual deterrence. The first two conclusions affect war-fighting strategies and the last is critical to an understanding of crisis stability.

1. Limited Objectives of War

A punishment strategy based on omnibalancing is predicated on an aggressor's decision that the costs of using nuclear weapons outweigh any perceived benefits. Since the need to deter Third World nuclear use remains necessary even after hostilities commence, a deterrence policy must be applicable to both pre-war and intra-war deterrence situations.

Intra-war deterrence will occur if the aggressor is convinced that his regime will not be destroyed as long as he does not employ nuclear weapons. Intra-war nuclear deterrence, therefore, will only succeed when the United States enters a conflict with declared limited objectives. If, in contrast, the United States is committed to a total victory over the aggressor, the Third World regime could plausibly conclude that the costs of using nuclear weapons were no different than not using them. Under these circumstances, the Third World dictatorship would only be influenced by perceived benefits of nuclear use.

The argument regarding limited objectives is more applicable to declaratory rather than to action signalling. Military actions in modern warfare, as demonstrated during the Gulf War, can blur the distinction between limited and total war. The citizens of Baghdad, for example, may not have appreciated the fact that coalition forces selected their targets carefully. Therefore, it is critical that the aggressor receives clear and unambiguous declaratory signals concerning the U.S. war objectives.

2. Declaratory vs. Employment Policy

One criticism of PD-59 was that the Soviet population may not have responded in the manner assumed by the strategy. This may also be a valid criticism of omnibalancing. Recent Third World conflicts are inconclusive regarding a potential domestic response to a counter-control strike. This is an irrelevant point as long as the Third World leadership is convinced that its regime security is credibly threatened and, therefore, does not challenge the deterrent threat. The response of the Third World population, however, will be significant if deterrence fails.

According to a declaratory deterrence policy based on omnibalancing, if deterrence failed and a Third World nuclear attack took place, the United States would destroy the mechanisms of internal regime control. This implies a need to minimize civilian casualties in the counter-control strikes. It would be critical to spare the source of regime opposition from excessive suffering. This requirement would influence the actual selection of targets

and weapons to ensure minimal collateral damage. One drawback of this discriminate targeting, however, is that the regime's leadership might not be destroyed in the attack. Additionally, since it cannot be assumed with assurance that internal opposition would overthrow the Third World regime, there is a possibility that the regime could survive. The survival of the dictatorship after a counter-control strike would leave the United States with no targets of sufficient value to hold at risk in order to reestablish deterrence. This situation would appear the same to the Third World leadership as if the United States entered the conflict committed to total war. In other words, after an unsuccessful U.S. strike, the leadership would perceive no relative costs to continued nuclear use. Another consequence of this situation is that other nuclear Third World powers might draw a critical lesson about the lack of U.S. capabilities or willingness to threaten their existence.

This discussion of deterrence failure is not meant to question the utility of omnibalancing as a basis for deterrence. It does suggest, however, that there would be a need to reevaluate target selection if deterrence fails. While the deterrent threat may be predicated on ensuring the regime's domestic opposition survives the strike, the objectives of the employment policy would be to ensure the regime does not survive. A conflict exists between declaratory policy and employment policy because it may not be possible to use the force necessary to guarantee regime destruction and still limit civilian casualties and collateral damage. In a sense, this conflict resembles the charge that PD-59 would actually result in a counter-cities strategy. But Third World nations, unlike the former Soviet Union, do not possess a second-strike capability which renders a counter-cities strike suicidal for the United States. Thus, the U.S. employment policy against a Third World dictatorship is not hindered by concern of retaliation.

3. Mutual Deterrence

The last conclusion refers to the possible Third World perceptions of nuclear deterrence and omnibalancing. Many of the preceding arguments were justified through

anecdotal evidence of U.S. experiences in Third World conflicts. But authoritarian leaders in potential nuclear nations may have also learned lessons from these events. One critical lesson dictators may have learned is that their regimes can survive armed conflicts with the United States. It has been six years since American aircraft bombed Libya and Muammar Khadaffi is still secure in his power. While it may be too soon after the Gulf War to make a prediction of Saddam Hussein's longevity, it is clear that his potential demise will not be directly attributed to the coalition military attacks. But while Hussein may have studied Khadaffi's experience battling the United States, recent events in the Persian Gulf are more significant in regards to future nuclear deterrence. Statements Hussein made before and during the war indicate his perception that he could use the threat of chemical warfare to ensure his survival. If this is true, then Hussein and others like him may see nuclear weapons as even more of a guarantor of their security.

It has already been concluded that the United States would be restricted to declared limited objectives in a conflict with a Third World nuclear power. If the regime used its nuclear weapons as a deterrent against U.S. counter-control strikes, there may emerge an inherent stability in potential crises. In this hypothetical situation, the counter-control threats of the United States would reinforce the need for the Third World authoritarian regime to threaten nuclear use against the United States to guarantee its survival. The result would be a potential situation of mutual deterrence, the stability of which would depend in a large measure on how well each side communicated their threats and intentions. Based solely on a superficial analysis of declaratory threats, the Gulf War experience could be interpreted as a situation of mutual deterrence. President Bush clearly stated that the overthrow of the Ba'athist regime was not an objective of the war, but he also threatened terrible personal consequences for Hussein if chemical weapons were used. At the same time, Hussein apparently threatened chemical use if his regime was directly attacked. Both threats complemented the other and might have contributed to the mutual

desire not to challenge either one. This example of mutual deterrence reveals a stability-instability paradox.¹ While the threat of Iraqi chemical use may have protected Hussein's power, it did not prevent the coalition from achieving limited military objectives with conventional weapons. This depiction of the deterrence policies in the Gulf War is admittedly only one of many possible interpretations of the decision-making processes of Iraqi and U.S. leaders. The value of the Gulf War experience for understanding future deterrence situations may, therefore, be limited.

All of these conclusions indicate that formulating a nuclear deterrence policy aimed at the emerging threat of Third World nuclear nations is a complex and uncertain process. This research and the theory of omnibalancing serve as initial steps in the eventual choice of a targeting strategy for deterrence. Neither nuclear proliferation nor regional aggression will discontinue in the foreseeable future. The United States must be prepared to deter a potential Third World nuclear power hostile to its interests or those of its allies and friends. It cannot be assumed that the apparent success of superpower nuclear deterrence can be transferred to situations in the Third World.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

Having reviewed the findings of this study and offered conclusions, some discussion should also be given to two aspects of nuclear deterrence against Third World regimes that have not been covered: the utility of the U.S. nuclear weapons; and the applicability of omnibalancing to third party deterrence. Both of these topics require further study. The following discussion is meant merely to indicate the importance of these issues.

¹ Glenn Snyder, "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury, ed., The Balance of Power (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), 184 - 201. See also Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy, 29 - 34.

1. The Utility of U.S. Nuclear Weapons

The theory of omnibalancing has presented a basis for a targeting strategy to deter Third World authoritarian regimes. The discussion of omnibalancing has not indicated a preference for a particular weapons system to implement the threatened response. Nuclear deterrence policies directed at the former Soviet Union, such as PD-59, were developed with an assumption of nuclear use by the United States. The question, in regards to deterring Third World aggressors, is whether the threatened use of nuclear weapons enhances deterrence.

President Bush, in a national address on 27 September 1991, announced a radical reduction of the U.S. nuclear force posture.¹ This reduction included: the elimination of ground-launched short range nuclear weapons; the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from naval ships and land-based naval aircraft; the stand-down of all alert strategic bombers and the termination of the development of mobile ICBM's and air-launched short range attack missiles.² These reductions of nuclear forces were enacted in reaction to the turmoil that was then present in the Soviet Union. The Bush administration hoped to influence President Mikhail Gorbachev and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin to reciprocate with similar Soviet reductions. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons, however, has meant that the United States must rely on strategic nuclear systems for immediate deterrence. It is not obvious whether the use of intercontinental nuclear weapons would result in a credible threat in a Third World deterrence situation.

John Deutsch, a former Undersecretary of Energy, suggests that Bush's arms control initiatives have produced a non-credible threat:

Theater nuclear weapons have perhaps their most significant role in deterring regional conflicts and the use of nuclear, chemical and

¹ George Bush, "Initiative on Nuclear Arms," Vital Speeches of the Day, (1 November 1991): 34 - 36.

² Ibid., 35.

biological weapons. I therefore believe that President Bush acted unwisely in removing tactical nuclear weapons from ships and submarines....⁴

Deutsch did not provide justifications for his premise but one possible explanation is that the relatively enormous yield of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons would represent a disproportionate amount of damage in response to a Third World nuclear attack. The magnitude of such an asymmetrical counter-strike may render it non-credible as a threatened response.⁵

The Department of Defense has apparently taken the opposite view and seems satisfied with the deterrent effect of intercontinental systems. Secretary Cheney, in his 1992 Report to Congress, stated:

Strategic nuclear forces will continue to play an essential role with respect to countries other than the former Soviet Union....Other countries...threaten to acquire [nuclear weapons]. This requires the continued reliance on a secure retaliatory capability to deter their use.⁶

Cheney's statement implies his acceptance in the ability for intercontinental systems to deter Third World dictatorships.

The statements of both Deutsch and Cheney are similar in that they indicate a perception that nuclear weapons are required for deterring nuclear use. It is not obvious that targeting the mechanisms of internal control of a Third World regime requires the use of nuclear weapons. The Gulf War has served as a showcase for the effectiveness of conventional, high-yield, precision-guided munitions. The use of conventional warheads

⁴ John M. Deutsch, "Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order," Technology Review (February/March 1992): 68.

⁵ Thomas W. Dowler and Joseph S. Howard II, "Countering the Threat of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons," Strategic Review 19 (Fall 1991): 36. Dowler and Howard recommend the development of low-yield nuclear weapons termed "micro-nukes" as a solution to the threat credibility problem.

⁶ Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, February 1992, 7.

in a punishment strategy would alleviate any reluctance U.S. decision-makers might have to respond if faced with only the option of employing nuclear weapons. Conventional weapons also have potential utility for a deterrence policy based on omnibalancing to prevent Third World use of chemical or biological weapons.

While omnibalancing forms a basis for a deterrence policy, it is evident that more research is required to determine the optimum weapon system for its implementation. It is not intuitively clear whether or not U.S. nuclear weapons are essential to satisfy the requirements of a credible deterrent threat.

2. The Applicability of Omnibalancing to Third Party Deterrence

The discussion of deterring Third World regimes from using nuclear weapons has been focused on potential conflict situations involving the United States or its allies. But, if nuclear proliferation continues, another nuclear scenario is likely: a conflict between two Third World nuclear-armed nations which does not directly involve the United States. The United States, in the role of a third party, may wish to remain neutral in this confrontation. The United States, however, may also desire to intervene to prevent either side from using nuclear arms. This latter situation can be described as "third party" deterrence.

A draft copy of the Defense Department's Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994 - 1999 indicates that a role for the U.S. military in third party deterrence is being considered:

[T]he actual use of weapons of mass destruction, even in conflicts that otherwise do not directly engage U.S. interests, could spur further proliferation which in turn would threaten world order. The U.S. may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent the...use of weapons of mass destruction...[These steps include preemption] or punishing the attackers or threatening punishment of aggressors....¹

¹ Patrick E. Tyler, "U. S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop," New York Times, 8 March 1992, A14. The Defense Planning Guidance is a classified document so it may be some time before the final draft is available for comparison. This early version was allegedly leaked to promote public discussion of its central points.

This potential use of U.S. forces makes it even more important to determine whether omnibalancing is applicable to third party deterrence.

Scenarios of conflict between nuclear-capable Third World nations are not implausible or difficult to imagine. India and Pakistan, both recognized as possessing nuclear capabilities, have fought three wars in the last three decades and came very close to a fourth in 1990.⁸ Leonard Spector speculates that if hostilities do break out between these nations, there is a possibility that the conflict might escalate to nuclear war.⁹ Similar scenarios could be envisioned either between India and China or between Israel and a future nuclear-armed Arab state.¹⁰ Another possibility is a potential nuclear war between former Soviet republics. While the republics have agreed to transfer all nuclear weapons to the territory of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine halted shipments in March 1992.¹¹ Because the Ukraine has been in a political conflict with Russia since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this act raised speculation about the Ukrainian leadership's true intentions regarding nuclear capabilities. Additionally, although Western analysts concluded that all tactical nuclear weapons had been removed from outlying republics in January 1992,¹² in March

⁸ "Indian and Pakistani Troops Exchange Gunfire in Kashmir," New York Times, 21 February 1990, A5.

⁹ Leonard S. Spector, "India-Pakistan War: It Could be Nuclear," New York Times, 7 June 1990, A 23.

¹⁰ See Robert E. Harkavy, "After the Gulf War: The Future of Israeli Nuclear Deterrence," Washington Quarterly (Summer 1991): 161 - 179; and Brahma Chellaney, "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power," International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 48 - 51. In a Middle East scenario it is unlikely that the United States could maintain a neutral posture in regards to Israel. It would not be implausible, however, for the United States to restrain from assisting militarily unless nuclear use was threatened.

¹¹ Serge Schmemmann, "Ukraine Halting A-Arms Shift to Russia," New York Times, 13 March 1992, A3.

¹² Allegedly, by January 1992 all former Soviet tactical nuclear weapons had been transferred to storage facilities in the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Robert S. Norris, "The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago," Arms Control Today 22 (January/February 1992): 24 - 25

1992, it was reported that there were nuclear weapons still stored in the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan.¹¹ The fact that these two republics have been fighting for four years conjures up worrisome scenarios about unauthorized acquisition of these weapons.

There are difficulties applying a targeting strategy based on omnibalancing to third party deterrence. One problem is that some of the potential nuclear nations, such as India, do not resemble the authoritarian regimes described in this study. In those cases, therefore, it cannot be assumed that omnibalancing will accurately describe the regime's value system. Another problem is an inherent lack of credibility for the United States, as a third party, to threaten military intervention of the scale proposed by a punishment strategy. Finally, as in the case of Israel, the United States may not enjoy the political freedom to maintain an unconstrained deterrence policy. In consideration of these drawbacks, it is apparent that further analysis must be performed before developing a U.S. third party deterrence policy.

¹¹ The weapons are reportedly under centralized control of the forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. "Armenian Says 10 Hostage Officers Will be Freed," New York Times, 12 March 1992, A6.

WORKS CITED

- Ahmed, Hisham H. "Iraq's Conduct of the Gulf Crisis." Arab Studies Quarterly 13 (Winter/Spring 1991): 11 - 35.
- Alagappa, Muthiah. The National Security of Developing States. Dover, MA: Auburn House Publishing Company, 1987.
- Albert, Bernard S. "Constructive Counterpower." Orbis 20 (Summer 1976): 343 - 366.
- Allen, Charles D. The Uses of Navies in Peacetime. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980.
- Al-Mashat, Abdul-Monem M. National Security in the Third World. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
- Ames, Barry. Political Survival. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- "Aremenian Says 10 Hostage Officers Will be Freed." New York Times, 12 March 1992, A6.
- Arnett, Eric H. Gunboat Diplomacy and the Bomb: Nuclear Proliferation and the U.S. Navy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989.
- Aspin, Les. A New Kind of Threat: Nuclear Weapons in an Uncertain Soviet Union. 12 September 1991.
- _____. "National Security in the 1990's: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces." Speech before the Atlantic Council of the United States. 6 January 1992.
- Ayoob, Mohammed. "Security in the Third World: The Worm About to Turn?." International Affairs 60 (Winter 1983-1984): 41 - 51.
- _____. "Perspectives from the Gulf: Regime Security or Regional Security," in Donald Hugh McMillen, ed. Asian Perspectives on International Security. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- _____. "The Security Problematic of the Third World." World Politics 43 (January 1991): 257 - 283.
- Azar, Edward E. and Chung-in Moon. "Rethinking Third World National Security," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, ed. National Security in the Third World. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988.
- Ball, Desmond J. Developments in U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy Under the Carter Administration. Working Paper No. 17. Canberra: The Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1979.

- _____. Targeting for Strategic Deterrence. Adelphi Paper No. 185. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1983.
- _____. "Toward a Critique of Strategic Nuclear Targeting," in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, ed. Strategic Nuclear Targeting. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Barnett, Michael N. and Jack S. Levy. "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-73." International Organizations 45 (Summer 1991): 369 - 395.
- Betts, Richard K. Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987.
- Betts, Richard K. and Samuel P. Huntington. "Dead Dictators and Rioting Mobs." International Security 10(Winter 1985/86): 112 - 143.
- Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: The Free Press, 1973.
- Blechman, Barry M. and Stephen S. Kaplan. Force Without War. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1978.
- Bouchard, Joseph F. Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- Broad, William J. "Pentagon Stance on Space Arms Is Faulted by Agency of Congress." New York Times, 11 March 1992, A12.
- Brown, Harold. "The Flexibility of Our Plans." Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 October 1980, 741 - 743.
- Browne, Malcolm W. "As U.S. Force Builds, a Military Stalemate Shapes Up." New York Times, 10 August 1990, A11.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. The War Trap. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and William H. Riker. "An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation." Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (June 1982): 283 - 306.
- Bundy, McGeorge. "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf." Foreign Affairs 70 (Fall 1991): 83 - 94.
- Bush, George. "State of the Union 1991." Vital Speeches of the Day, 15 February 1991, 258 - 261.
- _____. "Initiative on Nuclear Arms." Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 November 1991, 34 - 36.
- Campbell, Kurt C. and Thomas G. Weiss. "The Third World in the Wake of Eastern Europe." The Washington Quarterly 14 (Spring 1991): 91 - 108.
- Carus, W. Seth. Ballistic Missiles in the Third World: Threat and Response. The Washington Papers No. 146. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990.

- Chalabi, Ahmad. "Iraq: The Past as Prologue?." Foreign Policy 83 (Summer 1991): 20 - 29.
- Chellaney, Brahma. "South Asia's Passage to Nuclear Power." International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 43 - 72.
- Christensen, Thomas J. and Jack Snyder. "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity." International Organization 44 (Spring 1990): 137 - 168.
- Chubin, Shahram and Charles Tripp. Iran and Iraq at War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1988.
- Cimbala, Stephen J. and Joseph D. Douglass, ed. Ending a Nuclear War. London: Pergamon - Brassey's International Defense Publishing Inc., 1988.
- Clapham, Christopher. Third World Politics. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985.
- Cooper, Michael G. "The Iran - Iraq War and Lessons for the Future." Naval War College, 1989.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. and Abraham R. Wagner. The Lessons of Modern War Volume II: The Iran - Iraq War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Cottam, Richard W. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988.
- Dabat, Alejandro and Luis Lorenzano. Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule. London: Verso Editions, 1984.
- David, Steven R. Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
- _____. "Explaining Third World Alignment." World Politics 43 (January 1991): 233 - 256.
- _____. Choosing Sides. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
- Deeb, Mary Jane. Libya's Foreign Policy in North Africa. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- Deutsch, John M. "Nuclear Weapons in the New World Order." Technology Review (February/March 1992): 68.
- Dowler, Thomas W. and Joseph S. Howard II. "Countering the Threat of the Well-Armed Tyrant: A Modest Proposal for Small Nuclear Weapons." Strategic Review 19 (Fall 1991): 34 - 40.
- Enthoven, Alain C. and K. Wayne Smith. How Much is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961 - 1969. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971.
- Epstein, Joshua M. "Soviet Vulnerabilities in Iran and the RDF Deterrent." International Security 6 (Fall 1981): 126 - 158.

- "Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive," in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, ed. Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945 - 1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.
- Evron, Yair. "Nuclear Weapons for Israel?." Commentary 61 (February 1976): 4 - 8.
- "Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait." New York Times, 9 August 1990, A15.
- "Excerpts From Bush's Statement on U.S. Defense of Saudis." New York Times, 9 August 1990, A15.
- "Excerpts From Interview with Hussein on Crisis in Gulf." New York Times, 31 August 1990, A10.
- "Excerpts from President's News Conference on Crisis in Gulf." New York Times, 1 December 1990, I6.
- "Excerpts from President's News Conference on Gulf Crisis." New York Times, 31 August 1990, A11.
- "Excerpts From Remarks by Cheney and Powell on War Effort." New York Times, 18 January 1991, A9.
- "Excerpts from Schwarzkopf News Conference on Gulf War." New York Times, 28 February 1991, A5.
- "Excerpts From Statement By Baker on U.S. Policy." New York Times, 21 December 1989, A19.
- "Excerpts from Talk by Bush on Gulf War." New York Times, 6 February 1991, A10.
- Fetter, Steve. "Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?." International Security 16 (Summer 1991): 5 - 42.
- Fitch, John Samuel. The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.
- Freedman, Lawrence. The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983.
- Friedman, Thomas L. "Bush and Baker Explicit in Threat to Use Force." New York Times, 30 October 1990, A12.
- Garfinkle, Adam. "Will Saddam Get the Bomb." National Review (13 May 1991): 36 - 37.
- Garrett III, H. Laurence, ADM Frank B. Kelso II, USN and GEN A. M. Gray, USMC. "The Way Ahead." United States Naval Institute Proceedings (April 1991): 36 - 47.
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. "Regime Legitimacy and National Security: The Case of Pahlavi Iran," in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, ed. National Security in the Third World. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 1988.

- Gelb, Leslie H. "Gas, Germs and Nukes." New York Times, 30 January 1991, A23.
- George, Alexander L. "The Development of Doctrine and Strategy," in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall and William E. Simons, ed. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971.
- George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Goodman, Jr., Glenn W. "New Army Ballistic Missile Buster To Be Ready for Action in 1996." Armed Forces Journal International (March 1992): 21 - 22.
- Gordon, Michael R. "No War Unless Iraq Strikes, U.S. Gulf Commander Says." New York Times, 1 September 1990, I6.
- Gray, Colin S. "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory." International Security 4 (Summer 1979): 54 - 87.
- _____. "Targeting Problems for Central War." Naval War College Review 35 (January - February 1980): 3 - 21.
- _____. Nuclear Strategy and National Style. Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press. 1986.
- Gray, Colin S. and Keith Payne. "Victory is Possible." Foreign Policy 39 (Summer 1980): 14 - 27.
- Gustafson, Lowell S. The Sovereignty Dispute Over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Haig, Alexander M., Jr. Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1984.
- Harkavy, Robert E. "After the Gulf War: The Future of Israeli Nuclear Strategy." Washington Quarterly (Summer 1991): 161 - 179.
- Hermann, Margaret G. "Syria's Hafez Al-Assad," in Barbara Kellerman and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, ed. Leadership and Negotiation in the Middle East. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1988.
- Herrmann, Richard K. "The Middle East and the New World Order: Rethinking U.S. Political Strategy after the Gulf War." International Security 16 (Fall 1991): 42 - 75.
- Hilts, Philip J. "Tally of Ex-Soviets' A-Arms Stirs Worry." New York Times, 16 March 1992, A3.
- Howard, Michael E. "On Fighting a Nuclear War." International Security 5 (Spring 1981): 3 - 17.
- Huth, Paul K. Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

- Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. "What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900 - 1980." World Politics 36 (July 1984): 496 - 526.
- Ibrahim, Youssef M. "Sanctions on Libya Likely To Fuel Qaddafi's Chaos." New York Times, 1 April 1992, A6.
- "Indian and Pakistani Troops Exchange Gunfire in Kashmir." New York Times, 21 February 1990, A5.
- Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rosberg. "Why Africa's Weak States Persist." World Politics 35 (October 1982): 1 - 24.
- _____. Personal Rule in Black Africa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- _____. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- _____. "Deterrence and Perception." International Security 7 (Winter 1982/83): 3 - 30.
- _____. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
- _____. The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
- _____. "The Future of World Politics: Will it Resemble the Past?." International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92): 39 - 73.
- Kahan, Jerome H. Hedging Against the Unthinkable: U.S. Military Responses to Third World Nuclear Crisis. Professional Paper 484. Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1990.
- Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Kaufmann, William W. "The Requirements of Deterrence," in William W. Kaufmann, ed. Military Policy and National Security. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
- "Key Sections of Shultz Press Talk on Libya and Other Issues." New York Times, 18 April 1986, A10.
- Kidd, Isaac C. "For the Alliance, Seapower is an Anchor of Stability in an Unstable World." Seapower (January 1992): 32 - 38.
- Kime, Steve. "How the Soviet Union is Ruled." Air Force Magazine 63 (March 1980): 54 - 59.
- King, Ralph. The Iran - Iraq War: The Political Implications. Adelphi Paper No. 219. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1987.

- Kirkpatrick, Jeane. "U.S. Security and Latin America." Commentary 71 (January 1981): 29 - 40.
- Kissinger, Henry. The Necessity for Choice. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960.
- Lamborn, Alan C. "Power and the Politics of Extraction." International Studies Quarterly 27 (June 1983): 125 - 146.
- Lauder, John A. "Lessons of the Strategic Bombing Survey for Contemporary Defense Policy." Orbis 18 (Fall 1974): 770 - 790.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. Between Peace and War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- _____. "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War." The Journal of Strategic Studies 6 (March 1983): 5 - 35.
- _____. "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?." in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, ed. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
- Lebow, Richard Ned and Janice Gross Stein. "Beyond Deterrence." Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4 1987): 5 - 72.
- _____. "Beyond Deterrence: Building Better Theory." Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4, 1987): 155 - 170.
- _____. "Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter." World Politics (January 1989): 208 - 224.
- _____. "Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable." World Politics 43 (April 1990): 336 - 369.
- Lelyveld, Joseph. "Intense Talks Led to Thatcher Ruling." New York Times, 16 April 1986, A14.
- Levi, Barbara G., Frank N. von Hippel and William H. Dougherty. "Civilian Casualties from 'Limited' Nuclear Attacks on the Soviet Union." International Security 12 (Winter 1987/88): 168 - 189.
- Levy, Jack S. "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. Handbook of War Studies. Boston: Unwin Hyman Inc., 1989.
- Lewis, Paul. "Disaster Aid Plan Upsets Third World." New York Times, 13 November 1991, A4.
- _____. "Pakistan Tells of Its A-Bomb Capacity." New York Times, 8 February 1992, 15.
- _____. "Libyans Riot at Embassies; U.N. Protests." New York Times, 3 April 1992, A5.

- Livingstone, Neil C. "Iraq's Intentional Omission." Seapower (June 1991): 29 - 30.
- Looney, Robert E. and Craig Knouse. "Predicting the Success of Economic Sanctions." The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations 13 (No. 2. 1991): 40 - 68.
- Marwah, Onkar. "India's Nuclear and Space Programs: Intent and Policy." International Security 2 (Fall 1977): 96 - 121.
- Matthews, William. "Congress Gives DIA Day-to-Day Authority." Navy Times, 9 December 1991, 33.
- Mayer, Arno J. "Internal Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870 - 1956: A Research Assignment." World Politics 41 (September 1969): 295.
- McFadden, Robert D. "Hussein Hints Use of All His Weapons." New York Times, 29 January 1991, A12.
- Mearsheimer, John J. Conventional Deterrence. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Metz, Helen Chapin, ed. Libya A Country Study. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1989.
- Miller, Judith. "When Sanctions Worked." Foreign Policy No. 39 (Summer 1980): 118 - 129.
- Morgan, Patrick M. Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 1977.
- Nalebuff, Barry. "Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World." World Politics 43 (April 1991): 313 - 335.
- Nitze, Paul. "Deterring Our Deterrent." Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1976-77): 195 - 210.
- Nolan, Janne E. Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991.
- Norris, Robert S. "The Soviet Nuclear Archipelago." Arms Control Today 22 (January/February 1992): 24 - 25.
- Novle, Kenneth B. "In Zaire, Fear and Despair Grow as Economy Slides into Chaos." New York Times, 4 November 1991, A4.
- O'Kane, Rosemary H. T. The Likelihood of Coups. Hants, England: Gower Publishing Company Limited, 1987.
- Parks, W. Hays. "Crossing the Line." United States Naval Institute Proceedings 112 (November 1986): 40 - 52.
- Payne, Keith B. "Does the United States Need a Nuclear Warfighting Doctrine and Strategy?," in Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier, ed. Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and Deterrence in the 1980's. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

- Perez, Jane. "Violence Kills Dozens in Zaire Mining Town." New York Times, 28 October 1991, A6.
- Perry, John Curtis. "Dateline North Korea: A Communist Holdout." Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990): 172 - 191.
- Peterson, Walter J. "Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom." International Studies Quarterly 30 (September 1986): 269 - 294.
- Postol, Theodore A. "Lessons of the Gulf War Experience With Patriot." International Security 16 (Winter 1991/92): 119 - 171.
- Powers, Thomas. "Choosing a Strategy for World War III." Atlantic Monthly 250 (November 1982): 82 - 110.
- Prados, John. The Soviet Estimate. New York: The Dial Press, 1982.
- Quester, George H. "Ethnic Targeting: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Come." Journal of Strategic Studies 5 (June 1982): 228 - 235.
- Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces. By Brent Scowcroft, Chairman. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983.
- Rhodes, Edward. Power and MADness. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting." Comparative Strategy 2 (No. 3 1980): 223 - 237.
- _____. "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program." Journal of Strategic Studies 6 (June 1983): 125 - 146.
- Rohter, Larry. "Noriega Eludes U.S.." New York Times, 25 December 1989, A1.
- Rosenberg, David Alan. "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945 - 1960." International Security 7 (Spring 1983): 3 - 71.
- Rosenthal, Andrew. "Bush and Yeltsin Propose Deep Cuts in Atomic Weapons." New York Times, 30 January 1992, A1 and A6.
- Rothstein, Robert L. The Weak in the World of the Strong. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- Saucier, Aldric. "Lost in Space." New York Times, 9 March 1992, A15.
- Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Schmemmann, Serge. "Ukraine Halting A-Arms Shift to Russia." New York Times, 13 March 1992, A3.
- Schmitt, Eric. "Patriots Downed Fewer Scuds, Army Admits." New York Times, 8 April 1992, A9.

- Science Applications International Corporation for Defense Nuclear Agency. Missile Non-Proliferation: Implications for the United States Navy, 22 January 1990.
- Sciolino, Elaine. "Experts Assert Raid Will Stifle Libyan Opposition to Qaddafi." New York Times, 20 April 1986, I12.
- _____. "C.I.A. Casting About for New Missions." New York Times, 4 February 1992, A1 and A4.
- _____. "C.I.A. Chief Doubts North Korean Vow on Nuclear Arms." New York Times, 26 February 1992, A1 and A6.
- _____. "U.S. Agencies Split Over North Korea." New York Times, 10 March 1992, A1 and A8.
- Scott, Andrew M. The Revolution in Statecraft. Durham: Duke University Press, 1982.
- Scott, James C. "Patron - Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia." The American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972): 91 - 113.
- Shenon, Philip. "Troops Who'll Counter Gas Attack: Ready or Not?." New York Times, 13 December 1990, A20.
- Slocombe, Walter. "The Countervailing Strategy." International Security 5 (Spring 1981): 18 - 27.
- Snyder, Glenn H. Deterrence by Denial and Punishment. Research Monograph No. 1. Princeton: Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1958.
- _____. "The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror," in Paul Seabury, ed. The Balance of Power. San Francisco: Chandler, 1965.
- Spector, Leonard S. "India-Pakistan War: It Could be Nuclear." New York Times, 7 June 1990, A23.
- Spector, Leonard S. with Jacqueline Smith. Nuclear Ambitions: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1989-1990. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Steinbruner, John D. "Nuclear Decapitation." Foreign Policy 45 (Winter 1981-82): 16 - 28.
- Stepan, Alfred. "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, ed. Authoritarian Brazil Origins Policies and Future. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.
- Strategic Defense Initiative Organization. 1991 Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, May 1991.
- Strategic Survey 1990 - 1991. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991.
- Tagliabue, John. "Iraqi Weapons had Chemical Warheads." New York Times, 12 November 1991, A3.

- Talbott, Strobe. "Post-Victory Blues." Foreign Affairs 71 (No. 1 1992): 53 - 69.
- Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960.
- Tetlock, Philip E. "Testing Deterrence Theory: Some Conceptual and Methodological Issues." Journal of Social Issues 43 (No. 4 1987): 85 - 91.
- "Text of Bush's Television Message to Iraqi People." New York Times, 17 September 1990, A10.
- "Text of Letter From Bush to Hussein." New York Times, 13 January 1990, 19.
- Thies, Wallace J. When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict 1964 - 1968. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.
- Thomas, Caroline. In Search of Security, The Third World in International Relations. Boulder: Lynne Runner Publishers, 1987.
- Thompson, William R. "Regime Vulnerability and the Military Coup." Comparative Politics 7 (July 1975): 459 - 487.
- Trainor, Bernard E. "Gaps in Vital Intelligence Hampered U.S. Troops." New York Times, 21 December 1989, A21.
- _____. "Hundreds of Tips but Still No Noriega." New York Times, 23 December 1989, 113.
- "Transcript of President's Address to Joint Session of Congress." New York Times, 12 September 1990, A20.
- "Transcript of President's Address to U. N. General Assembly." New York Times, 2 October 1990, A12.
- "Transcript of President's State of the Union Address to Joint Session of Congress." New York Times, 24 January 1980, A12.
- Tsipis, Kosta. "Offshore Threat - Cruise Missiles." New York Times, 1 April 1992, A21.
- Tyler, Patrick E. "Pentagon Said to Authorize U.S. Use of Nonlethal Gas." New York Times, 26 January 1991, 17.
- _____. "Who's Talking Tough? Why Saddam Hussein." New York Times, 24 October 1991, A4.
- _____. "Iraqi Oil Minister Rejects U. N. Plan." New York Times, 25 October 1991, A4.
- _____. "U.S. Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop." New York Times, 8 March 1992, A14.
- _____. "Hounding Hussein." New York Times, 20 March 1992, A6.

- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Department of Defense. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1978 Part 2. 95th Cong., 1st sess., 1977.
- _____. Office of Technology Assessment. The Effects of Nuclear War. Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1984.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Nuclear War Strategy. 96th Cong., 2d sess., 16 September 1985.
- _____. House. Committee on Armed Services. Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 4-6, 12-14, 17, 19-20 December 1990.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 11, 13 September, 27-30 November, 3 December 1990.
- _____. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, Part I. 101st Cong., 2d sess., 4-5 December 1990.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1969 - 73 Defense Program and 1969 Defense Budget. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968.
- _____. Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget, FY 1982 Authorization Request and FY 1981 - 1985 Defense Programs (January 29, 1980). Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1980.
- _____. Report of The Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress February 1992. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992.
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European War, Over-all Report. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945.
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey, European War, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.
- United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Pacific War, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1947.
- U.S. News and World Report. Triumph Without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War. New York: Times Books, 1992.
- Van Evera, Stephen. "Primed for Peace: Europe After the Cold War." International Security 15 (Winter 1990/91): 7 - 57.
- Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979.

- _____. "A Strategy for the Rapid Deployment Force." International Security 5 (Spring 1981): 49 - 73.
- _____. The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better. Adelphi Paper No. 171. London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981.
- Wohlstetter, Albert. "Bishops, Statesmen, and Other Strategists on the Bombing of Innocents." Commentary 75 (June 1983): 15 - 35.
- Wohlstetter, Albert and Richard Brody. "Continuing Control as a Requirement for Deterring," in Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, ed. Managing Nuclear Options. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987.
- Wolf-Phillips, Leslie. "Why 'Third World'?": Origin Definition and Usage." Third World Quarterly 9 (October 1987): 1311 - 1327.
- Wiggins, W. Howard. The Ruler's Imperative. New York: Colombia University Press, 1969.
- Wright, Claudia. "Libya and the West: Headlong into Confrontation?" International Affairs 58 (Winter 1981/1982): 13 - 41.
- X [George F. Kennan]. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs 25 (July 1947): 566 - 582.
- Zilian, Jr., Frederick. "The U.S. Raid on Libya - and NATO." Orbis 30 (Fall 1986): 499 - 524.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

	No. Copies
1. Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, VA 22304-6145	2
2. Library, Code 52 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5100	2
3. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations OP-65, PNT Room 4D562 Washington, D. C. 20350 ATTN: Dr. Michael Altfeld	1
4. CINCSTRATCOM Staff Offutt Air Force Base, NE 68113-5001 ATTN: RADM Ralph Tindal	1
5. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations OP-74, PNT Room 5E613 Washington, D. C. 20350 ATTN: CAPT A.F. Richardson	1
6. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations OP-607, PNT Room 4D563 Washington, D. C. 20350 ATTN: LCDR Shannon Hurley	1
7. Office of the Chief on Naval Operations OP-605, PNT Room 4E514 Washington, D. C. 20350 ATTN: CAPT Patrick Curry	1
8. Navy Support Component Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff Offutt AFB, NE 68113-5001 ATTN: VADM Michael Colley	1
9. Office of Secretary of Defense Strategy and Resources, PNT Room 4E829 Washington, D. C. 20301 ATTN: CAPT Larry Seaquist	1

	No. Copies
10. Office of Secretary of Defense Strategy and Resources OUSD, PNT Room 4B926 Washington, D. C. 20301 ATTN: Mr. Paul Kozemchak	1
11. Office of Secretary of Defense Office of Net Assessment, PNT Room 3A930 Washington, D. C. 20301 ATTN: LTC Andrew Krepinevich, USA	1
12. Joint Staff (J-3/STOD) PNT Room 2C865 Washington, D. C. 20301	1
13. Joint Staff (J-5) ADDS&P, PNT Room 2E912 Washington, D. C. 20318-5106 ATTN: CAPT Farmer	1
14. Naval Surface Weapons Center Box 357 Dahlgren, VA 22448-5000 ATTN: CAPT Tolhurst	1
15. Defense Nuclear Agency Washington, D. C. 20305 ATTN: LCDR Edward Smith	1
16. Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau Chairman, National Security Affairs (Code NS/Bn) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
17. Professor James J. Wirtz (Code NS/Wz) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
18. Professor David Winterford (Code NS/Wb) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
19. Professor David Yost (Code NS/Yo) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
20. Professor Paul Stockton (Code NS/St) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1

	No. Copies
21. Professor James Tritten (Code NS/Tr) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
22. CDR R. Mitchell Brown III, USN Chair of Strategic Planning (Code NS/Br) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
23. LT David J. Gellene, USN 17 Woodstock Drive Wayne, NJ 07470	1
24. Naval War College Center for Naval Warfare Studies Newport, RI 02841 ATTN: Dr. Donald C. Daniel	1
25. Joint Staff (J-5) Nuc/Chem, PNT Room 2D93S Washington, D. C. 2031S-5106 ATTN: CAPT Boyer	1
26. MATRA Strategy and International Development Corporate Executive Office 4, rue de Presbourg 75116 Paris, France ATTN: Jean-Louis Gergorin	1
27. Russell G. Thomas USMCA - B CPD Unit #26704, P. O. Box 330 APO, AE 09235	1

Thesis

G259575 Geliene

c.1 Deterring nuclear-armed
Third World dictators.

DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY



3 2768 00033296 9